Part One: U.S. strategy in the 21st century: leadership through hegemony
Chapter II: Role and Place of the USA in the Twenty-first Century in the Research of American Political Scientists and Scholars of International Affairs
Samuel Huntington: The Concept of a Unimultipolar World17
Samuel Huntington, the well-known Harvard University professor, presents an original view of the world and the place and role of the USA within it. In many works, he tried to prove the inevitability of a clash of civilizations.18 Later, he apparently came to the conclusion that purely civilizational differences are not in themselves sufficient for a clash. Instead, he turned his attention to analyzing the geostrategic structure of international relations, the imbalance of which is, at a minimum, an additional source of conflict. He believes that global politics always revolves around power and the struggle for power. In the current situation, there are changes because the emerging structure is very different from the period of bipolarity.
He maintains that although just one superpower exists today, it does not mean that the world is unipolar. He reminds the reader that superpowers have existed even in the past—the Roman Empire is an example. In East Asia, China was the hegemon. The bipolar system was built on the rivalry of two superpowers that headed their respective coalitions and fought for influence on the nonaligned states.
The multipolar system was always based on several great powers of comparable strength that cooperated and competed among themselves, as was the case for centuries in Europe.
The current system does not correspond to any of the previous ones. “It is instead a strange hybrid, a unimultipolar system with one superpower and several major powers. …The United States, of course, is the sole state with preeminence in every domain of power—economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, technological, and cultural—with the reach and capabilities to promote its interests in virtually every part of the world.” (36) This is the first level.
At a second level, in Huntington’s opinion, are major regional powers that are preeminent in certain areas of the world without being able to project their interests and capabilities as globally as the United States. They include Germany and France in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China and potentially Japan in East Asia, India in South Asia, Iran in Southwest Asia, Brazil in Latin America, and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. (ibid)
I wish to note that Russia’s sphere of influence is essentially confined to its own territory.
At a third level are secondary regional powers whose interests are often in conflict with the more powerful regional states. These include Britain in relation to the German-French combination, Ukraine in relation to Russia, Japan in relation to China, South Korea in relation to Japan, Pakistan in relation to India, Saudi Arabia in relation to Iran, and Argentina in relation to Brazil. (36)
The superpower or hegemon (to Huntington, these words are synonyms) in a unipolar system, lacking any major powers challenging it, is normally able to maintain its dominance over minor states for a long time until it is weakened by internal decay or by forces from outside the system. In Huntington’s opinion, the great powers of today strive toward multipolarity because their own interests are often at odds with those of the USA. “Global politics has thus moved from the bipolar system of the Cold War through a unipolar moment—highlighted by the Gulf War—and is now passing through one or two unimultipolar decades before it enters a truly multipolar twenty-first century.” “The United States,” as Zbigniew Brzezinski has said, “will be the first, last, and only global superpower.”(37)
Therefore, Huntington sees the structure of relations as being in evolution: Bipolarity is followed by unipolarity, which is followed by multipolarity. He figures that bipolarity lasted for about forty years, unipolarity will last for about twenty years, and multipolarity will last through the remainder of the twenty-first century. Let us memorize these time frames.
It is necessary to note that Huntington’s approach is different from the official approach of Washington that actually presupposes a unipolar world. It is precisely in this connection that Huntington subjects the official policy of the USA to sharp and sarcastic criticism, especially the concept of the “benevolent hegemon.” He reminds us of the expression used by Lawrence H. Summers, deputy secretary of the treasury, who called the United States the “first nonimperialist superpower,” a claim that manages in three words to exalt American uniqueness, American virtue, and American power. Huntington “confirms” all these sarcastically with the following arguments: “In the past few years, the United States has, among other things, attempted or been perceived as attempting more or less unilaterally to do the following: pressure other countries to adopt American values and practices regarding human rights and democracy; prevent other countries from acquiring military capabilities that could counter American conventional superiority; enforce American law extraterritorially in other societies; grade countries according to their adherence to American standards on human rights, drugs, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, missile proliferation, and now religious freedom; apply sanctions against countries that do not meet American standards on these issues; promote American corporate interests under the slogans of free trade and open markets; shape World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies to serve those same corporate interests; intervene in local conflicts in which it has relatively little direct interest; bludgeon other countries to adopt economic policies and social policies that will benefit American economic interests; promote American arms sales abroad while attempting to prevent comparable sales by other countries; force out one U.N. secretary-general and dictate the appointment of his successor; expand NATO initially to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and no one else; undertake military action against Iraq and later maintain harsh economic sanctions against the regime; and categorize certain countries as “rogue states,” excluding them from global institutions because they refuse to kowtow to American wishes.” (38)
All these things were feasible for a while, but now the situation has changed. The American professor believes the time of all-permissiveness for the USA is over. The instruments of this policy are economic sanctions and military intervention; both have practically stopped working. Moreover, Huntington is justified in noting that the harder the United States tries to punish the “rogue states,” the more popular their leaders become in their own countries. Just consider, for instance, Fidel Castro, Saddam Hussein, and even Slobodan Milosevic.19
