Part One: U.S. strategy in the 21st century: leadership through hegemony
Chapter II: Role and Place of the USA in the Twenty-first Century in the Research of American Political Scientists and Scholars of International Affairs
Rand Corporation’s Forecasts and Future Scenarios to Year 202533
The book Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy was written by associates of the Rand Corporation, an important think-tank that influences the shaping of the foreign and domestic policy of the USA. Commissioned by the U.S. Air Force, this particular book contains forecasts for the period up to 2025. I will analyze one of the more important chapters in that book that deals with problems of interest to us. It was written by the well-known American scholars of international affairs Zalmay Khalilzad and David Shlapak, in cooperation with Ann Flanagan.34
The authors set out nine propositions about the state of the world in the next twenty-five years:
1. The United States will remain a globally engaged actor.
2. The global distribution of power will change.
3. Great power relationships will be in flux.
4. Regional divisions will be increasingly blurred.
5. The U.S. homeland will be more exposed to attack.35
6. The rise of a “global competitor” is uncertain.
7. Technology, including military technology, will spread rapidly.
8. The spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) weapons will remain a major problem.
9. The U.S. military will be called upon to respond not only to major regional warfare but also to other crises, and to play a key role in shaping the future security environment. (7-8)
The authors predict that by 2025, three kinds of scenarios might unfold on the world stage: (1) base case, (2) benign, or (3) malignant. They proceed from the assumption that Russia as the “Russian Confederation” fits the first scenario, “Dynamic Russia” fits the second, and “Sick Man of Eurasia” fits the third. The corresponding scenarios for China are called “Assertive,” “Liberalizing,” and “Hegemonic.” (8)
In keeping with the American tradition of prognosticating, the authors hedge their predictions by mentioning wild cards, i.e. unpredictable, random events. Listed among these are deadly viruses, cosmic objects, neo-fascists’ ascension to power in nuclear-weapon states, and a new Cold War caused by “civilizational” differences (i.e., Islamic fundamentalism against the West), etc.
The geostrategic context. In this scenario, the USA remains a global power. The authors are certain that this status will be maintained through the early twenty-first century because the entirety of economic, political, military, cultural, and other factors makes the United States the globe’s 500-pound gorilla, whether we like it or not. (10) In this connection, by the way, they make a note of U.S. cultural penetration throughout the world, deeper and more important than political ties. They even give this reminder in parenthesis: “Recall that Levis blue jeans were a status symbol in the pre-perestroika USSR.” (ibid.)
In the context of a global shift of power (point two of nine), the authors suggest, referring to World Bank data, that China, currently the world’s second biggest economy (as measured at PPP), will become the biggest economy by 2020. (12) As for Russia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics, they contend that nothing definite can be said about them due to the uncertainty of their current development. (ibid.)
Nonetheless, they do mention two possible variants of Russia’s development. The first is called a “Russian miracle,” analogous to the examples of Germany and Japan after World War II. The authors remind the reader in this connection how quickly the Soviet Union managed to build up its power and win the war against Germany, just as unexpectedly as Germany and the USA grew in the period 1870-1910. (19-20) The second variant of Russia’s future is called “the new sick man of Eurasia.” (14) Because both variants are theoretically possible, the USA must be ready for either one.
In connection with point six (uncertainty about increase of “global competition”), the authors write that China is capable of dramatically increasing her strategic weight and her military potential over the next twenty-five years. “China might even attempt to challenge the United States and its interests worldwide.” (19)
In Scenario One, World I: Evolutionary, the authors suppose that Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian-populated parts of Moldova and Kazakhstan are reunited with Russia proper in a confederation (in Ukraine’s case, perhaps loosely so), while the Central Asian and Trans-Caucasus countries drift away from Russia and into the Asian and Middle Eastern spheres. (26)
Scenario Two, World II: Benign, describes a peaceful, prosperous world, structurally interconnected and convergent. Naturally, in this world, democratic institutions and market mechanisms are the norm. Here Russia is a dynamic, democratic, market-oriented state, building relations with neighbors on the basis of commerce and investment and not through military mechanisms. (23) Ideal for the USA is the scenario in which Russia becomes a regional power whose influence only extends over part of the borders of the former USSR.
