Part One: U.S. strategy in the 21st century: leadership through hegemony
Chapter I: Concept Apparatus and Research Approaches
Russian scholars, with rare exceptions (E. Pozdnyakov, V. Baranovsky, N. Kosolapov, and a few others), are not concerned about the problem of the concept apparatus of the theory of international relations. They can write quite casually about globalization or integration, while in fact they are describing issues of internationalization; they can talk about a state’s power, while in fact they are describing that state’s might; they can formulate concepts of national security, while in fact they are describing problems of domestic policy. To them, world relations are identical to international relations, etc. This approach reflects the peculiarity of the Russian mind-set, which rejects rationality for irrationality, which they feel helps them to penetrate “deeper” into the essence of phenomena. I will later demonstrate this with examples, but for now, let us look at American ways of looking at the same problems.
The majority of American international relations scholars and political scientists are not inclined to “theorize.” This gives grounds for the authors of the monograph American National Security to state: “A chronic source of presidential difficulties with the Congress and, sometimes, the nation at large, is the tendency to use the concept of national security overly broadly, invoking it as a cloak to cover various controversial actions.”2
One has to admit that Americans have been pondering the subject of this conceptual apparatus since the end of World War II, and in many respects they have achieved impressive results. Nonetheless, the problem persists. Ken Booth demonstrates its urgency in the following fashion: “Many,” he writes, “use the word ‘peace’ in the sense of ‘absence of world war,’ despite the fact that since World War II, more than 20 million people have been killed in military conflicts.3 The term ‘Third World’ is used to mean all underdeveloped countries. But the upper social strata of this ‘world’ is not any different in its level of well-being from the wealthy in the ‘First World.’ The term ‘power’ is used as being synonymous with ‘military power,’ even though these notions are not identical.” Booth draws the following conclusion: “If these and other key words in academic international relations have not been naming things properly, how could the theories they create help us discern the future?” (336)
A confusion regarding concepts is often the result of several fields of science intersecting or overlapping. It is a known fact that in the West, “international relations” is studied as a branch of political science. Booth however says, “It has become increasingly evident that political science can be seriously studied only as a branch of the study of politics on a global scale. …World politics is the home of political science, not vice versa. Kant was right: political theory has to be international theory.” (340)
Here’s one more curious reflection from Booth: “Therefore, the goal of international political theory must be the joining of Marxian “science” with the “science” of Morgenthau in the art of utopian realism; the problem of international political science must be the attempt to unify the world through changing it.” (347)
Though it’s not clear from this sentence what Booth means by “Marxian science” and “Morgenthau’s science,” the term “utopian realism” reminded me at once of an utterance by Mr. Data the Android, one of the colorful characters in the TV series Star Trek: The Next Generation. He remarked once, quite reasonably: “To expect the unexpected is impossible.”
To a substantial, if not decisive, degree, the recent wave of theoretical research was caused by the end of the Cold War, when the Berlin Wall crumbled, along with the established clichés and stereotypes of the theory of international relations. To put it simply, this theory used to have two mighty currents: One was completely ideologically engaged (the school of political idealism dominant in the USSR), explaining all developments in international life through the struggle between “communism” and “capitalism.” The other one, called geostrategic (the school of political realism), relies on the concept of power.
Nowadays, when ideology has ceased to play a dominant role (in the opinion of American theorists) and the concept of power has begun to change, the elegant constructs of the past have become outdated. What has emerged instead? This is where debates start, centering in most cases on the following: the current structure of international relations (bipolar, unipolar, or multipolar); the content of the concept of power in today’s world; the role of the state in the era of “globalization”; and “national security”—an artificial abstraction or something objectively real?
I will address all these topics in one way or another throughout this book. But for a start, I want to present the views of Messrs. A. Jordan, W. Taylor, and M. Mazarr, the well-known authors of the textbook National Security of the USA. Their popularity is evidenced by the fact that their book is already in its fifth edition and is used by students of military academies and universities.
These authors (henceforth referred to as JTM) believe that the Cold War was followed not by simple peace but by a “hot peace.” The difficulty lies in describing this peace. Unlike the champions of the concept of U.S. “unipolar hegemony” (such as Charles Krauthammer), JTM believe that what has really emerged is “a complex multipolar international system.”