This policy of global leadership does not have the support of most Americans. According to Huntington’s data, in 1997 public opinion polls, only 13 percent spoke in favor of a supreme role for the USA in world politics, while 74 percent said they wanted the USA to share responsibility for world problems with other countries. (39) Fifty-five percent to 66 percent declared that events in Europe, Asia, Mexico, and Canada don’t affect their lives. The foreign-policy elite, however, ignores these attitudes. That’s how foreign policy acquires the growing reputation of “hegemony for show.” (40)
It is supposed that the USA acts on behalf of “the world community.” In reality, it acts mostly on behalf of its Anglo-Saxon brethren (Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) on most issues; on behalf of Germany and several smaller European democracies on many issues; on behalf of Israel on some Middle Eastern issues; and on behalf of Japan on the implementation of UN resolutions. (41)
Huntington reminds the reader that between 1993 and 1996, many decisions were made about imposition of economic sanctions. Only rarely did the USA get support from its partners; more often than not, it was forced to act alone. Even though the United States keeps pinning the “rogue” label on different countries, in the eyes of many states it has itself become a rogue superpower. (42)
To support his position, Huntington quotes the Japanese ambassador, Hisashi Owada, who said that after World War II, the USA conducted a policy of “unilateral globalism,” and now its policy is “global unilateralism,” that is, pursuing its own interests while paying formal attention to the interests of others. (ibid)
Referring to a conference held at Harvard in 1997, Huntington points out that scholars representing two-thirds of humanity (Russia, China, India, Africa, Arabs, and other Moslems) claimed that the USA poses an external threat to their societies. That threat is not military; it has to do with their wholeness, autonomy, ability to flourish, and freedom of action. They called the USA an interventionist, exploitative, hegemonist, hypocritical state, practicing double standards and pursuing policies of “financial imperialism” and “intellectual colonialism.” (43)
America’s leaders are convinced that world affairs are their affairs. In the author’s opinion, a unimultipolar world dominated by just one superpower automatically presents a threat to the other major powers.
“The United States rewards countries that follow its leadership with access to the American market, foreign aid, military assistance, exemption from sanctions, silence about deviations from U.S. norms (as with Saudi human rights abuses and Israeli nuclear weapons), support for membership in international organizations, and bribes and White House visits for political leaders.” (45)
Yet, despite the criticism of Washington’s foreign policy, coordinated counteraction to the USA is absent from this world. In Huntington’s opinion, the reason is this: “Global politics is now multicivilizational. France, Russia, and China may well have common interests in challenging U.S. hegemony, but their very different cultures are likely to make it difficult for them to organize an effective coalition.”
(46) Besides, they would themselves be facing the problem of leadership: Who would be number one in their coalition, and who would be number two? This was one of the reasons behind the Sino-Soviet spat. “Similarly, an obstacle to an anti-U.S. coalition between China and Russia now is Russian reluctance to be the junior partner of a much more populous and economically dynamic China.” (ibid) As a result, “The interplay of power and culture will decisively mold patterns of alliance and antagonism among states in the coming years.” (ibid)
In Huntington’s opinion, U.S. tactics are to support the secondary regional power against the primary regional power. In Europe it means support for Great Britain; in East Asia, for Japan (against China); for Ukraine, against Russia; in Latin America, for Argentina; in the Middle East, for Saudi Arabia; in South Asia, for Pakistan.
What should be America’s policy in a unimultipolar world? Huntington formulates the question and answers it in this fashion:
1. First of all, foreign policy should renounce the false notion of the existence of a unipolar world.
2. America’s leaders should let go of illusions about a natural coincidence between their interests and the values of the rest of the world.
3. Because the USA is unable to create a unipolar world, it is in its interest to use its superpower status to organize an international order based on cooperation with other countries to solve global problems.
4. The interaction of strength and culture has a special importance in European-American relations. Strength leads to rivalry; similarity of cultures leads to cooperation. Attainment of goals depends on culture prevailing over strength. Europe is the central link in America’s policy.
Should these recommendations be heeded, Huntington envisions the emergence of a world satisfactory both to the world community and the USA. He writes: “In the multipolar world of the twenty-first century, the major powers will inevitably compete, clash, and coalesce with each other in various permutations and combinations. Such a world, however, will lack the tension and conflict between the superpower and the major regional powers that are the defining characteristic of a unimultipolar world. For that reason, the United States could find life as a major power in a multipolar world less demanding, less contentious, and more rewarding than it was as the world’s only superpower.” (49)
I feel like adding: “And then will come the Kingdom of peace on Earth, and the whole world will be united in brotherhood, and the lion will lie down with the lamb.” This is but a dream dreamt by all utopians ignorant about the laws of world affairs. Huntington must have been shaken by the criticism of his preceding concept about the clash of civilizations, so he decided to mend his ways and offer a concept of universal brotherhood, leaving the field of science as a result and dropping to the level of “common sense.” Apparently, we can soon expect him to take up a religious vocation.
17 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (March/April 1999).
18 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Touchstone Books, 1998).
19 He was mistaken about Milosevic, though.
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)