home        author        address        articles        books        contact               


Glasnost in the Snare of Foreign Policy

and International Relations

"Glasnost! Glasnost!

It certainly has not had any tangible results...

but isn't this too much to ask?

Svistok, 1861, No. 7

It is strange that glasnost, which has penetrated nearly every sphere of public affairs, is meek in the face of Soviet foreign policy and international relations. However there is some logic to this strange phenomenon. The point is that the new political thinking articulated as a conception nearly immediately after the April 1985 Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee, has had the greatest results precisely in Soviet foreign policy, both in theory and in practice. As early as the 27th party congress, important new positions were put forth that became the guidelines for action. It is sufficient to name three of them. The first one relates to the changing accent in interpreting the principles of peaceful coexistence. In the past the approach was that these principles primarily reflected a form of class struggle. Now they are interpreted mainly as a means of human survival. This approach underlines the priority of universal problems over class issues. The second position, proceeding from the first, is concerned with removing ideology from relations between states. The third one is the conception of reasonable sufficiency, subsequently termed defense sufficiency? The essence of this position is that strategic military parity can be achieved and maintained not by a mirror reflection in the balance of military forces, but by qualitative parameters in asymmetrical quantitative indicators of military strength.  A series of military-political initiatives have backed up theoretical positions with concrete content:  comprehensive security, the doctrine of a balance of interests, the program for step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, plans for demilitarization of Asia-Pacific region, etc.  

The theory of new political thinking on the international scene brought results quickly:  activization of the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States at the summit level, the conclusion and ratification of the INF Treaty, continuation of talks on reducing strategic weapons by 50%, and generally strengthening contacts in all areas between East and West.

It appears that without any glasnost the perestroika of international affairs is in full swing at the initiative of the Soviet Union.  However this is a dangerous illusion.  While recognizing the initial impetus on the foreign policy front, we must not ignore the new realignment of forces in western

countries, their possible preparations for counter moves against new political thinking and against ending the arm's race.

In this context it is necessary to realize clearly that new political thinking is not a rigid dogma,  "is not a final and consummate doctrine.''[1]  This is only natural, since it's main virtue should be its ability to constantly reflect the changes occurring inside the country and on the international scene. Only in this case can the doctrine retain the quality of being "new."

Furthermore,  the great praise lavished on new political thinking does not yet mean that its content  is clear to or that it has been adopted by everyone.  This was pointed out by Edward Shevardnadze at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Union Republics on July 15, 1987:  "Today we hear quite often that our foreign policy is guided by the principles of new political thinking.  People say this with varying degrees of understanding, and I must say frankly that often it is with complete lack of comprehension of what the term means."[2]  To fully understand the conception of new political thinking party leaders at the highest level are calling on scholars, journalists and the public to discuss it openly.  Such appeals are contained in the theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th partly conference, in the speeches made at the conference and in the conference resolutions, including the special resolution on glasnost.

New political thinking is what gave rise to glasnost. Glasnost, in turn, through feedback, should help promote new political thinking.  The main arena for this should be the public at large, since "politics is not the elite privilege of professional politicians,"[3]  as Yevgeny Yevtrushenko once aptly commented. "Politics is the privilege of all."  However in order to exercise this privilege, everyone must  know everything.  The instrument for this knowledge should be glasnost.

A resolution on international relations passed at the party conference said the following:  "On the international scene, reflecting the positions of governments and peoples, glasnost is helping the sense of peace and cooperation, promoting the ideas of a nuclear-free and non-violent world, and the shaping of advanced aid civilized international relations.  Being a means for the conduct of an open foreign policy, it  is helping public organizations, work collectives, and the mass of working people, people in science and culture to establish international contacts, to further people-to-people diplomacy;  it helps to resolve complicated international problems at the interstate level and along intergovernmental channels."[4] 

Thus, glasnost as a goal coincides with new political thinking.  But glasnost is also a means  of involving the public at large in the realization of new political thinking.  This raises a question and

even a problem:  how can the public  at large be involved in foreign policy decisions?  This is a major problem that has to be solved, and quickly, because politics, said Lenin, begin when millions of people are participating. Without their involvement politics turns into political manipulation.

What have been some of the results of glasnost in foreign policy and international relations?

First, leaders of the party and government have made a critical evaluation of Soviet diplomacy during the period of stagnation.  This is something new, since it was always believed in the past that we can make no errors in foreign policy and that our policy is unconditionally supported by "all of progressive humankind."

