Part One: U.S. strategy in the 21st century: leadership through hegemony
Chapter II: Role and Place of the USA in the Twenty-first Century in the Research of American Political Scientists and Scholars of International Affairs
The Institute for National Strategic Research:
Russia as Geostrategic Ghetto
Let us now take a look at the views of the authors of Strategic Assessments, published annually since 1995 under the aegis of the National Defense University and its associate organization, the Institute for National Strategic Research (INSR). Hans Binnendijk is the editor-in-chief of these collections, and INSR researchers are its principal authors. Prominent scholars from other universities and institutes are sometimes invited to participate. Active politicians, in particular those in the State and Defense departments, sometimes participate in the writing of certain chapters.
It is believed that the ideas put forth in Strategic Assessments have a considerable influence on the formulation of official policy. This is not surprising, considering that the authors used to be or still are functionaries (in the Pentagon, the State Department, and various other agencies directly accountable to the president).
In this chapter, I make use of the issues of 1997, 1998, and 1999.12
In the 199713 annual number, the authors’ view of the world system after the Cold War looks like this: First of all, the world system is experiencing three qualitatively new phenomena which the authors designate as “revolutions.” The first revolution is the geostrategic one. It is characterized by “a world asymmetrical multipolarity,” where one power, the USA, alone has global reach. Other great powers enjoy influence on a regional scale. The authors emphasize that “the world has not become unipolar, as many believed at first after the Cold War.”
Another aspect of global geostrategy is “the triumph of the idea of market democracy.” From this perspective, the world is divided into three categories: (1) the states that have successfully implemented the ideas of market democracy; (2) the states in transition from an authoritarian system to market democracy, where a politicized economy and a partially free political system may yet slow down this process; and (3) the troubled states that are way behind the rest of the world, in many instances struggling with ethnic and religious extremism.
Another revolution is the informational one; it introduces new parameters to the definition of national might.
The third revolution is the change in the role of government, as it apparently “retreats” in the face of regional authorities in many countries (USA, the European Union, Russia, China) and before the might of international business. (This revolution is directly related to the theory and practice of internationalization, which will be discussed separately.)
Prior to giving their evaluation of Russia’s place in the world, the authors specify their understanding of the term “major powers.” These are “countries with sufficient weight to be major players in several aspects of world affairs.” According to this definition, only the USA is a great player at once in the political, economic, and military spheres. “Russia is not among the world’s top ten economies, yet it qualifies as a major power because of its military might and the legacy of its days as the core of the Soviet superpower.” (Chapter one, Context)
The authors draw attention to the gradual decline of Russia’s military might. To illustrate, they offer certain data: “No more than 20 percent of the military’s manpower perform combat-related jobs. In the Ground Forces, only eight maneuver divisions are judged mission-capable—and four of these are under the peacekeeping command; 70-75 percent of tanks are in need of replacement; modern tanks account for only 2 to 5 percent of the force inventory, with estimates that the proportion will rise to only 30 percent by 2005. Only 60 percent of Air Assault units are judged to be combat ready; in the Naval Forces, between 1990 and 1995, personnel was cut by 50 percent (fleet aviation personnel by 60 percent), ships by 50 percent, and fleet aircraft by 66 percent.” (Chapter two: Russia)
Considering the interests of the USA, the authors write that because the future of political reforms in Russia is still questionable, “The hopes for a new strategic partnership between the U.S. and Russia have faded.” (Chapter one: Context)
At the same time, they note: “For the foreseeable future, Russia will retain the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the U.S. through use of its nuclear arsenal. Reducing the threat from this nuclear arsenal will remain the principal U.S. interest vis-à-vis Russia.” (Chapter two: Russia)
Nonetheless, the United States “has encouraged democratic reform in Russia and supported Russia’s attempt to establish a market economy through bilateral and international loans and technical-assistance programs.” The United States also exerts influence on the IMF, persuading it to give loans to Russia.
The 199814 issue of Strategic Assessments contains additions and clarifications. The most important one is that ideology, not power, structures the world. Accordingly, the world is divided into four groups of states.
The first group is a core of partner nations—flourishing democracies that are capable of joining the United States in shouldering the burden of this core’s security and expansion. This group accounts for about one-fifth of the world’s population and four-fifths of the world’s economic might.
The second group of states (most prominent among them are China, India, and Russia) is in a state of transition. How this group evolves will determine the degree to which the core is able to expand and guarantee its security in the future. The bigger part of the world’s population belongs to this group.
