Part One: U.S. strategy in the 21st century: leadership through hegemony
Chapter II: Role and Place of the USA in the Twenty-first Century in the Research of American Political Scientists and Scholars of International Affairs
Alternative Developments of the Situation in Europe
The future of the strategic order in Europe depends on which direction the development of each of its subregions takes, and how these subregions interact with each other and with the rest of the world.
“Six such alternative strategic worlds could result: (1) Modified Cold War Order; (2) Atlantic Partnership; (3) European Bipolarity; (4) West European Dominance; (5) Rivalry and Fragmentation; and (6) Pan-European Order.” (290)
It is important to keep in mind that the present strategic order is a mix of the Modified Cold War Order (where NATO membership for Central and Eastern European countries is perceived as a defence against Russia) and the Pan-European Order (as evidenced by NATO’s efforts to include Russia in the European security structures, even as it expands against Russia’s will).
Probabilities and time frames. The current strategic order in Europe can be characterized as an approximation of the Modified Cold War Order, although with a lower threat level, with tendencies toward building a Pan-European Order. A shift toward another strategic order will probably occur as soon as the process of post-Communist transition is over and in response to the long-term trends described earlier in this chapter.
The intensification of rivalry in Europe and its falling apart is the least likely alternative, though even this variant cannot be ruled out in the longer term (2025 and beyond). From the short-and middle-term perspective, it is difficult to imagine Western Europe in the kind of economic and political crisis that could lead to the collapse of the integration that started in the 1950s. (292)
The Pan-European Order is the most desirable trend that may materialize even in the longest term. A political dialogue, as well as the many new and traditional institutions (ESCO, the Founding Act Russia, NATO, etc.), represent useful links in a Pan-European Order. Nonetheless, in the short- and middle-term perspective, an effective implementation of this order is hardly possible because the expansion of NATO and the European Union, as well as objective conditions “on the ground,” widen rather than narrow the gap between Russia (Ukraine and other CIS members) and a large part of Central and Eastern Europe.
Yet, the most likely scenarios for Europe in the middle- and long-term perspectives are European bipolarity, West European dominance, or a continuation of the modified Cold War order, in combination with the Atlantic Partnership.
Due to the economic superiority of Western Europe over Russia, West European dominance would appear to be, at first sight, the most likely outcome. But a number of factors, including the reluctance of several West European countries to speed up integration, the difficulties that stem from the acceptance of Central and Eastern European states into the European Union, and the problems of establishing the European currency, make the emergence of such a scenario doubtful. More important problems are the burden of military expenditures and the formulation of a common concept of defense and security policy.
This knot of problems implies that bipolar relations with a weakened Russia will turn out to be the most likely scenario. Keeping in mind U.S. involvement in counteracting Russia’s hidden or real threat to Western Europe, this order would turn out to resemble the modified Cold War order. If one considers another group of factors, namely that parts of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe remain an unstable gray zone, not fully integrated into Western Europe though free from Russian domination, then this order fits the rivalry and fragmentation scenario. (293)
The Pan-European Order. This order appears to be the preferable one for the United States. It frees the USA from involvement in internal European conflicts, including those stemming from a containment policy against a reconstituted Russian nuclear threat to other parts of Europe. Stability would be established throughout Europe, and the principal European states, the EU, and Russia would be capable of implementing on their own a policy of maintaining peace on the continent.
