Robert Bierstedt
The American sociologist Robert Bierstedt is one of the few scientists whose book’s title is almost identical to that of my book.[12] Even though it is compiled of works written in different years, the main thing is that it contains two extremely interesting chapters dedicated to progress and to force. Let us start with the former which is titled Once More the Idea of Progress (1974).
To start with, the author reproduces the views held on the topic of progress by the English sociologist Morris Ginsberg (1889-1970) who was well known in his time. It will be useful for us, too, to become acquainted with his views, for they will enable us to evaluate the depth of understanding of this phenomenon by mid-20th-century English sociology.
In Ginsberg’s opinion, the idea of progress went through three stages. In the first stage progress was viewed as an ethical ideal toward which mankind is apparently moving. The second stage was marked by attempts to give the idea clear definitions and to find a base in either some general philosophical theory or in the biological theory of evolution. In the third stage it was realized that progress is not necessarily a constant phenomenon, that the reverse phenomenon – retrogress – also exists, and as a result the criteria of general progress remained still unclear.
Since the late 19th century the idea of progress was triumphant due to science and the evolutionary theory; however, by the middle of the 20th century the faith in progress weakened dramatically. This was due to the discovery that technical achievements, on the one hand, are not connected to morals; on the other hand, they can be destructive in nature. The theoretical underpinnings of the idea of progress are likewise imperfect, since they are based on the interpretation of the cyclical nature of history and the irrationalism of elements of human nature.
Despite such attitudes, there still remained proponents of progress in the 20th century; Ginsberg divides them into three groups: followers of Marxism; followers of a moral theory in the spirit of Hobbes; and followers of the evolutionary theory. Ginsberg lists himself with the third direction, “cleansing” it of certain vagueness and complicatedness. He proposes, for example, to distinguish evolution and development. Evolution often means well-ordered development, especially in biology when new life forms emerge from old ones in the process of differentiation. Development – the old term – is a process in which the potential becomes actual (real). Neither one is progress. So what is progress? Here is how Ginsberg answers the question that he posed himself: “Progress is development or evolution in a direction which satisfies rational criteria of value.” (quoted from: Bierstedt, р. 281) He specifies that evolution does not by itself give birth to its ethics, repeating that the general law of social development or progress hasn’t been found yet. Next Bierstedt himself enters into the reasoning.
He writes that first we need to find out whether “advance” exists in history or society. In Bierstedt’s opinion, Ginsberg provides “the rather awkward notion” – “the unification of mankind” as the trend of history in the spirit of Turgot’s ideas. Bierstadt believes that this idea was acceptable in 1935 and even in 1952 (when Ginsberg wrote his work), but supposedly not in 1974 – evidently meaning that the opposition of the capitalist and socialist systems was in effect at that time. This remark is evidence that Bierstedt is tied to the current moment, that his thinking is of applied nature, and therefore the American is not capable of theoretical generalization. It is exactly Ginsberg who is ultimately correct, though not original. To scholars of the Marxist direction, the idea about “unification of mankind” which he expressed is an axiom. It is theoretically defended, however, by some non-Marxists as well, for example the Jesuit Theillard de Chardin with his idea of the collective mind concentrated in the noosphere. Mankind, which is currently divided into states, classes and races, must necessarily unite if only for the purpose of simple survival in the face of natural earthly and cosmic challenges. It will be shown later whether this idea has anything to do with progress.
Another example of “advance” is tied to the development of knowledge. Science, in Ginsberg’s opinion, is objective (to which relativists ordinarily object). He stresses in particular that development of knowledge by itself reflects “the growing dominance of man over nature.” This thought is not new (J. Huxley expressed it more clearly), but nonetheless correct.
Ginsberg also finds progress trends in the social organizations of society, but, as Bierstedt notes, they are not without difficulties - which manifest themselves, firstly, in the emergence of law (coming to replace traditions, habits, etc.); secondly, in the unification of mankind (which was discussed above).
The second topic requires us to address the problem of civilization. In this issue Ginsberg, same as Turgot, champions the monistic interpretation of civilization, i.e. as one civilization for all of mankind, rather than a multitude of civilizations.
If a single civilization exists, does it then have a single goal? First of all Ginsberg disagrees with Whitehead and Toynbee in that he denies that religion in general and the Christian faith in particular demonstrates “an upward trend.” The answer, in his opinion, cannot be found in religion. So what is then the moral of progress? This is what, it turns out: “The case for moral rests above all on the persistence of the quest for justice in the history of mankind, spurred on by the sense of injustice.” (ibid.) Ginsberg is in agreement with the 18th-century philosophers who regarded progress as movement toward reason and justice, equality and freedom. His theory is built on premises of “the unity of the human reason and the possibility of a rational ethic,” which contradict the relativist views on knowledge and on morals.