In reality Soviet foreign policy has been dogmatic and inflexible.  A decision made based on circumstances in one period was maintained subsequently, even though the situation had changed,  For instance, it was one thing to increase military potential in the Far East when Sino-Soviet relations were tense, and quite another to preserve this potential after relations had improved.

Second, the Soviet Union has admitted that it allowed itself to be drawn into the arm's race, which naturally could not help but affect the country's socioeconomic development and its international standing.[5]

Third, the media has raised the question of who makes important  foreign policy decisions, including the decision to send troops to Afghanistan.  The report presented be Mikhail Gorbachev at the party conference noted:  "It sometimes happened that even decisions of vital importance were taken by a narrow circle of people without collective, comprehensive examination or analysis, and, occasionally without properly consulting friends...  Unfortunately, the cost of this to the people and the implications of this or that course of action were not  always weighed up."[6]  

Thus criticism has been leveled at foreign policy.  Efforts of another kind have also been made.  The media has presented interviews and sometimes articles by scholars and politicians from other countries who have criticized the Soviet Union and our foreign policies.  Such articles have appeared mainly in Moscow News, and to a lesser degree, in Za rubezhom (Abroad).  Such articles enable us to know exactly what our political opponents have to say and to analyze the logic of their arguments.  New international publications have appeared--Planeta and the Vestnik MID SSSR.  Some changes have occurred in old foreign policy magazines (International Affairs and World Economy and International Relations), which have more boldly removed the propagandistic tone of academic articles.

Hence commentaries on international affairs have been affected by glasnost.  But what is cause for concern? 

Criticism of Soviet foreign policy usually comes from leaders of the party and government, rarely from the directors of foreign policy institutes (George Arbatov, Yevgeny Primakov, Oleg Bogomolov).  The only journalists who have "risked" criticizing foreign policy are Alexander Bovin, Vladimir Tsvetov.

Furthermore, the criticism has been aimed at the history of foreign policy and over a brief period:  from the late 1970s until 1985.  It would appear that everything that  occurred outside that framework was blameless.

The main problem is everyone's total "unanimity" regarding both the objects of criticism and the objects outside the bounds of criticism.  That attitude essentially amounts to complete indifference to Soviet foreign policy, which is evidenced by the absence of any discussion.  The official line is considered the only correct one, and any decision made "at the top" is the only reasonable one.  Perhaps all these decisions are the best especially since the results are positive.  Nevertheless... Could there have only been one option in adopting all the measures taken by the USSR before the late 1970s and since1985? After all, there are always various ways to approach a problem, some more effective than others.  But different  options only arise out of discussion, which has so far been lacking.  In this respect academician Primakov was absolutely right when he noted at the party conference that "the logical extension of such discussions the next step, should be to determine different alternatives.  The possibility of choosing from many options is one of the most important indicators of rejecting command administrative methods."[7]

So why aren't these discussions taking place?

One reason has already been suggested:  some successes in the area of foreign policy seemingly make discussions unnecessary, the situation appears to be all right as it is. However in domestic affairs, where the situation is not all right,  passions are high.  It is indicative that at the party conference,  where so many problems were debated hotly, the problem of Soviet foreign policy was raised only by Ambassador Yuri Kvitsinsky and bypassed in the remarks made by the directors at the Institute of USA and Canada and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

Another reason is that scholars of international affairs are accustomed to reiterate official documents, are not used to independent analysis, which is facilitated by the fact that the vast majority of them (with the exception of five or six people) do not know the theory of international relations.  This is why the authors of new political thinking were not scholars but decision-makers.  Journalists writing on international affairs (with the exception of two or three) are even more constrained, since their function has always been propaganda, not the analysis of an official line.

The main reason, however, is that the Soviet public has essentially been divorced from the decision-making process, and thus a tradition of discussing decisions never developed.  The public at large is used to foreign policy being decided somewhere at the top, in the Foreign Ministry and the Central Committee. Therefore people learn about Soviet foreign policy initiatives or actions unexpectedly, the same time as the world public.  The only right that the public has is to "wholeheartedly approve" any step taken be its government.

That is how it has been and continues to be.  Glasnost is supposed to overturn this system.  In order for the public at large to participate in all stages of foreign policy decision- making, it is necessary to implement the resolutions of the 19th partly conference. 

One of the resolutions says that in all stages of their activities government bodies should take into account public opinion, encourage publish discussions of the issues.  The first condition is that public opinion polls be taken on international affairs.  For instance.  When the Japanese government comes out with demands for the Soviet Union "to return its northern territories" it often refers to public opinion in Japan.

