Chapter IV. The crisis of the family in the West
The West is doomed, if only because
It no longer tells man from woman.
Oleg Arin
In my college years, when studying the above-mentioned work by Engels: “The Origin of the Family…”, I somehow had difficulty believing his criticism of the bourgeois family, his angry formulations of the type “In both cases, this marriage of convenience often enough turns into the crassest prostitution—sometimes on both sides, but much more generally on the part of the wife.” (79) It seemed to me back then that even if Engels is correct, it all applied to the “uncivilized” 19th century. I thought that in the advanced stage of capitalism, especially since the second half of the 20th century, much has changed for the better, including the sphere of family relations.
Was I ever wrong. It turns out that Engels’ evaluations apply not just to a certain historical period; they are correct in principle regarding the essence of the bourgeois family. This is evident not only from the example of today’s uncivilized capitalist Russia, but also from the examples of “civilized” capitalism in the USA, Western Europe and even Japan.
Admittedly, the crisis of the family has been discussed and described in the West for over two centuries now. The more convincing job here was done not in scientific papers, but in fiction; it suffices to recall Balzac, Dickens, Dreiser, and other outstanding writers. Still, they started sounding the alarm for real only in the late 20th – early 21st centuries – not so much writers this time as sociologists and politicians. They have good cause: the crisis of family has acquired a scale that threatens the existence of the very institution of marriage as one of the main structural pillars of the state, as illustrated obviously by statistical data.
However, prior to presenting these data, two remarks are in order. Firstly, the statistical average data are derived in different countries and international organizations following different methods. For example, one of American statistical reference books takes the age interval between 15 and 64 years for calculating the table of marriage and divorce rates, while the European statistical reference book indicates no “age interval.” On account of this, a difference in rates is possible (the dynamics are almost identical, nonetheless).
Secondly, the statistics don’t reflect the difference between the dynamics of processes in families belonging to different classes of society. The differences are actually very material if one compares the average working-class family and the average upper-class family in a bourgeois society, if only because the latter’s incomes exceed the formers’ incomes by hundreds of times. However, even when speaking of the so-called middle class, there is a big difference between its upper and lower strata across all parameters of family life. Perhaps such detailed analysis is actually performed in special literature, but its results are not included in statistical reference books. This is only natural: the publishers don’t want to agitate society with figures that show a growing gap between the upper and the lower strata. One has to keep in mind that the statistic data presented below are averages that apply to the “average” family.
On Love, Family, and the State
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)