The relativity and truth (absoluteness) of knowledge and morals is an old topic of debates which survived to our day, even though it was solved by Hegel and the Marxists. I will note here only that relativist ethics have no relation to progress, while rational ethics do. Ginsberg understood perfectly well that knowledge in itself is not a sufficient condition for achievement of progress; it only provides the possibility to move in that direction. Most importantly, “Knowledge offers no apocalyptic visions, but it can do something to help man to make his own history before the end is reached.” (ibid.)
Even though some major scientists (for example, B. Russell) were skeptical of the idea of progress as set forth by Ginsberg, it is important to emphasize that he singled out several things which had been largely forgotten by the mid-20th century. Progress is movement toward such goals as freedom, equality, justice and truth. The latter is important from the perspective of opposing the adherents of relativism in ethics (=ethical relativism). Morals, Ginsberg thought, must be built on truth, same as all other spheres of knowledge.
Bierstedt noted that the topic of progress ceased being of interest to sociologists in the 1960s. It was even removed from the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968). It remained, however, a topic in historical research. In this connection the question arises: is progress in philosophy, history, sociology, and ethics the same phenomenon, or does it have different incarnations in those areas? Manifestations can be different, sure, but can the essence be different? With this question alone, Bierstedt reveals himself to be a non-philosopher, a man far removed from science. We will become convinced of this as we analyze the course of his own reflections.
Bierstedt, like many before him, reminds again that the meaning of the concept “progress” is unclear, since it “wears many clothes.” This means that it is not yet a “concept” at all, but merely a term which it is necessary to elevate to the level of a concept, i.e. uncover the essence of the phenomenon. Here are his attempts to give a definition of the concept “progress” with references to the “hints” made by the American sociologist MacIver.
Change is a neutral word; we take it as the primary and indeterminate one. If we add continuity to the concept change (I note that Bierstedt himself did not define the word change as a concept), we will get process. If we add direction to the concept process, we will get evolution. If we add improvement to the concept evolution, we will get progress. From these definitions Bierstedt concludes for some reason that MacIver’s position is identical with Ginsberg’s approach; the latter defined progress as development and evolution based on rational criteria of value. This approach also coincides with the position of Carl Becker who believed that “Belief in progress as a fact depends upon the standard of value chosen for measuring it.” (р. 285)
Bierstedt appears to agree with the above definitions, yet he points out with justification that words like “improvement” and “value” force one to move out of the sphere of sociology into the “ocean of ethical speculation.” The objective is to free oneself from “normative connotations.” In his view, such “progressive” actions include, for example, “the completion of a task,” the writing by the author of every sentence in the manuscript, etc., i.e. any actions in the process of completing some task. There are indeed no “connotations” in that, but the concept “progress” is also absent. Bierstedt lists under this category the fact that progress is sometimes used to mean purely a time-related change (from winter to summer and the other way round; the motion of a clock’s hands; the life of a man – from childhood to maturity to old age). This, too, is a circle with cyclic recurrence and linearity. Here is movement in time only. All this is of no interest to Bierstedt, though.
Bierstedt believes that one can agree in principle that increase, differentiation and specialization can be described in terms of progress, even in “Spencer's sesquipedalian definition of evolution.” However, when we apply progress to those processes we lose interest, since in these cases a legalized and neutral use of the word “progress” takes place, whereas movement and evolution do not imply improvement.
When we speak of progress, Bierstedt continues, what we have in mind is not merely steps toward completion, or movement through time, or evolution, but something else, something greater. Like Ginsberg, we have in mind the progress of mankind regarding such goals as peace and justice, progress in history from ignorance to knowledge in dealing with nature, successes in achieving the objectives which the race desires. (This makes some definite sense.) Putting it crudely, we want to know whether things are “better” now than they used to be, whether we can determine in history any improvements in the quality of life and society - and if the answer is yes, we want to know which analytical instruments we can use for the purposes of this determination.
At this point Bierstedt reproduces the well-known dialogue between Montaigne and Socrates (after Fontenelle) from which it follows that progress does not exist. Bierstedt points out that many writers in the 18th and 19th centuries were convinced nonetheless that history was developing in the direction of progress - seeing, for example, a great difference between barbarianism and civilization. The latter was held to hold an obvious “advantage” over barbarianism. Barbarianism implies cruelty, whereas civilization implies civility (good breeding). The former is the lowest, the latter is the highest.