Why not conduct such opinion polls in the Soviet Union regarding these territories?  Otherwise we appear in an unfavorable light, because the Japanese government is acting in the name of the people, but in whose name is the Soviet government acting in this case?  In the name of the Foreign Ministry?

Realization of the second condition is related to the foreign policy activity of the broad public in the media, and also the organization of referendums, especially about the adoption of extremely important foreign policy decisions affecting the fate of the whole nation.

However referendums are a rare form of involving the people in politics.  Therefore it is important to devise a mechanism for the continual, daily participation of the broad public, not only in the formation of the state's foreign policy line, but also in the decision-making process.  In socialist countries the decisive voice in adopting decisions belongs to the governing parties through the party's Central Committee and, more precisely, through the party's top leadership.  True, some believe that the Foreign Ministry is a more important link in this mechanism.  In a discussion published  in the Literaturnaya gazeta, academician Bogomolov said that "the Foreign Ministry still has a monopoly on expressing opinions and outlining approaches."[8]  The head of the department on evaluating and planning in the Foreign Ministry, Lev Mendelevich disagreed, arguing that the Foreign Ministry is joined in this process by corresponding departments in the Central Committee, the MiIitary of Defense and some other organizations.[9]   Indeed, in preparing decisions, in proposing initiatives, any of the aforementioned organizations can be involved, including research institutes, such as the Institute of USA and Canada, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, the Far East Institute.  The final decision, however, still rests with the Central Committee, which this is only natural, since the actual adoption of decisions cannot be dispersed among numerous actors.  Approximately the same system of decision-making exists in the West, although structurally there are different links in the mechanism.  In Japan, for one, the structure has three links:  monopolies-- party--government.

When we talk about the role of the broad public in shaping foreign policy, we should be looking at the need to increase their influence on decision-making.  In this respect academician Bogomolov is absolutely right when he says that "the broad public is not involved in examining foreign policy issues, and these issues are not seriously discussed even in the commissions of the Supreme Soviet."[10]

The structural reform of the Supreme Soviet, as stipulated at the 19th party conference, should ensure the participation of the broad public in decision-making through their representatives, including in the area of foreign policy.  This reform would entail creating permanent commissions and committees, one of which should be a committee on foreign policy and international relations. In his report Gorbachev proposed this innovation:  "It would be advisable to expand the practice of open hearings in the commissions and committees to set up special groups of deputies to study questions of acute public interest.''[11]   Such hearings would be fruitful if the participants are not only representatives of the broad public and academics, but also foreign scholars and politicians.  This has been done in the United States, for instance, where Soviet journalists, academics and officials, including Lev Mendelevich, have participated in congressional debates.  Open discussion is glasnost, a basic element of democracy.

It is not really so difficult to revise the mechanism, to create the conditions for discussion.  This can be done overnight.  What is much more complicated is for the participants to have the  necessary skills for debate, adequate political development and knowledge about all the nuances of international affairs.  This is all the more difficult when it comes to involving the broad public in politics.

It is crucial to inform the public about many aspects of international affairs.  The party's recognition of this fact is clearly stated in the party conference resolution on glasnost: "As it  expands glasnost the party follows Lenin's  thought that the masses  should know everything (emphasis -- A. A.), that they should have an opportunity to judge, and to be aware of what they are accepting."[12]

Some advances, as was already mentioned, have already been made in the area of international affairs.  But clearly not enough.  Concern over this situation apparently compelled the General Secretary to stress in his report the idea that "the quality of information on international affairs must be drastically improved."[13]  Naturally the question arises, what is meant by "the quality of information?"

First of all, information on international affairs continues to be one-sided, which means it is untrue.  Here are some examples:

Since 1975 seven major capitalist countries have been holding regular summits where they discuss the "critical" economic and political problems of the participating states. Information about these summits in the mass media and in academic journals is presented in a clearly negative light, and the general conclusions are usually that the participants did not agree on anything and that their differences were even aggravated.  Of course there are contradictions between these countries and they are sometimes sharp.  However many controversial issues are resolved at these meetings.  For instance, at the recent summit in Ottawa (June 1988) the leaders of the United States and Japan agreed to remove barriers against US agricultural produce on the Japanese market.  Furthermore, the participants at these summits agree on the general line of the leading Western nations with regard to the socialist countries, and chart concrete measures to solve one or another international problem.  In other words, the summit meetings, despite their inadequacies, have become an effective mechanism for eliminating, either partially or totally, tension in their relations. This aspect is essentially ignored by the mass media.