Scenario Three, World III: Malignant, describes a bad world of power rivalry and frequent conflicts. In Europe, this scenario envisions failures of integration processes, a vacuum of power and influence. Western Europe is unable to enforce stability in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The vacuum is filled by a mighty Germany and with interstate conflicts, as well as ethnic conflicts. NATO is either paralyzed or split. “Although the Russia of World III is ‘authoritarian but weak’ in the wake of failed political and economic reform, the overall depressed state of Europe could allow Moscow to re-emerge as a potential hegemon, at least over the eastern part of the continent. China tugs on Russia from the east, and Iran and Pakistan from the south. Amidst these tensions, a catastrophic breakdown of a country that still possesses thousands of nuclear weapons is a never-too-distant possibility.” (30-31) Considering China’s ascension, she may strike an alliance with Russia. In any case, even “a weak Russia relying on its nuclear arsenal to protect itself could pose a constant danger to important U.S. interests worldwide.” (32)
Analyzing one official government paper, the authors note one “curious” detail, namely, in the chapter that deals with the “APR” the impact of different countries on the USA, China, Japan, and India are mentioned, but not a word is said about Russia. The same is true of the discussion on the Middle East. The European part of the paper states: “With Russia’s military in drastic decline, the United States and its allies will enjoy a decisive technological superiority over potential adversaries in Europe.” (41)
Conflicts connected to Russia. A special chapter in this book, dedicated to the sources of conflict in Europe and the former Soviet Union, is written by the Dutch author John Van Oudenaren.36
The author posits that the fundamental interest of the USA in the area of security in Europe is to prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon, or a country aspiring to the status of a hegemon. He indicates Russia as potentially aspiring to such hegemony. Despite Russia’s current weakening, her re-emergence as a serious “adequate rival” cannot be ruled out. At least this threat may emerge in the event of strengthening relations within the CIS or some “other grouping,” leading to the re-creation of the former Soviet Union. Having thus scared the reader, Van Oudenaren qualifies his statement right away: “However, as will be argued below, no Russian-led state or coalition is likely ever again to achieve the global power position or pose the same threat to the United States that the Soviet Union did in 1945-1990.” (233)
He emphasizes that within the framework of the economic and geopolitical shifts throughout the world, and considering the globalization of security issues in a multipolar world from the perspective of the long-term view, the interests of European security constitute for the USA only part of its overall security. He reminds the reader that in the first half of the twentieth century, the USA was supposedly supporting weak Russia against ambitious Japan in the Far East.
Van Oudenaren clearly does not know history: In the geostrategic game in the Far East, the USA was actually provoking Japan against both Tsarist Russia and Soviet Russia; this policy culminated in the joint aggression of Japan and the USA against the Soviet Far Eastern republic in 1918. This lack of knowledge enables the author to suggest that the possibility of supporting contemporary Russia “against an aggressive China or other Asian power cannot be ruled out and follows from the overriding U.S. interest in preventing the emergence of a dominant and hostile power in either Europe or Asia.” (233)
The Dutch scholar views Russia’s relations with the Baltic countries from the perspective of a military threat proceeding from Russia. The threat can be realized by territorial disputes with Estonia and Latvia, or by some shifts in the status of Kaliningrad, or by a change of Belarus’s attitude toward Lithuania. It can also be provoked by the expansion of NATO.
Russia may develop equally difficult relations with Turkey, a NATO member. The conflict may arise on any pretext in connection with economic, political, or geostrategic problems. (237)
“Russia could use levers short of military intervention to destabilize and expand its influence in some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These levers might include economic dependence, espionage, exploitation of contacts and relationships left over from the Soviet period, and military intimidation through deployments and exercises. Russian stresses of this sort may not necessarily lead to overt conflict but could intensify pressures on the United States and its allies to extend security arrangements and guarantees to countries within what traditionally has been Russia’s sphere of influence.” (238)
Van Oudenaren believes that short of military conflict, Russian political and economic weight in the CIS area poses a latent threat to the independence and maneuvering freedom of other states in the former Soviet Union. Reintegration of Belarus into a Russian-controlled union, particularly military reintegration, would constitute a threat for Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine.