The third group consists of rogue players that reject the core’s ideals, universally accepted means, and opportunities. They are capable of doing harm to U.S. interests and the interests of its core partners. The rogue states seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction and other dangerous technologies. Among them are North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, as well as all kinds of terrorist organizations.
The fourth group of countries, called failing states or troubled states, is usually subject to coups and wars (for instance, Bosnia, Sudan, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, and Afghanistan).
However, the general state of global relations gives the authors satisfaction because: “The enemies of the United States are thus few, isolated, and relatively weak. No global challenger or hostile alliance is on the horizon.” (Chapter one: The Global Environment)
The authors emphasize that despite its strength, the United States seeks respect from other countries, not hegemony over them. Possessed of unique capabilities, the United States does not strive for supremacy over others. “Power is not its goal, achievement of supremacy is not its strategy.” (Chapter One: The Global Environment)
The United States is mainly interested in strengthening the democratic core, partly through a more even distribution of responsibility between its members; in expanding that core through the addition of transitional states; and in neutralizing the “criminal” states, partly through swinging transitional states to their side on this issue.
At the same time, the United States pursues not only “tangible interests” but also some idealistic objectives, such as the establishment of a system of international norms. The authors emphasize that the establishment of these norms does not mean forcing “Western values” on other states and cultures; rather, it implies growing recognition by lawful governments of basic standards of correct conduct.
The norms of the core are as follows: (a) Those that bolster international peace (nonaggression, the right of collective self-defense, the laws of war, arms control, peaceful settlement of disputes, antiterrorism covenants, respect for the authority of the UN Security Council, and respect for other instruments and institutions that affect directly whether and how conflicts occur); (b) Those that govern the functioning of the international economy (self-determination of commerce, law of the sea, access to resources, noninterference with the flow of information, environmental protection, the rules of open multilateral trading, and cooperation in addressing transnational problems; and (c) Those that bear on the treatment of people by states (human rights, the rule of law, representative and accountable government, individual liberties, freedom of the press, and other tenets of civil societies and states).
The authors believe that the collapse of communism, the expansion of the core, and the democratization of many underdeveloped nations open up great opportunities “for the acceptance of these norms by almost everyone.”
These scholars attach a great importance to China, Russia, and India, emphasizing that “China is the most important transition state, by virtue of its size, aspirations, untapped human potential, prosperous expatriate community (some 150 million strong), and location in the world’s most vibrant region.”
As for Russia, its present problems are explained by the absence of economic and political liberties for her population throughout history. “Russia is unlikely to emerge as a major threat to the core: The free fall of industrial production, the lack of domestic investment, inhospitable conditions for value-added enterprise, and the country’s deteriorating human capital point toward a continued contraction, not a rebound, of Russian power.” Russia, however, is capable of not only being a threat to its “near abroad” but also of creating enormous problems for the USA and its partners through supplying dangerous technologies to rogue states.
In future scenarios up to the year 2008, the worst one envisions the expansion of democracy coming to a halt. This can come to pass through increased Chinese hostility because China’s energy needs will push it toward closer relations with Iran and other criminal states. Besides, the failure of reform and disenchantment could also push Russia toward spreading WMD technologies.
In chapter six, titled “The New Independent States,” where Russia gets much more attention, the general conclusion is that Russia’s development is impossible to forecast. Though the authors note that Russia is unlikely to return to the Soviet model, “the question now is what kind of capitalism Russia will create.” At the present moment, they see a formation of a system of criminal capitalism in which business, government, and organized crime are merged. In this connection, their recommendation is to continue assisting Russia in its economic reforms over the next ten years, but also give more attention to the countries of the Caspian region, a region that has the potential to move up to fifth or fourth place in the world in terms of fuel production.
The 199915 issue of Strategic Assessments is marked by a less optimistic view of the future than the preceding volumes. This is evident even from the subtitle: “Priorities In a Troubled World.” A number of events are cited as having negatively impacted upon world relations. These include the Asian economic crisis, the growing belligerence of Iraq and North Korea, tensions with China, failure of reforms in Russia, tests of nuclear weapons and missiles in South Asia, growing fears of WMD proliferation, and the war in the Balkans (xi). Therefore, hopes for a democratization and stabilization of the world, expressed in the 1995 issue of Strategic Assessments, are clearly unfulfilled.
The authors list the same four groups of states as key players, describing them in already familiar terms, but impart to them somewhat different characteristics from the perspective of their behavior and their role in the system of international relations.
The market-democracy players retain the biggest influence, though the spreading of democracy is now less obvious than in previous years.