Our information about the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is also incomplete. Sine 1982 when Sino-Soviet relations began improving, the mass media in the USSR has been focusing on Chinese policies toward the Soviet Union, which is understandable. At the same time nothing is said about the fact that China's relations with the capitalist countries have by no means decreased.  On the contrary, its ties with Western countries are growing, and not only in trade and economic matters, but also in military and political affairs. These areas are not covered in the mass media, which forms among the public a distorted notion about China's foreign policies in general.

One-sided information is also presented about international public opinion regarding Soviet foreign policies. The publications of positive statements do not reflect the reality, because there are no less negative commentaries in the West. Otherwise how can we explain why dozens and hundreds of Soviet initiatives are not put into action. This is not dealt with in the mass media or in academic publications. It is simply not analyzed. Perhaps a year after a proposal is made we should carefully and critically analyze why it has not been accepted? Such an analysis might gradually force us to think more about the "quality" of our initiatives, not their quantity.

Let us take a look at our main foreign policy initiative -- new political thinking. Eduard Shevardnadze said at the above mentioned conference of foreign ministries that although not

everything about such thinking is clear, we support it entirely.

I am not sure this is so, but let us assume it is.  However the representatives of some communist parties do not completely agree with the idea of new political thinking, for one, with the idea that global interests take a priority over the class struggle. For instance, a representative of the Communist Party of Ecuador, Jose Regato, writing in The World Marxist Review, says that "in the Third World, where every year hunger and diseases kill as many people as would a dozen nuclear bombs, the very choice between a nuclear disaster and the tragedy of day-to-day existence is regarded as absurd."[14]  Similar statements have been made by representatives of the Communist Party of El Salvador, Jaime Barrios, the Senegal Party of Independence and Labour, Semou Pathe Gueye, the Communist Party of the Sudan, Ahmed El Tayeb, the Communist Party of Great Britain, Bert Ramelson, etc. The latter, incidentally, says that "the impression is that for the sake of new thinking, we should renounce the class struggle."[15] Such comments were made during a discussion held by The World Marxist Review.  However these discussions have been inadequate among Soviet scholars and politicians, not to mention the public at large.  But they are necessary in order to eliminate "simple improvisation" within the framework of one official opinion intended to give the appearance of discussion.

Doesn't the conception of defense sufficiency, that has again been approved by "everyone," require discussion?  The idea itself is fine.  However some related problems must be discussed publicly.  For instance, how does the conception relate to strategic equilibrium?  Judging by official documents and opinions, this parity should be brought to the point of defense sufficiency on a mutual basis.  But what if the United States does not support the conception of defense sufficiency?  Can we, without the United States, on a unilateral basis, realize the idea of defense sufficiency or, in other words, lower the military potential?  Some say this is impossible;  reciprocity is necessary.[16]   But is it necessary?  Mendelevich notes: "What is defense sufficiency in nuclear conditions?  It is the maintenance, under any circumstances, of second strike capability.  In this case nuclear war is impossible, which is what Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan have said."[17]   This is absolutely right.  But doesn't the Soviet Union, by unilateral reduction within the framework of defense sufficiency, maintain second strike capability?  As is stated by the authors of a highly publicized monograph edited by academicians Yevgeny Velikhov, Renald Sagdeev and Doctor Andrei Kokoshin, the effectiveness of unacceptable damage, "measured as the ratio of the number of warheads that reach their destinations to their initial number, can be as low as one percent or even less."[18]   In other words, even if strategical arsenals are cut in half, the  possibility will still remain for a retaliatory nuclear strike with unacceptable destruction, that is, strategic equilibrium.

The aforementioned arguments are by far not the only correct ones.  I simply used them to show that this subject requires comprehensive discussion, which is absent in the Soviet media. This is not because the idea has come from above and no one, or almost no one, wants to argue against it or even examine it. Discussions would inform the public about the problem and would encourage independent thinking on international affairs and Soviet foreign policy.

This would also be facilitated by another form of obtaining information unrelated to the media--citizen diplomacy, which is noted in the resolution on glasnost.  We must honestly admit that ordinary people are hardly involved in citizen diplomacy;  the majority are personalities in culture and science, activists in the Soviet Peace Committee, Friendship Society, etc.  Widescale international communication is hindered, of course, by numerous objective difficulties that must be overcome, primarily in favor of the broad circles of the socially active population, and not representatives of bureaucratic official and official activists. The same people are seen over and over in the ranks of citizen diplomacy, individuals who have made a career of "fighting for peace."  If we want to involve the masses in foreign policy, they have to regularly meet with the people of other countries and with the countries themselves in order to see and evaluate events in the world on their own.