Here again a problem arises, however – this time about the term “civilization.” What indicators are there for distinguishing civilizational societies? Biesrstedt thinks he poses a tricky question. It would appear that the American sociologist managed to miss a multitude of scientific works on civilization and culture, among which the works of A. Toynbee are worth mentioning, to say nothing of Engels’ work The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. One may disagree with these authors, but in that case one has to disprove them rather than refer to some dilettantes or non-specialists who reason about civilization on the level of schoolchildren. Bierstedt refers, for example, to the largely forgotten (by Bierstedt’s own admission) American sociologist Edward Cary Hayes who proposed setting as the start of civilization the establishment of the institution of three meals per day, and to the historians Will and Ariel Durant who though that civilization started when man first made a store of food for the future. Stendhal identified civilization with the invention of love; no one can remember that day and that invention, though. (I have the urge to add that my Moscow apartment neighbor believed the repeal of temporary limitations on purchases of vodka to be the start of civilization; it is obvious why this guy fell in love with the current capitalism in Russia.) The more involved Bierstedt becomes in his own reflections, the lower is the level of his analysis; this is confirmed by his reasoning presented in a footnote. He writes there that there is no satisfactory word to countervail the word “civilization.” The words “savage” and “barbaric” supposedly won’t do, as they are too rude and demeaning. The word “primitive” contains a value judgment (how can it be otherwise?) and likewise has an evolutionary premise. The word “preliterate” avoids being judgmental, but it is the premise for “non-literate” and, like the previous term, emphasizes one of the indicators as being self-evident. “Uncivilized” carries a value judgment, while “non-civilized” by itself means barbarism. “It may be significant that there is no word in the English language that can serve the required purpose.” (р. 289)
Should we proceed from this logic – that is, beware of calling a fool a fool – it would hardly be possible to understand who is smart. Were Bierstedt a philosopher, he would have known for sure that there exist words which reflect the ontological qualities of phenomena; words which represent categories or concepts in the mutual definitions plus-minus, good-evil, finiteness-infiniteness, love-hate, material-ideal. They are not valuational, i.e. they don’t belong to the group of epistemological concepts. Bierstedt becomes confused or simply fails to understand, therefore he doesn’t distinguish words from everyday language – for example, the word barbarian (negative connotation) from the conceptual word barbarism which countervails the word civilization and designates one of the transitional forms of mankind’s development. Bierstedt the sociologist doesn’t understand these simple things and begins reasoning like that young female sociologist from the University of Zurich who was mentioned in the preceding section. Having preliminary expressed again doubt in the superiority of civilization over barbarism and reminded the reader that similar doubts supposedly visited Rousseau and Toynbee, he quotes – with a reference to the Durant couple – the Eskimo’s pronouncement: “I do not have to think. I have plenty of meat.”[13] The Durants perceive this phrase as a concentration of wisdom and add: “The moment man begins to take thought of the morrow he passes out of the Garden of Eden into the vale of anxiety.” (quoted from: Bierstedt, р. 290)
It follows from the two sages’ quotes that when man is comfortable, when he has plenty of food or money and has no need to think – that is when real progress takes place. Conversely, when man is in a bad way and he is compelled to start thinking how to get out of that “bad,” that is regress. Such is their logic, which is deepened by Bierstedt’s own reasoning. He says that we accustomed ourselves to the thought that the life of “primitive” man was supposedly poor, nasty, brutish and especially short. Who, however, is able to measure such “mirages”?
Since Bierstedt himself is unable to measure them, he goes on moaning. We are all supposedly living in the shadow of a radioactive cloud. We belong to those species which lack “instincts”; we are so weak intellectually that we apparently prefer nuclear annihilation to surrender of national sovereignty.
This is followed by an interesting passage in a footnote. Yes, indeed, Bierstedt admits that due to psychological knowledge and medicine, civilized people live longer that their predecessors. However, it was not the life span that increased, especially in the 20th century; it was the average life expectancy at birth. Our life spans are still insignificantly higher than those of the characters in the Bible.
This statement is in fact untrue; Bierstedt is simply unfamiliar with the problem which he touched on and which will be expounded on in detail in the third part of the book. By the way, he doesn’t know the Bible either. He ought to know that according to the Bible Adam, Seth, E’nosh, Ke’nan and other patriarchs of mankind lived 930, 912, 905, 910 years respectively – and they did it without any health care. Now that was some progress – if the Bible doesn’t lie, that is.
Bierstedt writes in this connection, with disapproval, that the decline of mortality and the increase of the average life span may be taken by many to be indicators of progress; yet the old difficulty remains: assertion of progress requires a value judgment.