By the way, they remind the reader where the concept of “unipolarity” originated. Back in 1992, a document was prepared in the Pentagon and unfortunately leaked to the world, from which every-one learned of the proposed policy emphasis “on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor.” (545) This was not directed at an already weakened Russia but rather at the allies of the USA, and formulated in rather harsh phrases, such as: “American defense should be so strong that potential competitors, from Western Europe or Asia, as well as the former Soviet Union, would be deterred from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” (546)
The authors remind us that apart from the die-hard “unipolarists,” there exist proponents of “superpower multipolarity” who champion hegemony by the USA while “allowing” other powers, such as Germany and Japan, to provide a multipolar background. JTM themselves favor a “complex multipolarity,” denying hegemonic status to the USA for a number of reasons, among which is the following: The focus of U.S. national strategy has shifted from the global to the regional level. On the global level, there is no other global power; therefore, there is no adversary for a global struggle. On the regional level, the structural aspects vary widely. In Africa a balance of power shapes the structure of relations; in some places, it is defined by bipolarity; in others, by multipolarity. In other words, not one of the “power models” is universal, and none explains the actual reality.
Another cause of “multipolarity” has to do with the fact that several mighty regional powers are capable of ensuring their survival and independence on their own, without help from allies. This argument might appear strange at first, but the authors mean to say there is no hostile power in the world capable of endangering “the survival and independence” of, say, Germany, Great Britain, or Japan.
But the main reason for “multipolarity” is something else, namely, the problem of diffusion of the term “power”—the key term in all concepts of “polarity.” “The diffusion of the other non-military elements of power—particularly of economic strength—throughout the international system further refutes this unipolar concept.” (8)
In this connection, I want to draw your attention to the following important fact: Power is a key category in the theory of international relations, debated by generation after generation of theorists who have failed to this day to define what it is. JTM acknowledge this fact, adding that the method for calculating power is also absent. That’s only natural. If there is no definition, there is nothing to calculate. Because power is an important category, we’ll let the authors expound in more detail on this subject.
JTM believe that the enigma of power is that “power is dynamic.” They write: “In the simplest terms, it is the ability to get others to do something they would not do of their own volition.” The authors clarify: The ability to coerce does not necessarily only mean “physical violence upon an adversary,” though that is an important argument of power. Other aspects of power are listed as “bargaining ability” and “persuasion, based on common interests and values.” (9) They consider this definition of power sufficient and move on to its estimation.
They write: “Power can be viewed and appraised in several ways. Since it is based upon capabilities, power has certain objective characteristics. But it also has a highly subjective element, for the reputation for having and being willing to use power is sufficient to achieve results in many cases, without really applying it. Hobbes rightly wrote, ‘Power is what people think it is until tested.’” (Emphasis by the authors, ibid.)
At this point, JTM fall into an elementary logical contradiction. If power is an objective category, it cannot have “a highly subjective element” because only the evaluation of power can be subjective, not power itself. The observer’s (analyst’s) goal is precisely to have his subjective evaluation coincide with the content of power. (Hegel called this the merging of object and subject.) The multiplicity of interpretations of a single phenomenon means only that the phenomenon is not perceived correctly. Having fallen at this stage into a logical and philosophical trap, JTM are subsequently unable to get out of it.
They write: “Power is also essentially relative in character, for its utility depends in part on comparing it with whatever opposes it; when this comparison is made explicit, the resulting calculus is often called net power. Further, power is highly situational; what may generate power in one set of circumstances may not in another. Such intangibles as the political and technical skills of the key actors, national will and solidarity on the issue, the nature of the issue in question, and the purposes being sought all condition the power a state can bring into play in a given situation.” (Emphasis by the authors, ibid.)
If it is impossible to objectively estimate power as such, then it is also impossible to estimate the opposing power, and no kind of comparison will help because in this case two indeterminate values are being compared. JTM are optimists, however.
“If power is dynamic, subjective, relative, and situational, as well as objective in character, can it usefully be defined at all? Despite the caveats and difficulties, the answer is “yes.” Particularly if we focus on its objective characteristics (which are, more accurately, measures of ‘strength’ and may or may not yield influence, as already noted) and qualify it appropriately for time and circumstances, we can say at least a few things useful about power.” (ibid.) They did indeed say a few things, but not about power. Like everyone before them, they confused the concepts of strength and power, and I will return to this topic in the corresponding chapter.