Let us return to information and glasnost from another point of view, the subjects that remain closed or almost closed in the Soviet press.  Sometimes they are referred to as "delicate" subjects.

 It has been asserted for a long time that the balance of forces in the world is changing in favor of socialism, peace and progress.  Without getting into a complicated political discussion of categories of "forces," which many theoreticians believe cannot be determined, let us focus on the foundation of a force, which is economic potential.  In other words, in order to analyze the very concept of the "balance of forces," it is necessary to at least have some information about the balance of economic potentials or, which is one and the same, a state's might.  The need for such information is so great that in the West a whole scientific field has developed--comparative statistics.  Quite often Soviet scholars use western sources to determine the balance of power among the "three centers of imperialism":  the United Scathes, Common Market and Japan.  But how can the economic potentials of capitalism and socialism be compared when the Soviet Union lacks its own statistical data. In view of the numerous statistical publications, this criticism might seem unfounded.  However none of these publications contain information about the rate of price rises in the Soviet Union or any other socialist country, the percentage of the national revenues used to cover losses, the percentage of services in the Gross National Product, the amount of the foreign debt, gold and foreign currency reserves, military aid to the Soviet Union's allies, economic assistance to the developing countries, comparative data on living standards, etc., not to mention information about the budgets of ministries and other government offices.  Why is it that Soviet researchers know the budgets of the United State's National Space Agency and the Japan's National Space Development Agency, but does not know the cost of Soviet space programs?  The answers, of course, are clear:  for the command economy of the Stalinist-Brezhnev type such information was too risky.  But now, in the era of glasnost, what is keeping such data from being published?  Some publications have gradually begun to provide some comparative data for the Soviet Union and United States.  But these are only small steps that must become more bold and extensive.  Also relevant is the problem of revealing military information that is still classified.  Readers abroad, at best, can only laugh at data about our military potential from western sources.  At worst, they may be skeptical.  The political leadership of the Soviet Union has decided in the next two or three years to provide complete data on our defense budget.  But is that enough?  Why do western countries "expose" themselves by publishing not only their troop budgets, but also their entire programs for modernizing armed forces, indicating concrete types of weapons?  Why is a public discussion in full swing in Japan on its military program for 1991-1995 when in the Soviet Union "it  isn't customary" to publish future military programs?  How can we expect trust from the countries to whom we are proposing mutual disarmament?  Secrecy about such information enables the Soviet Union's opponents to exaggerate the country's military potential and claim that the Soviet "threat" is growing.

Here I would like to say a few words about the militarization of space.  The Soviet Union is absolutely against the Strategic Defense Initiative, and for good reason.  In response to our criticism, however, US officials have frequently pointed out that the Soviet Union is working on a similar program.  This has never been denied in the Soviet press.  Simple logic tells us that the Soviet Union must be ready to respond to the West's military space program, so why not state this emphatically and describe it in detail?  The Soviet population has just as much right as the people in Western countries to know about spending on military research and development in the USSR, especially since the Soviet Union's adversaries obtain this information from secret sources.

Now about the semi-closed subjects.

An important one is the coverage and analysis of the political and economic situation in socialist countries, and their relations.  Due to the glowing information about our friendly allies the Soviet public has often been confounded when it suddenly learned of various political-economic cataclysms in one or another socialist country.

Another closed subject is the discussion of different models of socialism, since it has been felt that only one model existed -- the Soviet model.  The rest are "deviations" from scientific socialism. Of course there are no strict models of socialism, any more than there are of capitalism. It is enough to compare the political-economic structures of Yugoslavia, the People's Republic of China, the USSR, and the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

Glasnost has begun to reveal some of the problems in our fraternal countries.  Furthermore, we are seeing some sharp contradictions within socialist societies, which, as academician Bogomolov admits, are even "turning into real crises."  Despite this, the fear of glasnost remains.  This is evident from the fact that the media has not fully presented or analyzed, for instance, the political reforms in Bulgaria, the national-state contradictions between Hungary and Rumania, not to mention an analysis of the political system in the Korean People's Democratic Republic in which power is transferred by heredity.

