Part One: U.S. strategy in the 21st century: leadership through hegemony
Chapter II: Role and Place of the USA in the Twenty-first Century in the Research of American Political Scientists and Scholars of International Affairs
Russia “Presents a Threat to the United States, to the West,
and to the Russian People.”
This sentence was uttered by another conference participant, Ariel Cohen, a senior Russia expert whom I would list among the best Russia analysts in the United States. As befits a representative of the Heritage Foundation, he criticized the Clinton administration for its inadequate approach to Russia, following up on his criticism with recommendations about what to do about Moscow. His views reflect the approach of those circles in the USA who view Russia as “neither friend nor foe,” but a state that must be made subordinate to U.S. interests at all costs.
Cohen attempts an appeal to realism. “The Clinton administration and Congress,” writes Cohen, “need to realize that today’s Russia— with a gross domestic product only slightly higher than Indonesia’s and lower than Mexico’s, and a living standard like Brazil’s—is not the global power its predecessor, the Soviet Union, was.”42 At the same time, under the leadership of Primakov (Russia’s minister of foreign affairs in 1997), Moscow was forming a strategic alliance with Beijing and Teheran. The idea of a “multipolar world” and a “coalition of equals” may potentially be transformed into an anti-American Eurasian coalition. This introduces a serious threat to the security interests of the USA and its allies in Europe, in the Middle East, and the Pacific Ring. According to Cohen’s information, “During 1996, over 3,000 Russian nuclear scientists moved to China to work on modernization of the PRC’s strategic nuclear program. Russia signed agreements to transfer to China its advanced gas centrifuge technology, used in uranium enrichment, and nuclear missile technology to build multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), which can arm a single missile with up to twelve warheads. Russia also has agreed to sell the technology to build Sukhoi-27 fighters with mid-air refueling capabilities, as well as advanced missile-armed destroyers, to the Chinese navy.”
Cohen believes that in this kind of “strategic partnership,” Russia is doomed to be the junior partner. Besides, Russia won’t receive adequate repayment from China. His sole consolation is the fact that not everyone in Russia approves of this policy (Primakov’s policy) toward China.
As for the USA, it “must pressure Russia to make her curtail the transfer of nuclear technology to China” or even to put an end to this process (“U.S. must stop it”). In his other writings, he also keeps emphasizing that a partnership between Russia, China, and Iran “presents a threat to the USA and its allies.” 43 In one chapter of Issues 2000: The Candidate’s Briefing Book,44 Cohen criticizes the Clinton administration in his usual style for its inadequate approach to Russia. In particular, he quotes the figure of $27 billion—money transferred to Russia through the IMF since 1992 that was not used as intended, i.e., for the rebuilding of the economy. Part of it was stolen in the bowels of the Central Bank of Russia and the Ministry of Finance; part of it was “possibly” used to fund the war in Chechnya. According to Cohen’s information, since 1992 the Bush and Clinton administrations gave Russia financial aid to the tune of $4 billion, and helped in providing another $48 billion as multilateral aid in the form of loans from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Group of Seven industrial nations (G-7). (707)
Cohen considers it ridiculous that such help was provided against the background of anti-Western rhetoric that was characteristic of Yeltsin during the last year of his presidency. He lists Russia’s anti-Western deeds, mentioning again the military-technological cooperation with China, Yevgeny Primakov’s idea of a “three-member block” (Russia, China, and India), the sale of missile technology and nuclear reactors to Iran, limitations placed on religious freedoms, and the killing of civilians in Chechnya. (709-710)
Cohen thinks that the Clinton administration’s main mistake is the illusion that Russia will become a democratic, market-economy country of the Western type. It is not happening, which means that the desired result requires a different approach and a different policy.
Here is what Cohen, i.e., the Heritage Foundation, suggests:
First, if the IMF is to make loans, it must have full control on how the monies are used. If Russia is to receive these loans, she must agree to a long list of conditions, including the demonopolization of the natural gas, power-generation, fuel, and transportation sectors of the economy, the liberalization of agriculture (i.e., adoption of the law on private ownership of land), and reduction of defense expenditures, etc. Second, the USA must dump the ABM Treaty of 1972. Third, it must force Russia to stop providing technological assistance to Iran and Iraq. Fourth, the USA must give more effective support to market reforms in Russia. Fifth, it must support the sovereignty, independence, and civil societies of the New Independent States, including Ukraine, the Trans-Caucasus, the Baltic countries, and the states of Central Asia. (713-716)
To the question of whether Russia is “a threat to America,” Cohen gives this answer: “Russia was dangerous in its strength and can be a danger in its weakness. Its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and the technologies to produce them is leaking to countries that are hostile to America. Russia still has the largest nuclear arsenal outside the United States and is the only country that is capable of obliterating the United States.” (719) Elsewhere, he writes: “Russia is emerging as a potentially troubling actor in world affairs.” (703)
It is symptomatic that, unlike many Western observers and scholars who pin their hopes on Putin as a president capable of suppressing corruption and stabilizing the Russian economy, Cohen confidently predicts the opposite. He writes: “Instead, the people Putin has selected for his cabinet may serve only to exacerbate the problems that encumbered Russia under Yeltsin. As huge insider business deals and the war in Chechnya continue, President Clinton should be under no illusion that he will find a ‘reformist’ Russian president coming to the summit table.”45 And further: “Given Putin’s decisions and appointments, the new Kremlin appears unlikely to veer far from the path carved out by the Yeltsin regime. This means that the Clinton administration should not confuse its need to establish a working relationship with Putin with its desires to help Russia develop democratic institutions and a free market.” (ibid.)
It is something worth underscoring that, though many in the USA are skeptical about Russia in general and Putin in particular, Cohen is one of the few who voices their skepticism directly. Most importantly, his evaluations are correct and will certainly be confirmed by the subsequent course of events.
42 Ariel Cohen, “A New Paradigm for U.S.-Russian Relations: Facing the Post-Cold War Reality,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, no. 1105 (March 6, 1997).
43 Ariel Cohen, The “Primakov Doctrine”: Russia’s Zero-Sum Game with the United States, Heritage Foundation FYI, no. 167 (December 15, 1997).
44 Stuart M. Butler and Kim R. Holmes, eds., Issues 2000: The Candidate’s Briefing Book (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2000).
45 Ariel Cohen, “Summit Rhetoric Aside, Putin’s New Cabinet Makes Russian Reforms Less Likely,” Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, no. 675 (June 1, 2000).
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)