The authors do offer valid criticism of the views held about the category of power by Harold and Margaret Sprout, for: “They suggested a crude equation: power is equal to human resources, plus physical habitat, plus foodstuffs and raw materials, plus tools and skills, plus organization, plus morale and political behavior, plus external conditions and circumstances.” (ibid.) Clifford German’s writings on the subject are in much the same key, while Ray Cline added “strategic purpose and national will” to those quantifiable characteristics. (10)
By the way, the understanding of power by JTM themselves coincides to a large degree with Cline’s formulations.
Further, JTM attempt to define the contemporary state of national power, which has been naturally undergoing some changes. “It was not only more fragmented, but at the same time more interdependent. The fragmentation came from the demise of the major bipolar blocs of the Cold War, as well as corresponding release of previously suppressed ethnic or rather tribal nationalism in many nations across the globe.”(548)
This resulted in national power becoming more diffuse, complicating the effect of one state’s influence on another. “‘Soft’ forms of power, such as the ability to manipulate interdependences, become more important, as does the long-term economic strength of the nation, which is the base for both hard and soft forms of power.” (548)
Please note that the authors have started using the terms power and strength as synonyms without even noticing. This is the pit that ensnared all theorists who have ever struggled to define the category of power. Approaching “power” first from one side, then another, they failed to produce a clear definition thereof. They went on to repeat the well-known banality: “Power and the will to use it become the prerequisite for success, even survival. …The purpose of power is to overcome resistance in an effort to bring about or secure a preferred order of things.” (Emphasis by the authors, 13.) The result is this: Instead of defining power, JTM identified two of its functions (both debatable)— victory in struggle and securing of order. Power, as such, slipped away from them once again. In other words, the authors realize the treacherous nature of this concept, yet they fail to transcend the framework of views held by all theorists (without exception) who have struggled with this concept since the time of Hans J. Morgenthau.4
An even wider circle of theorists is involved in discussions of the category of national security. Heated attacks are mostly directed against the neorealists who represent two schools of thought, ordinarily called paradigms—structural neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. The attackers are sociologists whose mission is the “innovative unification of research in the areas of sociology and national security.” Their views are presented in the monograph The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, one of the principal ideologues of the sociological approach.5 To understand their charges against the neorealists, a few words are in order about those people’s views.
One of them is Kenneth Waltz, who belongs to the structural neorealists of the second wave (after Hans J. Morgenthau, George F. Ken-nan, Arnold Wolfers, and others). He identifies three distinctive characteristics in the international system of states: (1) It is decentralized; (2) the most important actors (states) are unitary and functionally undifferentiated; and (3) differences in the distribution of the capabilities of the most important states distinguish bipolar from multipolar state systems. (12)
The well-known theorist Robert O. Keohane is classified as a neoliberal institutionalist. He maintains that after the collapse of hegemony, international politics does not necessarily collapse into uncontrolled power politics that results in anarchy. The international order created in the period of hegemony has the capability to rectify the problems that provoke international anarchy. “The institutional infrastructure of a post-hegemonic system thus can facilitate the coordination of conflicting policies by lowering the transaction costs associated with cooperation.” (13)
Sociologists accuse Keohane’s theory of not explaining the category of interest, even though it does not deny its existence as an outside phenomenon. The category of interest is the sociologist’s favorite hobbyhorse. This is recognized to a degree by Keohane himself: “Without a theory of interests, which requires analysis of domestic politics, no theory of international relations can be fully adequate. …Our weak current theories do not take us very far in understanding the behavior of the United States and European powers at the end of the Cold War. … More research will have to be undertaken at the level of the state, rather than the international system.” (14)
According to P. Katzenstein, the sociologists’ research paradigm contains a three-step analysis. “First, there is the specification of a set of constraints. Then comes the stipulation of a set of actors who are assumed to have certain kinds of interests. Finally, the behavior of the actors is observed, and that behavior is related to the constraining conditions in which these actors, with their assumed interests, find themselves.” (ibid.)
