Denis Wrong
Denis Wrong, another American sociologist, wrote a special book titled Power in which he notes, same as everyone else, the mystery of this term, the multitude of its formulations, and analyzes this phenomenon within the framework of the paradigm generally accepted among sociologists. He agrees with Bertrand Russell’s formulation of power and offers his own, somewhat more exact variant of the definition. It goes like this: “Power is the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others.”[31] Wrong writes that a number of other sociologists agree with this formulation of Russell’s definition. He then analyzes in detail five problems which arise in the detailed exposition of this definition: the directedness of power; its effectiveness (in the sense of inevitability of consequences); its latency (its concealed state); asymmetry or balance in relations of power; and, finally, the nature of the consequences produced by power. He practically reproduces Robert Bierstedt’s arguments, for example those concerning “latency” of power, emphasizing only that he views power of such in a broader way than his predecessors.[32]
Wrong does, however, have some judgments of his own about asymmetry and balance of powers. He points out that power as such can be manifested only in the interaction of two actors. This statement is justified when speaking about society. On the ontological level, though, an explanation would be in order of why two actors are drawn into “interaction.” (I had to explain this in my book Dialectics of Force.) However, as I noted already, political scientists and sociologists have no interest in the ontology of power. In order for such interaction to take place in society, an asymmetry of powers is necessary, of course. Here Wrong touches on the old debates about the term “balance of powers” supposedly having no meaning, since “When everyone is equal there is no politics, for politics involves subordinates and superiors.” Or, as yet another sociologist put it, “Interdependence and mutual influence of equal strength indicate lack of power.” (р. 10) Behind all this stands the debate on the topic of: how one can evaluate power in a situation of balance or equality of powers without their interaction. “Reciprocal action” is a term from the international affairs’ lexicon; “peace-loving” politicians insist on it as they absolutely do not understand the absurdity of their pronouncements.
Unlike Bierstedt, Wrong sees force, manipulation and convictions merely as forms of power. His logic about these things is the same in each case, so it suffices to present here his judgment on force. “Force involves treating a human subject as if he were no more than a physical object, or at most a biological organism vulnerable to pain and the impairment of its life-processes. The ultimate form of force is violence.” (р.24) Nonviolence, however, is also a form of power, since “People use their own bodies as physical objects to prevent or restrict actions by others rather than acting directly on the bodies of others.” (ibid.) This judgment is supported by examples of nonviolent actions in the spirit of Mahatma Gandhi.
Wrong builds a “tree” of power which consists of different forms - in the following sequence. Power–influence bifurcates into “unintended and intended influence.” After that, four branches go their separate ways; one is force (physical and psychic), and the physical one divides in turn into violence and nonviolence; the second is manipulation; the third is persuasion; the fourth is authority, which splits into five kinds of “sub-authority”: personal, competent, legitimate, induced, and coercive. (ibid.)
He goes on to examine all these topics (democracy, state, society, etc.) over many pages in the spirit of ordinary sociology. These are all important topics, but they are not related to the current work. As for the essence of power, Wrong never explained why it is the capacity of some people to make others do something against their will. What gives power this capacity? It is unclear.