Political realists and neo-realists
The problem of force was researched for the most part by political scientists and scholars of international affairs from the school of “political realism”; Hans J. Morgenthau is rightly believed to be the founder of this school. I was obliged in my time to subject this school’s conception of force to critical analysis in a number of works and show that it has no scientific foundation, since it gave no answers to any of the questions which its authors themselves posed.[15] I have to admit that in that time (the 1980s) I myself had no ontological notion of force; I was reflecting within the framework of the traditional paradigm which was conceptually incorrect. The only thing I could do was to separate the concept “force” from the concept “might,” unlike the other researchers of force; this was clearly not enough.
To make it clear to the reader what all the fuss is about, I have to give the floor to the neo-realists. In their notions, power is the key term of the theory of international relations; several generations of theorists have been conducting debates around this term, yet still haven’t managed to define what it is. This is admitted by those prominent scholars of international affairs, the well-known authors of the textbook National Security of the USA - A. Jordan, W. Taylor, and M. Mazzar (henceforth referred to as JTM). They also claim that the method for calculating power is also absent. This is only natural: if there is no definition of power, there is nothing to calculate.
JTM believe that the enigma of power is that “power is dynamic.” They write: “In the simplest terms, it is the ability to get others to do something they would not do of their own volition.” The authors clarify that the ability to coerce does not necessarily only mean “physical violence upon an adversary,” though that is an important argument of power. Other aspects of power are listed as “bargaining ability” and “persuasion, based on common interests and values.”[16] They consider this definition of power sufficient and move on to its estimation.
They write: “Power can be viewed and appraised in several ways. Since it is based upon capabilities, power has certain objective characteristics. But it also has a highly subjective element, for the reputation for having and being willing to use power is sufficient to achieve results in many cases, without really applying it. Hobbes rightly wrote, ‘Power is what people think it is until tested.’” (Emphasis by the authors, ibid.)
At this point, JTM fall into an elementary logical contradiction. If power is an objective category, it cannot have “a highly subjective element,” because only the evaluation of power can be subjective, not power itself. The observer’s (analyst’s) goal is precisely to have his subjective evaluation coincide with the content of power. (Hegel called this the merging of object and subject.) The multiplicity of interpretations of a single phenomenon means only that the phenomenon is not perceived correctly. Having fallen at this stage into a logical and philosophical trap, JTM are subsequently unable to get out of it.
They write: “Power is also essentially relative in character, for its utility depends in part on comparing it with whatever opposes it; when this comparison is made explicit, the resulting calculus is often called net power. Further, power is highly situational; what may generate power in one set of circumstances, may not in another. Such intangibles as the political and technical skills of the key actors, national will and solidarity on the issue, the nature of the issue in question, and the purposes being sought, all condition the power a state can bring into play in a given situation.” (Emphasis by the authors, ibid.)
If it is impossible to objectively estimate power as such, then it is also impossible to estimate the opposing power, and no kind of comparison will help, because in this case two indeterminate values are being compared.
JTM are optimists, however. “If power is dynamic, subjective, relative, and situational, as well as objective in character, can it usefully be defined at all? Despite the caveats and difficulties, the answer is “yes”. Particularly if we focus on its objective characteristics (which are, more accurately, measures of ‘strength’ and may or may not yield influence, as already noted) and qualify it appropriately for time and circumstances, we can say at least a few things useful about power.” (ibid.)
They did indeed say a few things, but not about power. Like everyone before them, they confused the concepts of strength and power, and I will return to this topic in the corresponding chapter.
The authors do offer valid criticism of the views held about the category of power by Harold and Margaret Sprout, for: “They suggested a crude equation: power is equal to human resources, plus physical habitat, plus foodstuffs and raw materials, plus tools and skills, plus organization, plus morale and political behavior, plus external conditions and circumstances.” (ibid.)
Clifford German’s writings on the subject are in much the same key, while Ray Cline added “strategic purpose and national will” to those quantifiable characteristics. (10) By the way, the understanding of power by JTM themselves coincides to a large degree with Cline’s formulations.
Further, JTM attempt to define the contemporary state of national power, which has been naturally undergoing some changes. “It was not only more fragmented, but at the same time more interdependent. The fragmentation came from the demise of the major bipolar blocs of the Cold War, as well as corresponding release of previously suppressed ethnic or rather tribal nationalism in many nations across the globe.” (548) This resulted in national power becoming more diffuse, complicating the effect of one state’s influence on another. “’Soft’ forms of power, such as the ability to manipulate interdependences, become more important, as does the long-term economic strength of the nation, which is the base for both hard and soft forms of power.” (ibid.)