All this balderdash, meaningless to the uninitiated, really is an exposition of certain elements of behaviorism as directed to the analysis of security problems. Sociologists maintain that only on this basis can one capture such important factors as “prestige and reputation, which neorealists view as ‘force effects’ rather than as social attributions.” (ibid.) In this connection they remember the well-known political economist Robert Gilpin. Katzenstein writes that though Gilpin, being a realist, does recognize sociological approaches, he falls back all the time on economic explanations. This is because for Gilpin “prestige” is the “functional equivalent to the concept of authority in domestic politics and has functional and moral grounding.” “Gilpin,” Katzenstein writes ironically, “asserts, but does not demonstrate, that ‘ultimately’ prestige rests on military or economic power.” But he writes that “‘prestige,’ rather than power, is the everyday currency in international relations.” (15)
If only American theorists knew Russian (I never met a single one who did), they would have discovered to their surprise that the concept of prestige and authority as a function of several variables was described by the Soviet systemic-economist A. V. Sergiev back in the 1970s and repeated by me in a book published in 1986.6 Equally naïve is the tendency on the part of American sociologists to view the state as a “social organism” whose self-identification and norms affect national interests; these topics were widely discussed by Soviet political scientists in the 1970s and 1980s.7
Be that as it may, the sociological approach to the problem of national security through an analysis of the concept of national interests of the state as a social organism gained widespread acceptance, as evidenced by a monograph written by a group of English sociologists.8 The practical creators of America’s security policy prefer for the time being to rely on the neorealist approaches, including those of Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr (JTM).
The essence of their approach is not complicated and can be summarized as follows: Admitting the elasticity of the term “national security,” JTM see a difference nonetheless between the volume of its content before and after World War II. The term itself, in its narrowest sense, means “defense.” But prior to World War II, the policy of national security barely connected with foreign policy, or with economic, trade, and environmental policies. After World War II, parts of these three spheres overlapped each other, that is, became interconnected, though other segments of these blocks remained autonomous. (See figure on the next page.)
The overlapping parts have a name of their own, complex national security. This concept was formulated some time ago by the Japanese and played an official role in the late 1970s and early 1980s.9 It is composed of three components: military security, economic security, and political security.
Few argue in principle with this approach (though some do argue; more about that in the corresponding chapter). More serious debates start with the topic of tying together national and international security. They center on the problem of combining the former with the latter; that is, on ways to ensure that national security (protecting national interests) does not contradict international security (designed to satisfy the interests of the international community). Some believe that this contradiction can be resolved through collective security. JTM remind the reader: “Under such an approach, an attack upon one member is taken as an attack upon all, with the expectation that such a united opposition would deter any would-be aggressor.” (14) In actual practice, however, there have never been any such precedents, and the authors believe that there are none at present. That is why: “The result is that collective security in any universal sense does not now exist, nor does it seem likely to come to exist, given the sovereign state system and the inequalities within it.” (ibid.)
JTM are quite trustful of alliances and coalitions because these kinds of systems are built on mutual benefit. They pin big hopes, however, on international law, which is known to be treated quite skeptically by many scholars of international affairs. The authors believe that this skepticism is misguided. They write: “Law exists not only to improve the distribution of justice but also to make life predictable by providing all who live under the law with a code of expectations regarding the behavior of others in the system.” (16) Besides, there is “mature law,” and there is “primitive law.” Understandably, the authors hope that in international affairs, “mature law” will be used. The problem is in determining the degree of the law’s “maturity.” Historical practice shows that the dominant states in the world make these decisions. As the still-relevant Karl Marx once wrote, when two equal rights come into conflict, the conflict is resolved through power. Once again, we’re back to this ill-fated concept. JTM themselves indirectly confirm Marx’s formula when they write about Russia and China.
For a start, they describe certain parameters of the Russian state: imperial history, vast resources, a strong industrial base, a well-educated population, and an obvious desire to play a significant role in the world arena. The problem is this: “How Russia chooses to engage its neighbors and the rest of the world, whether in the form of an overt reconstitution of its former empire or in a more benign strategic design, will in large measure depend on the ability of the West to engage Moscow effectively. …The West cannot afford to let this grand experiment collapse.” (556-57) There you have it: Everything is made to depend on American intentions to be of use to Russia on the basis of the “mature laws” of democracy and free markets, regardless of whether these laws are compatible with the nature of the Russian state.