The transition states are the same (Russia, China, India), but this time other goals are ascribed to them. “They are pursuing foreign policies anchored in state interests and seek to establish themselves as leading powers on the world scene. Each seeks a revision of the status quo that will increase its influence at the expense of the United States. Only China has the potential to become a global power, but Russia and India will remain regionally influential.” (Emphasis mine; xiv)
The rogue states remain the main causes of conflicts; added now to their list is Serbia.
The “troubled” states are described as extracting unjustifiably large resources from the USA and its allies for the purpose of maintaining internal stability. (The point being, for how much longer they will keep doing that?) Yet this can’t be avoided because these countries are the source of transnational players such as terrorists, drug dealers, organized crime, and refugees.
Despite all this, the USA remains the sole superpower, in spite of its inability to solve international problems on its own. The following is a list of potential threats and dangers:
• Aggression by current rogues and emergence of new rogues;
•Increasing ethnic warfare and violence from failed states;
• Accelerating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles;
•The spreading of terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking;
•Military developments that erode U.S. superiority and encourage regional aggression;
•Authoritarian rule in Russia or other major countries, coupled with militarism and imperialism;
•An anti-Western global coalition of rogues and malcontents;
•Clashes over resources, or a global economic collapse that produces widespread frustration and less political cooperation;
•Geopolitical rivalry with Russia and/or China;
•Emergence of a strong Islamic alliance in the Greater Middle East that seriously challenges Western interests;
•Disintegration of the Western Alliance system and renewed nationalism. (7)
More specifically, the risks related to Russia and China mean the following: “A bigger risk is that a global coalition of regional rogues and local troublemakers might emerge, perhaps under Russian or Chinese sponsorship, to challenge the United States.” (xii)
On the regional level, it is again Russia and its Eurasian neighbors that give concern to the American analysts. The authors lament: “In Russia, reforms aimed at instituting market democracy have fallen short. Russia has adopted some important features of democracy, but its transformation is far from complete, owing to a host of problems. Its economy is in shambles, organized crime has taken hold, its government is not effective, its society is becoming disillusioned, and regional fragmentation is growing.” (xii)
Even though the authors of this collection, as well as the previous ones, don’t expect a return to “communism” or the establishment of different kinds of extremist ideologies, they forecast that: “The entire region could become an unstable geopolitical ghetto, creating anti-Western attitudes and internal dangers of its own.” (xiii) Richard L. Kugler, apparently the author of the term “geopolitical ghetto,” warns: “Such regional chaos may be a new menace to Europe, as it would be a natural breeding ground for authoritarianism, even fascism.” (5)
Yet it is Asia that remains the biggest question mark for the USA. “In the long term, the emergence of China as a world power and the reactions of Japan and other countries will be the key. If China integrates into the Western community, regional stability will be enhanced. If not, China could become a major security problem and an eventual military threat in ways that affect the entire region, as well as U.S. relationships with key allies.” (xiii)
This complicated and uncertain situation in the world arena requires a transformation of security policy, derived from the strategy of involvement, based on three central elements: shape, respond, and prepare.
The essence of this change is described by the well-known principle of the carrot and the stick. This is how it applies to Russia and China:
The carrot in this case is still the USA’s willingness to “integrate” (the authors’ expression) Russia and China in the Western community. The stick is applied when integration fails: “If this is not possible, the United States should cooperate with them when mutual interests permit, but react firmly when legitimate U.S. interests are opposed by them. At a minimum, U.S. policy should prevent them from becoming adversaries of U.S. interests and leaders of a new anti-Western global coalition.” (xvii) For instance, in the Pacific region, China should be treated with a combination of firmness and containment, i.e., frustration of her attempts to destabilize the situation. “A new containment strategy could be needed if a stronger China seeks hegemony in Asia. Conversely, a broader emphasis on collective security may be possible if China becomes a cooperative partner.” (xviii) This, of course, is only allowed the USA and, to a lesser degree, Japan.
12 An analysis of Strategic Assessment 1996 is contained in my book Asia-Pacific Region: Myths, Illusions and Reality. Eastern Asia: Economy, Politics, Security (M.: Flinta/Nauka, 1997), 220-22.
13 Strategic Assessment 1997. Flashpoints and Force Structure (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997); available online from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa97/sa97cont.html.
14 Strategic Assessment 1998. Engaging Power for Peace (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, March 1998); available online from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa98/sa98cont.html.
15 Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1999); available online from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa99/sa99cont.html.
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)