Please note that the authors have started using the terms power and strength as synonyms without even noticing. This is the pit which ensnared all theorists who have ever struggled to define the category of power. Approaching “power” first from one side, then another, they failed to produce a clear definition thereof. They went on to repeat the well-known banality: “Power and the will to use it become the prerequisite for success, even survival. …The purpose of power is to overcome resistance in an effort to bring about or secure a preferred order of things.” (Emphasis by the authors, 13.)
The result is this: Instead of defining power, JTM identified two of its functions (both debatable) - victory in struggle and securing of order. Power, as such, eluded them once again. In other words, the authors realize the treacherous nature of this concept, yet they fail to transcend the framework of views held by all theorists (without exception) who have struggled with this concept since the time of Hans J. Morgenthau.[17]
Researchers from other schools and other countries suffered similar failures; here are some examples. Since not one of the schools is capable of defining what power is on the conceptual level, they naturally end up with confusion when they try to determine the quantity of elements of power and their characteristics of essence. Some, like J. Scott in particular, include 12 elements in power, namely: the state’s geographic location and land area, natural resources, population (political structure, education, etc.), the readiness of offensive military force and the degree of activeness or passiveness of the defensive military force, the state’s capacity for providing assistance and for repulsing an undeclared attack, etc.[18] Others – they are in the majority – limit themselves to a smaller set of components of power. For example, Seizaburo Sato, a Japanese scholar of international affairs, names just three: military might, economic power and flexible political power.[19]
One notices right away that the elements listed differ from each other in their essence and in the character of their manifestation. What do they signify in the aggregate? Power? Might? Something else? And what is “flexible political power”?
Hitoshi Hanai, another Japanese scholar of international affairs, singles out the country’s material resources, adds to them the military potential and, using his coefficient of comparability (which is in itself highly doubtful), he ranks states “by power” which they possessed in 1967-1968 thusly: USA, USSR, China, India, Japan, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Canada, Brazil[20]. The already mentioned Cline introduces another two indicators (“national strategy” and “national will”) and by way of complex calculations offers the following picture of the “distribution of powers” in the mid-1970s: USSR – 523 units, USA – 421 units, West Germany – 168 units, Japan – 144 units, Iran – 128 units.[21]
The examples presented above show the absurdity of the methods for calculating “power” or “might” presented by scholars of international affairs; it is due to their contradictory and non-provable nature. Recognizing the vulnerability of such an approach, the French sociologist R. Aron attempted to surmount the difficulty by using a “coefficient of mobility” which “depends on many factors, but one of the most important ones is doubtlessly the nature of the domestic regime.”[22] Indeed, Aron put his finger on a very important element of power, but how does one evaluate it quantitatively?
Having met the “elusive definition of power,” some theorists propose abandoning the term altogether. For example, the above-mentioned American scholars Harold and Margaret Sprout though that “if the term ‘power’ was struck from the dictionary of world politics, this could have facilitated clearer understanding of relations between states.”[23] This is exactly what Hanai does: he ejects from his lexicon the word “power” and replaces it with the words “might” and “influence.” However, the problem is that this changes nothing, since the same elements are included in the concepts “might” and “influence” which were included in the term “power.”
The above-mentioned Seizaburo Sato, that Japanese scholar of international affairs, acts in the same key; he decided to get rid of the term “power” and replaced it with another word: “greatness.” He defines this word in the following manner: “A state’s greatness is measured by four things: well-being, military power, political ideas and the will to realize them, and culture which is directed at other people and can influence them. Japan, Sato says, has well-being and can arrive at having the cultural component, too. However, it does not have political will or military power.”[24]
This passage shows just how deeply established schemes and notions are rooted in scholars’ heads, to say nothing of politicians. Question: what does Japan need military power for, when it has managed to penetrate all corners of the Earth through the power of its Toyotas and Nissans? The military component in foreign policy is usually needed only in those cases when the state is incapable of realizing its goals through other means – economic ones, for example; Japan does have such capacity. That, however, is a different topic. Here is another view on the topic of power by a scholar of international affairs – an English one this time.