A threat to the environment also exists. Especially worrisome are the forty-five commercial nuclear reactors built in the Soviet era and still functioning in Russia, Ukraine, and Armenia. (239)
A modified Cold War order. This state of the world envisions a strong Russia/CIS and a relatively weak Western Europe that relies on the United States. In other words, the European structure resembles the structure of the Cold War period. (241)
It is expected that the relative economic potential of some countries (for instance Germany and Italy) will decline somewhat in absolute terms, while other states will experience a modest increase. Germany’s population is expected to decline from 81.1 million in 1995 to 77.7 million in 2015 and to 73.4 million in 2030. A number of factors (such as Germany’s known political limitations, an aging population, and declining numbers of draft-age recruits) should modify the perception of Germany as a threat to stability on the continent. One must also consider the new population ratio between Russia and her “near abroad.” Some experts expect Russia’s population to grow from the current 149 million to 153 million in 2015 (an increase of four million). But over that same time, the eight countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus will see their population grow from 72 million to 96 million (an increase of 24 million). (243)
“A similar range of views exists with regard to Russia. Many policy analysts stress the different cultural and political traditions of Russia and conclude that Russia constitutes a permanent geopolitical challenge to its western neighbors; that “enlargement” of the Western community inevitably will stop at Russia’s western border (or, in Samuel P. Huntington’s view, at the western edge of the entire Orthodox world).”(262)
Other experts believe that Russia will be adjusting to the world in one way or another, in view of the dramatic decline of her status. Still, a weak Russia has a better chance of being integrated into the global system than the stronger Soviet Union used to have.
Russia’s military potential. From the military perspective, Russia will remain weak, unlikely in the short or the middle term to present an aggressive threat to other European countries, except the Baltic nations. Her armed forces currently suffer from insufficient funding and are below full strength. Draft evasion is ubiquitous, and officers of all ranks are quitting the armed forces in droves. Those who remain suffer from a serious fall in status and standard of living. Shipments of most types of armaments are virtually nonexistent. The technology gap between Russia and the advanced Western countries, especially the United States, will doubtlessly grow. (278)
Russia’s air force is facing myriad problems having to do with obsolete armaments, though several new aircraft models are in the works, including the MiG-33 and the Su-35. Despite the constant emphasis on quality and technology in modernization, one should not expect Russia to make progress in the development of fifth-generation fighter jets. The air force top brass has often proclaimed its desire to acquire a new fighter plane, emphasizing the growing importance of stealth technologies. But competing priorities in the defense administration and the general shortage of funds in the defense budget will most likely prevent the Russian air force from acquiring a new generation of aircraft in the near future. (281)
“In defense as in foreign policy, Russia draws a distinction between what it calls its ‘near abroad’ and its ‘far abroad,’ and at least for now is focusing on the former. Russian national security policy places a heavy emphasis on defense integration in the CIS, even though, as has been seen, several key members do not participate in the CIS’s military activities.
“Much of what has been concluded at CIS meetings on defense can be discounted as rhetoric.” (279)
Contrary to official doctrine, Russia’s military planners and political leaders do not rule out the possibility of conflict with countries of the “far abroad.” Border clashes are not impossible between Russia and Turkey or China; Russian forces in Tajikistan may clash with guerrillas from Afghanistan supporting the Tajik opposition. “Over the long term,” notes the Dutch scholar, “Russia could be especially vulnerable to pressure from China.” (280)
Russia and the CIS. For Russia and the CIS, depending on which of the scenarios discussed above comes to dominate, four alternative orders are possible: (1) reconstituted union, (2) muddling along, (3) dynamic Russia, and (4) sick man of Eurasia. (287).
33 Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, eds., Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy (Rand, 1998).
34 Zalmay Khalilzad and David Shlapak with Ann Flanagan, “Overview of the Future Security Environment” (chapter two) in Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century.
35 Unfortunately, this prognosis was too quickly proven correct.
36 John Van Oudenaren, “Sources of Conflict in Europe and the Former Soviet Union,” chapter five in Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century.
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)