Glasnost also sidesteps such an extremely important subject as the contradictions within the socialist system.  It is possible that this subject has remained closed in fear of aggravating these contradictions, as was the case when tensions were high in Sino-Soviet relations.  In those days China's policies were portrayed as being extremely negative, which did more to promote confrontation than overcome it.  At the same time it would be wrong to ignore serious contradictions between socialist countries, creating the illusion of complete accord in the socialist community.  We have far to go.  An example is the tension in relations between the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, or the support by some socialist countries of the Red Khmers who are waging an armed struggle against the government of Kampuchea.  Undoubtedly, coverage in the media on this subject requires tact and skill, but it is necessary that the Soviet people have a realistic picture of the socialist world.

The only delegate at the party conference to talk about Soviet foreign policy and international relations was the Soviet Union's Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Yuri Kvitsinsky.  For one, he said that "it is no secret that socialist integration lags behind the West in terms of its pace, volume, goals and results."[19]  Actually this is a "secret," since neither the mass media nor academic literature has compared the pace of integration processes in the socialist and capitalist systems.  Consequently they have not analyzed the reasons for this gap.  Yet this subject is extremely important from the point of view of the theory of modern socialism and capitalism.

Many problems and subjects relating to international affairs have not been presented in the mass media.  Whether this situation will continue or be overcome hinges largely on the approach in general to glasnost and its interpretation.  Here is one way to interpret glasnost.  Immediately after the party conference, spokespersons for the USSR Foreign Ministry met with the employees of a Moscow factory.  One person asked:  "Much is being said today about the mistakes made in our diplomacy during the period of stagnation.  But why hasn't anyone said whether these mistakes are being made today, in the last two or three years?  Or haven't there been any?"[20]  One spokesperson replied that "such questions already show that the process of glasnost is gaining impetus.  Of course, he said, we have problems, but we cannot talk about all of them or we might hurt relations with our partners and damage our own interests."[21]

And so it appears that the questions themselves are not only evidence of glasnost, but its growing impetus.  But... the eternal "but"... it is not in our "interests" to answer them just now.

This reply is a typical example of stagnant thought--under the pretext of "national interests" an analysis is avoided of current events and mistakes.  If it is too early to talk about them now, then later it will be too late.

The questions asked by the workers brought out another problem:  they are not yet ready to analyze the mistakes and successes of Soviet diplomacy, but continue to wait for assessments from above, from the corresponding offices.  The task of glasnost in foreign policy and international relations is to ensure that every worker, every socially active individual be able to not only have his or her own opinion and answer questions on international subjects, but to also participate in the decision-making process.

Otherwise Soviet glasnost is doomed to repeat the fate of Russian glasnost in the early 1860s, about which Svistok, the supplement to the magazine Sovremennik, wrote that "ever since we have been given the opportunity to discuss various questions through so-called Russian glasnost, we have not resolved one question."[22]

Since then more issues have accumulated and they must be resolved as soon as possible.  Time is short.


Published in  Glasnost: opinions, analysis, policy. Moscow: Yuridicheskaya Literatura Publishers, 1989:  220-37. 

[1] Documents and Materials /19th All-union Conference of the CPSU/.  Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1988, p. 31.

[2] Vestnik MID SSSR, 1987, No. 4, p. 11.

[3] Literaturnaya  Gazeta, July 22, 1987, p. 14.

[4] Documents and Materials, p. 162-3.

[5] See:  Documents and Materials, p. 31.

[6]  Ibid.

[7] Pravda , July  2, 1988 .

[8]  Literaturnaya gazeta, June 29, 1988, p. 14.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Documents and Materials, p, 55.

[12] Ibid., p. 153-4.

[13] Documents and Materials, p. 37.

[14] World Marxist Review, March 1988, p. 99.

[15] Ibid., p. 112.

[16] On December 6, 1987, in Moscow News, Academician Alexander Sakharov, contrary to general opinions said it was possible and necessary in the foreseeable future for the Soviet Union to take a bold step and unilaterally reduce the term of service in the army, navy and airforce, and at the same time reduce all types of weapons.  Apparently this has been the only publication expressing this opinion.        

[17] Literaturnaya gazeta, June 29, 1988, p. 14.

[18] Weaponry in Space:  the Dilemma of Security, Mir Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p. 113.

[19] Pravda, July 3, 1988.

[20] Argumenty i fakty, No. 29,  1988, p. 5.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Svistok, Moscow, 1981, p. 242

By Rafik Aliyev (Oleg Arin)