Part One: U.S. strategy in the 21st century: leadership through hegemony
Chapter II: Role and Place of the USA in the Twenty-first Century in the Research of American Political Scientists and Scholars of International Affairs
U.S. National Security: the Realist Approach
A few years ago, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and Dickinson College’s Clarke Center organized a lecture series on U.S. national security in the post-Cold-War period. The speakers were scholars of international affairs and former diplomats, well known in their own country. These lectures were published in 1997 under the aegis of the SSI.29 The main reason they are of interest is that even though both the Institute and the Center are part of the Department of Defense, their scholars express ideas and views that are substantially different from the U.S. official positions on national security, especially those of the Pentagon. As an example, I picked the lecture by former Ambassador Robert F. Ellsworth, who held high positions in the State Department and other organizations involved in U.S. foreign policy. My other choice is the lecture by Professor Ronald Steel of George Washington University and the University of Southern California, the author of five books on U.S. foreign and domestic policies.
I will start with Ellsworth.30 He identifies “the twin Transformations” that will substantially change international relations in the twenty-first century. The first of the two forces is the demographic explosion in the underdeveloped regions, the migration from those regions to the wealthy ones, and the globalization of economic relations. Also included in this force is the rivalry between religions and the new self-affirmation of states on an ethnic basis, which development, he thinks, is paradoxically stimulated by nation-states. He sees China as precisely one of the driving forces that promote ethnic “Asianism.”(70)
The second force is formed through the influence of technological change, most notably computer systems and biotechnology that give birth to new industries and instruments used in military operations throughout the world.
The interaction of these two transnational forces can theoretically produce three results in the system of international relations: chaos, prosperity, or something in between.
To be prepared for any of these eventualities, the national security of the United States in the early twenty-first century must be based on five vital national interests. These vital interests are (1) to prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States; (2) prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemony in Europe or Asia; (3) prevent the emergence of a hostile major power on U.S. borders or in control of the seas or of space; (4) prevent the catastrophic collapse of major global systems (trade, financial markets, energy, and environment); and (5) ensure the survival of U.S. allies. (72)
A sixth vital interest, entirely up to the United States, will be instrumental to securing the first five; that is, to promote U.S. leadership, military capabilities, and the reputation for adhering to clear U.S. commitments and evenhandedness in dealing with other states and people. (ibid.)
Apart from vital interests, there also exist, in Ellsworth’s terminology, twelve “extremely important” national interests, such as preventing and ending major conflicts in important geographic regions and preventing massive uncontrolled immigration across U.S. borders; eleven “just important” ones, such as discouraging massive human rights violations in foreign countries as a matter of official government policy; and five “less important,” or secondary ones, such as balancing bilateral trade deficits and enlarging democracy elsewhere for its own sake. (85)
The way the ambassador sees it, the difference between vital and important interests is that the former must be protected by any means, including military force, and alone, if necessary. The latter must be defended—if the issue of using military force arises—“only with a coalition of allies whose vital interests are themselves threatened.”(73)
Ellsworth believes that Russia must not be compared to the former Soviet Union, as some researchers are wont to do. He writes: “The government of Russia enjoys only limited political legitimacy at home and, despite the rhetoric of its brilliant foreign minister, lacks the ability to project political, economic, or military power beyond its ‘near abroad.’ Even in its ‘near abroad’ Moscow’s writ runs weak. “…The proliferation of Russian weapons and skills among criminals, insurgents and terrorists, and rapid military fragmentation, pose a far more immediate international danger than notional Russian military aggression anywhere.” (78-79)
Ellsworth emphasizes that Russia’s military potential, together with her military-industrial complex, continue to deteriorate, being in a demoralized state since 1991. “Leading Russian politicians count survival as Russia’s most pressing national interest, and this will clearly be served by keeping an open U.S. option. Yet the way of thinking of many in the U.S. foreign policy elite is still tinged with nostalgia for the good old Soviet threat.” (79)
On the other hand, the ambassador remarks with optimism that Russia is becoming actively involved in the world economy—not just through her usual exports of fossil fuel and mineral resources but also through the export of steel, armaments, and cooperation in outer space, etc. Ellsworth reminds the reader that Russia has on her territory enormous energy resources, exceeding those of the Caspian region; those resources touch in one way or another on the problems of security in the twenty-first century.
The ambassador believes it necessary to encourage Russia’s rapprochement with the West, for example, through the strengthening of relations between NATO and Russia, giving the latter a “real voice” in European security. On the general plane, it is necessary to engage Russia in the realization of “three of our own (and many others’) national interests: a strong and truly global energy system, in which Russia itself, and the Caspian Sea region, would be copious sources of oil and gas; containment of Islamic militarism; and no hostile hegemony in Europe.” (80)
I wish to draw attention to the words I have italicized: our own. The ambassador ponders ways to make Russia an accomplice in the realization of American interests. Do these interests correspond to Russia’s interests? Such a silly question doesn’t even enter the ambassador’s mind. Perhaps that goes with being American. Only Russians worry about how things are going in, say… Ethiopia? Do they need any help over there?
Ellsworth insists decisively on the leading role of the United States in the twenty-first century, meaning that it seeks to solve all international problems in cooperation with its allies and through finding common ground with Russia and China. This approach is characteristic of the supporters of a collective hegemony of the West, headed by the United States. It is unusual for Ellsworth to take this position, considering that he was Senator Robert Dole’s adviser on foreign policy issues during the latter’s presidential campaign of 1996. It is well known that Dole insisted on a solitary hegemony of the USA in the world with no regard for its allies. Times have changed, apparently, and so has Ellsworth.
29 U.S. National Security: Beyond the Cold War (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997). Available online from SSI’s home page: http://carlislewww.army.mil/usassi/.
30 Robert F. Ellsworth, “American National Security in the Early Twenty-First Century,” U.S. National Security: Beyond the Cold War.
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)