Martin Wight
The Englishman Martin Wight analyzes the topic of power in the key that is classical for all scholars of international affairs: he does not delve into the ontology of the term and analyzes the manifestations of power in the sphere of politics. His main concern is to sort out the different schools of thought, or, more exactly, to identify these schools depending on their interpretation of the term “power.” The only reason why I dwell on M. Wight’s views is that he examines the indicated term through the prism of “revolutionism” – something I met for the first time. First, however, a few words about two schools – the Rationalist one and the Realist one – in Wight’s interpretation.
In his opinion, the Rationalists examined not power as such, but rather something that is transformed into authority. Power was examined in this key by Aristotle, for example, and much later by Grotius. The general idea is that power-authority rests on a “natural law” which is in a way inherent originally to the consciousness of man. To them, the art of ruling and implementing policies is the means to achieve objectives which are security and relative freedom of the rational man.[25]
The Realists, on the other hand - Machiavelli foremost among them - believed that it is precisely the power-authority of the state that is the objective, i.e. political power is by itself a natural and sufficient goal. According to Machiavelli, for example, the individual is the raw material from which the ruler draws state power. These ideas whose essence boils down ultimately to “politics for the sake of politics” were developed by Baudin, F. Bacon and, of course, by Hobbes (the state as Leviathan). They were also picked up by the school of political realism which transferred all this reasoning into the sphere of international relations. To the Realists, the state is important from the perspective of its actions in the world arena. As E. H. Carr put it: “Any international moral order must rest on some hegemony of power.” The doctrine which regards the state as power-authority and accords priority to foreign policy led to the political-power theory, according to which history appears as a history of conflicts and changes of power-authority rather than a history of classes. In Wight’s opinion, this position was held in principle by G. Treitschke, O. Spengler and A. Toynbee. As Spengler wrote, “Domestic politics exist simply in order that foreign politics may be possible.” (quoted from: Wight, р. 105)
And here is how “revolutionist” views are interpreted. Unlike the Realists who made the emphasis on existing realities rather than some ideas, and unlike the Rationalists who actually accorded the greatest importance to moral laws which appeared to be higher than reality, the Revolutionists rejected bourgeois cynical sentimentalities and proceeded from the already-mentioned Marx’ 13th thesis on Feuerbach. It is no good to talk about duty, consciousness or other idealist abstractions. One should simply know: Man’s cause is to help bring about the immutable goal of history, which is to radically reconstruct the international community by revolutionary means, and this means trading “the weapon of criticism for criticism by weapons.” As Stalin said: “The Bolsheviks were not mere pacifists who sighed for peace, as the majority of the Left Social Democrats did. The Bolsheviks advocated an active revolutionary struggle of peace, to the point of overthrowing the rule of the bellicose imperialist bourgeoisie.” (quoted from: Wight, р. 106.)
In Wight’s opinion, the difference between the Rationalist and the Realist schools lies in the interpretation of three overlapping words: power; authority, and force, which are used in their theories.
Power (the Realists’ conception) is the ability of a political organization to ensure accord, the state’s ability to implement its will both within and outside the country.
Authority (the Rationalists’ conception) is power ensured through harmony with moral principles; it is the possibility for the state to ensure accord and coordination based on freedom both within and outside the country.
Force (the Revolutionists’ conception) is the ability to overthrow the power-authority, to destroy the existing political organizations to realize the necessary transformations.
To Lenin, Wight thinks, ‘force’ was the key word; he always used it in the context of liberating something. Marx and Engels wrote and talked of the same (force is the midwife of history, etc.) Lenin wrote that the grand issues in the life of states were always resolved only by force, since, as he thought, the reactionary classes are usually the first to resort to violence, to civil war; “they are the first ‘to place the bayonet on the agenda’, as Russian autocracy does… great historical questions can be solved only by violence.” (р. 107)
Departing from the topic, I note that the words quoted above are perfectly justified if one proceeds from the traditional understanding of the word “force.” The truth of these words said nearly a hundred years ago is constantly being confirmed by modern history.
Wight also directs attention to the phenomenon of “inverted Revolutionism.” He understands this term to mean anarchism which rejects power in general (including, apparently, power as the state). In Wight’s opinion, this Revolutionism turned upside down has two sources: the first is Indian philosophy, of which the phenomenon of Gandhi may serve as an example; the second is Anglo-Saxon Christianity as represented by the Quakers. It was represented most distinctly, however, in the theory of Tolstoy who drew it from Christian tradition and turned it into a Christian Revolutionism of sorts. The arguments here rest in the fact that the early Christian churches held to a nonpolitical or even anti-political way of thinking, which manifested itself in a militant form. It suffices to remember the epistles of St. Paul which are full of militant metaphors resembling the works of Marx. The roots are in this early Christianity which initially was of a purely spiritual character as “Spiritual Revolutionism” and subsequently turned into political Revolutionism. However, Wight says, after Christianity became established as the official religion in the 4th century, it gradually changed its attitude toward authority. Moreover, Christianity itself joined the authority, and in the doctrinal sense it turned into Rationalism. Wight’s general conclusion: “Rationalism equals politics for the sake of the good life; Realism equals politics for politics’ sake; Revolutionism equals politics for the sake of the doctrine.” (р. 110)
All this may be of interest, of course, yet the essence aspect of power was never uncovered. In general one gets the impression that theorists of international relations don’t even understand how to penetrate into the depth of this word, how to “merge with it.” Having browsed through the books on the theory of international relations that were published in this century, the 21st, I found nothing new: the same beating of the air based on old paradigms. As an example I will quote the views of one more Englishman – a Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics.
Chris Brown believes that: “Power is an attribute – it is something that people or groups or states possess or have access to, have at hand to deploy (the “something,” apparently. – A.B.) in the world. Power is a relationship – it is the ability that people or groups or states have to exercise influence on others, to get their way in the world. … A third dimension of power in which it is seen as a property of a structure is less easily incorporated into realist accounts of the world, at least insofar as these accounts rely on the notion that power can only be exercised by an actor or agent.”[26]
Professor Brown evidently doesn’t understand that if power is defined through “something,” then this “something” must be defined. “Something,” after all, is the only thing that can hatch out of “something.”
One could, of course, manage without using the word “power.” It has become, however, so habitual, so integral a part of the language that no decrees or laws can evict this term from scientific usage. The word is not the main thing, after all. Whichever symbols are used to designate the phenomena called power and might, it is important to understand what hides behind them, what load of meaning they carry – i.e. give them definitions. Scholars of international affairs failed to do this.
Let us now address philosophers who are bound by duty to “dig” deeper than scholars of international affairs. For example, let us take a look at one of the most famous ones in the 20th century – Bertrand Russell, who wrote a special book on the topic titled “Power.”[27] He proclaims right from the start that lust for power, desire of power permeate the entire history of mankind; they are among man’s most passionate motives. In general: “The fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics.” (p. 4) And a little later: “The laws of social dynamics are laws which can only be stated in terms of power.” (ibid.) And here is his definition: “Power may be defined as the production of intended effects.” (p. 23) He clarifies: “A has more power that B, if A achieves many intended effects and B only a few.” (ibid.) This is the general formula which became classical in this expression: power is an impact which influences the behavior of the subject-object in accordance with the interests of the subject of power.
In this definition everything remains unclear: why does the subject of power have the power to make the subject-object submit – in other words, where does power derive its power, what does it consist in? Generally speaking, Russell’s approach in his reasoning about power was that of a sociologist rather than a philosopher, since he was practically analyzing the manifestations of power in the economy, in politics, etc. In this respect his compatriot Spencer was deeper, since he conducted his search for power in the ontological depths.