It’s the same thing with China. JTM see no serious contradictions between the USA and China. They are not much concerned about the modernization of China’s armed forces because they are still much inferior to those of the USA; Beijing’s relations with Taiwan likewise cause no excessive concern at present. But should events like those in Tiananmen Square happen again, or should the military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait suddenly heat up, then the course of the present positive relations may change. The authors note one other important fact: “The imbalance between Chinese economic development and its lagging authoritarian political system make future bilateral problems highly probable.” (558) That is, the methods China’s leaders use to resolve their domestic problems (Beijing considers the Taiwan problem a domestic one) do not conform to the standards of the “mature law” of the West. So, to bring the Chinese closer to “civilizational norms,” the authors recommend a policy of “engagement” with relation to China, similar to the one adopted with respect to Russia. What they mean is involvement in the Western world, in its standards, which in the minds of Western ideologues are universal.
This conviction about the universality of “mature law” has many times tripped up and will continue to trip up scholars who pounded these kinds of illusions into their heads. I will show later that some of them are beginning to get rid of these clichés. They will be helped along in this process not only by China with its national specifics but also by Russia, whose experience disproves that capitalism enjoys a natural advantage over other systems.
Yet one has to admit that some American scholars, including those mentioned above in this chapter, are now seriously tackling the task of developing a conceptual apparatus, realizing that without it, all pronouncements on foreign policy and international relations are nothing more than empty talk. In this respect, I agree with Ronald Rogowski, who writes: “There is a fundamental failing in the theory that makes definitions uncertain; uncertain definitions make for uncertainty about strategies and measures; and so long as measures remain uncertain, convincing tests of the theory are impossible. The problem lies with the theory. It may be possible to remedy it; but … it is hard to see how.”10
Continuing his thought, Michael C. Desch writes: “Without systematic variables, there is no prediction. Prediction, however, is central to the social scientific enterprise not only for theoretical reasons (we need theories to make predictions in order to test the theories) but also for policy analysis (theories that do not make clear predictions are of little use to policymakers).” (153)
The problem has its roots in the absence of a comprehensive science of foreign policy and international relations. What exist are separate areas of research, dedicated to particular segments of world politics. Each of these areas uses its own set of terms, which are only in rare instances defined as concepts, and practically never defined on the level of categories.
Thus, the geostrategic approach uses the terms “bipolarity,” “multipolarity,” “power centers,” “national security,” and “national interests”; underlying all these is “power” (though no one has, as yet, managed to determine which kind of power—force, power, might, or strength). The geoeconomic approach exploits the terms “integration,” “globalization,” “internationalization,” etc. The ideological, or class-based, analysis uses yet another set of terms: democracy, dictatorship, and authoritarianism. The geopolitical approach, the civilizational approaches, the system approaches, and others all have their own terminology. One should keep in mind that often one and the same term can have a different meaning depending on the approach taken. For example, the terms “pole,” “power,” “integration,” and others are used in a variety of ways by different scholars.
When an author does not specify in advance the field of his research, it becomes unclear what exactly he is analyzing and prognosticating about—the entire system of international relations or just a certain part of it. The ambiguity becomes worse whenever the author doesn’t explain the content of a term he uses in his analysis. While at least quite a few American and English scholars strive toward conceptual clarity, the vast majority of Russian research workers ignore such “trifles.”
2 Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, American National Security (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 4.
3 Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds, International Relations: Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 334.
4 For example, see Maruyama Masao, “Thought and Behavior” in Modern Japanese Politics (Oxford University Press, Tokyo, Oxford, New York, 1979), 268-89; K.Kaizer u. H.-P. Schwarz, Hrsg., Weltpolitik. Strukturen—Akteure—Perspektiven (Stuttgart: Klett-Gotta, 1985); and Hugh Ward, “Structural Power—A Contradiction in Terms?” Political Studies 35, no. 4 (1987): 593-610.
5 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
6 R. Sh.-A. Aliev, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1970s-80s (Theory and Practice) (M.: Nauka, 1986), 284-85. [Aliev was my name when I lived in the Soviet Union.]
7 International Relations, Politics and Personality. Annual of SPSA, 1975. (M.: Nauka, 1976); Contemporary political systems. Essays. (M.: Nauka, 1978); E. Pozdnyakov, ed., National Interests: Theory and Practice. Selected articles (M.: IMEMO, 1991).
8 Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Origins of National Interests (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1999).
9 See Aliev, 148-164.
10 Quoted from Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash. Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security 23, no. 1 (summer 1998), 151.
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)