Part One: U.S. strategy in the 21st century: leadership through hegemony
Chapter II: Role and Place of the USA in the Twenty-first Century in the Research of American Political Scientists and Scholars of International Affairs
Zbigniew Brzezinski: As Always, Favoring U.S. Hegemony
and Status Quo for Russia
Because Zbigniew Brzezinski gets more attention from Russian political scientists, it is worth taking a look at some of his views. His vision of the world is naturally, cardinally different from Huntington’s. In an article included in the collection dedicated to the theory of complexity, he analyzes in his conventional traditional manner America’s foreign policy, making it clear that his approach has nothing to do with the theory of complexity.20
Right away, he attacks the thesis about America defended by many American scholars of international affairs, expressed in the briefest form by the phrase: “It’s leadership, stupid!” Brzezinski designates this as an “exit strategy,” i.e., a strategy of detachment in all international affairs. He identifies six problems that cannot be resolved through application of that concept, formulating them as six questions: Will a larger and a more secure Europe emerge? Will Russia become a status quo power? Will the Persian Gulf and the Middle Eastern region become more stable? Will the Far East adjust to the nature of the power shift that is now under way? Will we effectively manage nuclear proliferation? Will large-scale social collapse be avoided in some critical parts of the world?
The American expert’s answer to all these questions is perfectly obvious: Of course they won’t be solved without the U.S. involvement. If somehow they are solved, the solutions won’t be satisfactory from the point of view of U.S. national interests. We are interested in the subject of Russia as it figures in his answers. Brzezinski believes that Russia should be helped, but how and in what areas? He writes: “That means creating circumstances in which Russia has no choice but to become a status quo power. That in turn means on the one hand, the expansion of NATO because it does reduce any geopolitical temptations to which Russia at some point may aspire and might be able to exercise even from a position of weakness. On the other hand, it also means creating conditions in the space of the former Soviet Union in which the status quo becomes permanent. That means a deliberate policy of matching aid to Russia with simultaneous aid to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. For only if they remain sovereign and independent, will Russia be more inclined to accommodate the status quo society.”
Here is another of Brzezinski’s clarifications that follows his musings about more attention to Ukraine: “My choice, in addition to Ukraine, would be Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, for reasons that are probably familiar to many of you. Uzbekistan because it is the hard core of an independent Central Asia. It is in our interest to preserve an independent Central Asia, because it helps to make Russia a status quo society. Azerbaijan because it is the cork in the bottle. If Azerbaijan is sealed because of Russian, or Russian and Iranian collusion, there is no access for us to Central Asia. Central Asia would become strategically vulnerable.”
Many regard this as no more than leisurely musings of a once-influential policy adviser. In point of fact, Brzezinski simply describes the actual policy of the USA in the zone of the former Soviet Union.
In another article21 based on the concept of “Eurasian wholeness” (the European Union, Russia, China, and Japan), Brzezinski proposes the forming of two triangles—one to include the USA, the EU, and Russia; the other, USA, Japan, and China. This construct seems to him effective for the purpose of “constructive involvement of Russia.” So, what is the essence of this proposal?
It is quite simple, actually. To start with, Brzezinski lists a whole bunch of figures illustrating the pitiable state of Russia’s economy, the social situation, the weak external ties, etc. He also notes that the current ruling political elite headed by Putin belongs to the third generation of the Soviet class of apparatchiki, consisting mostly of former KGB persons. This composition of the elite accounts for anti-American attitudes, greater negativity toward the process of NATO expansion, and attempts to instigate rivalries between European states and the USA. At the same time, Russia’s leadership developed the conviction about the necessity to restore Russia as a powerful state and use that power to subjugate again the entire Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) space. In Brzezinski’s opinion, the Kremlin has been taken over by Leninist ideas about zero-sum political games. It is manifested in the Kremlin leaders’ belief that non-Russian regions of the CIS are better off not developing their economies at all than falling under the West’s influence. As an example, he cites Moscow’s approach toward the Caspian region countries and President Putin’s hostility to Ukraine’s flirtation with NATO. In other words, these three directions of Russia’s policy—the Caucasus region, Ukraine, and Belarus (with the idea of “unification in brotherly Slavic solidarity”) and attempts to prevent Baltic countries from joining NATO—do not agree with Brzezinski’s ideas about a constructive structure of international relations. Brzezinski is certain, though, that Moscow’s present goals are unattainable in principle. For instance, an alliance with China can only result in Russia’s subjugation by China “without resolution of her problems.” Should Russia continue her present policies, instead of a “Europe stretching to the Urals,” the result may well be a devastated, besieged “Russia stretching to the Urals.”
This result does not suit the West. Brzezinski proposes that the West, or rather the USA, pursue the same kind of policy toward Russia that the West followed toward Turkey after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Kemal Ataturk. Brzezinski thinks that Putin is no Ataturk (because his thinking reflects the thinking of the last generation of the Soviet leadership, rather than the first post-Soviet generation); therefore, he should not be relied on. But the next generation will think differently, having been educated in and viewing themselves as part of the West. In this direction, active measures should be taken, i.e., the number of invitations to study in America should be greatly increased, so that young Russians may digest the fruits of American democracy. This new generation can be convinced that Russia will derive all kinds of benefits from NATO expansion, including not just Russia’s neighboring states but Russia herself. At some time in the future, a NATO-Russian Joint Council can be formed. On this permanent basis, the above-mentioned idea of two big triangles can be implemented.
Brzezinski is correct in stating that Russia’s current foreign policy is doomed to failure. However, he is dead wrong when he envisions the policy of involving Russia in one of the two triangles as the way to avoid this failure. Such a construct cannot be balanced when one of the three pillars (Russia) is weaker by (at least) an order of magnitude than the other two. We’re only talking about economic mass here. The Western mentality of the next generation of leaders will not strengthen the Russian “corner” of the triangle; on the contrary, it will be weakened because the interests of this kind of elite can only be pro-Western, not pro-Russian.
Besides, it would be naïve to expect Russians to believe that the inclusion of the Baltic States in NATO can have some kind of strategic benefits for Russia. It is perfectly obvious that the expansion of NATO does not have Russia’s interests in mind. By the way, this article by Brzezinski received a response from Stephan Sestanovich, who convincingly showed that a favorable Russian reaction to NATO’s expansion and a “Turkish approach” to Russia was not possible.22
I would add one more thing regarding Brzezinski’s proposal to fit Russia and China in different triangles directed by the same patron. Of course, from Washington’s perspective, the implementation of this idea would suit the U.S. strategic interests perfectly; all the “poles” would then be covered and under control. But think: Even the USA’s resources would not be enough to form these triangles. To me, President Bush’s current approach appears to be more optimal from the perspective of U.S. interests, because it is “point”-oriented and well structured in its priorities. Nevertheless, Brzezinski’s proposal is not without merit as a strategic idea.
20 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “America in the World Today,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997); available online from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books.html.
21 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Living With Russia,” The National Interest, 61 (fall 2000).
22 Stephen Sestanovich, “Where Does Russia Belong?” The National Interest, 62 (winter 2000/2001).
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)