John Van Oudenaren draws attention to one important aspect of the Pan-European Order’s desirability to the USA, one that Americans themselves prefer not to discuss. It has to do with China. The author reflects that it would be quite important to the USA and Western Europe to support a friendly Russia (and possibly Kazakhstan and other states of Central Asia) in response to China’s resurgence. Moreover, “This effort could entail military assistance by the West to Russia, and possibly even the extension of NATO or other security guarantees to Russia (and/or Kazakhstan) at some point in the future.” (298)
War between Russia and China. The probability of the above-mentioned events is explained by China’s ascension and transformation into a global economic and geostrategic power located on Russia’s borders. “Regional trends point to the growing importance of China as a global economic power—and the strategic implications for Russia of the geopolitical rise of its eastern neighbor. War between Russia and China would burst the parameters of the alternative strategic worlds outlined above (based on existing regional trends), raising the prospect of an entirely different strategic world coming into being, perhaps built along civilizational lines with Russia allied with the West against China. The position of Japan in such a world would be crucial.” (300)
The author doesn’t explain the reasons for Russia and China coming to war, but he already outlines in advance the anti-China coalition that might take shape. Van Oudenaren believes that, generally speaking, Russia does have the potential to become a military threat to Western Europe by the period 2015-2025. But this will only happen if Russia’s economy gets back on track and/or Russia manages to re-establish her de facto or de jure hegemony over parts of the former Soviet Union. “It is less likely to resume its role as a peer competitor to the United States. Indeed, Russia is unlikely ever to exercise the kind of global and European role that it did for 45 years after World War II, especially given German reunification, the loss of influence in Eastern Europe, and the rise of China on its eastern flank.” (302)
The appendix to Van Oudenaren’s book contains a scenario of a possible war between Russia and Ukraine. (I remind the reader that the book was published in 1998.) Here is how it goes:
Russia has evolved its own variant of semi-authoritarian rule based on a strong president and market capitalism dominated by huge quasi-monopolist firms in key sectors. Fears of encirclement by hostile powers—aggravated by NATO’s expansion to include Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia in 1999 and continued talk in the West about admitting the Baltic states and Ukraine to the alliance—are a growing source of pressure in Moscow’s decision making.
By 2005, Ukraine has made substantial progress toward building a bona fide state and a viable national economy, but the country remains poor by European standards and critically vulnerable to Russian pressure from a variety of sources, including dependence on Russian energy supplies, extensive Russian ownership in key economic sectors, penetration of Ukrainian offices by Russian intelligence, and dependence on Russian suppliers for arms and spare parts.
NATO has been weakened by the effects of enlargement and disputes among its members on a variety of issues such as containing Chinese expansion in Asia and deterring Iranian adventurism in the Gulf. Western Europe has established an energy community with Russia, from which it obtains an increasing share of its oil and natural gas.
In 2005, an anti-Western president triumphs in Russia, while Ukraine is suffering from the cyclical effects of a recession, etc. Gripped by anti-Russian sentiment, Western Ukraine is closely intertwined with Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, while the eastern parts of the country maintain close cultural and economic ties with Russia. Many there believe that their interests are sacrificed in order to develop the Western parts of Ukraine. The problem of the Crimea worsens. In this situation, Moscow believes that Ukraine is allying itself with Turkey against Russia. The pro-Russian part of the population takes to the streets. Demonstrations are suppressed, with many people killed.
Russia then has no choice but to occupy the eastern part of Ukraine and Crimea, using rapid reaction forces. Russia’s air force neutralizes Ukraine’s air force on the ground and proceeds to attack key military targets.
Ukraine formally appeals for help to NATO, the United States, and the European Union.
The U.S. NSA (National Security Agency) orders the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) to prepare to execute operations aimed at deterring further Russian aggression and restoring the territorial status quo. Once this is accomplished, the outbreak of a major civil war in Ukraine is prevented.
The EU and NATO response to the crisis has been tepid, at best. The German government blames Ukraine for setting off the confrontation. The remainder of Western Europe appears inclined to follow Germany’s lead. Within pre-1999 NATO, only the United States, Great Britain, and Turkey are urging a forceful military response.
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have also called for a strong Western response to defend the Ukraine against Russian aggression. However, Warsaw in particular makes clear that its support is contingent upon broad alliance support involving Germany and other European allies, as well as the United States; Poland does not want to stand alone as a forward U.S. base in a Russo-American war. There is a possibility, however, that a strong and forceful U.S. response could rally Poland. (326-329)
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)