I ask anyone at all, no matter which values are held: what can be more valuable than life? What has mankind been dreaming of since the moment it had reason? What are all myths about, including the religious ones and the fairy tales? – About immortality.
Bierstedt, like many others, starts asserting in this connection that this kind of progress (declining mortality and increasing birth rates) leads to overpopulation of the planet. And as a consequence many children go hungry. If only Bierstedt in his capacity as a sociologist calculated how much of foodstuffs are thrown out by the world’s advanced countries, the “golden billion” above all, he would have found that these foodstuffs could have fed the population of several globes. It isn’t the population number that is the problem, but the social-economic causes which make part of the planet rich and the other part poor. That topic, however, is outside Bierstedt’s specialty.
Bierstedt quotes a phrase by the writer John Updike which fits well with his conclusions - so it seems to him. Here is the silly pronouncement Updike made, possibly after a quarrel with some part of mankind: “The race is no longer a tiny tribe of simian aristocrats lording it over an ocean of grass; mankind is a plague, racing like fire across the exhausted continents.” (quoted from: Bierstedt, р. 291). Updike apparently believed that the continents would have been better off without mankind. There was a time when this was indeed the case; the entire planet existed without people, and the entire Universe as well. Who needs this humanity anyway? All it does is pollute continents.
It turns out, by the way, that in Bierstedt’s opinion, a long life cannot be a boon in itself, despite what many think. For example, Hobbes, Fontenelle and B. Russell felt that their lives were too long. Fontenelle even said: “I’m tired of being” (“Je souffre d’être.”) Small wonder – he lived a hundred years! There were even some who believed that it is better not to have been born; it turns out that these included J. Swift, Friedrich the Great and Churchill. It would have been reasonable for Bierstedt at this point to quote the number of suicides and other similar statistics; as a result we may have arrived at the conclusion that mankind emerged to no purpose. The problem is, though, that it did not ask anyone’s permission.
Let us continue. Bierstedt is compelled to admit that progress in science is obvious – in physics and astronomy, for example. However… there is nothing good about it. The Archbishop of the Diocese of New York believes, for example, that this progress results in the decline of religion. This was written and talked about sufficiently earlier, though. Bierstedt quotes with pleasure the decision of France’s Council of State which banned Diderot’s Encyclopedia in 1759, justifying it thusly: “The advantages to be derived from a work of this sort, in respect of progress in the arts and sciences, can never compensate for the irreparable damage that results from it in regard to morality and religion.” (р. 292)
Bierstedt summarizes in the spirit of such obscurantism that science is not perceived as something good even among its supporters. It does, of course, deliver much in the way of creature comforts, but it also facilitates the killing of people. Who can say, the sociologist asks, whether the internal combustion engine delivers more happiness or unhappiness to the human race? We are asking ourselves at the end of the 20th century: are we deriving benefits from technology – or are we its victims?
Such questions can hardly be taken seriously; this is elementary hypocrisy. If professor Bierstedt really were tortured by civilization and technology, he could have settled without difficulty on some island in the Pacific and read his lectures to the meow-meow tribes.
He keeps lamenting that modern science does not further ethics: patience, magnanimity, freedom, equality, justice. This is only natural, since this individual who endeavored to write about progress wrote about something entirely different instead. What he came up with is grumbling apropos of everything that is indirectly related to progress. Here are his concluding phrases:
“I do not contend that progress is a disreputable idea. I contend instead that it hardly qualifies as an idea at all. It is the better part of discretion, in fact, to construe it as an attitude and to remind ourselves that we can quarrel with ideas but not with attitudes. Belief in progress is a temperamental response to history. It has more to do with optimism and pessimism than it has with truth and falsity. We are induced to assert therefore that progress is any social change that gives us pleasure, any development that wins our approval, and any trend we are inclined to applaud. ….it is a phenomenon wholly devoid of objective validity.” (рp. 293-4)
Compared to this “scientist,” the sociologist from Zurich looks like a full member of the Academy of Science. I never could understand based on which qualities American universities hire instructors? What do they pay them for?
“I conclude this primitive observation with a bow, a quotation, and a paradox.” (р. 294) The bow is addressed to Ginsberg. The quotation is from the pronouncements of Henry B. Hough (editor of a provincial newspaper) whose words Bierstedt found witty: “Progress is, after all, the great enemy.” Bierstedt “wittily” adds to this: “We might all make progress if we abandoned the idea of progress.” (ibid.)
Which is precisely what today’s Americans are doing.