Part One: U.S. strategy in the 21st century: leadership through hegemony
Chapter III: Official U.S. Strategic Doctrines: A View of the World and of Russia
A National Security Strategy for a New Century47
In the foreword, supposedly penned by the president, the status of the USA is defined right away: “The United States remains the world’s most powerful force for peace, prosperity, and the universal values of democracy and freedom.”
The objectives of U.S. strategy are to enhance America’s security, to bolster America’s economic prosperity, and to promote democracy and human rights abroad.
The strategy indicates that the main characteristic of the twenty-first century will be globalization, which is defined as “the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural, and political integration.” At the same time, it is noted that globalization will be accompanied by different kinds of “challenges” and risks that will affect the security of the USA. The most important risks are weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crime, resource depletion, rapid population growth, environmental damage, new infectious diseases, pervasive corruption, and uncontrolled refugee migration.
The document clearly defines U.S. national interests, divided into three categories: vital interests, important national interests, and humanitarian and other interests. The vital interests are those that relate “to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation.” “Among these are the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens, the economic well-being of our society, and the protection of our critical infrastructures—including energy, banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water systems, and emergency services—from paralyzing attack. We will do what we must to defend these interests, including, when necessary and appropriate, using our military might unilaterally and decisively.”(1) “The important national interests are those that do not affect our national survival, but they do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live. Important national interests include, for example, regions in which we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies, protecting the global environment from severe harm, and crises with a potential to generate substantial and highly destabilizing refugee flows, such as the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, etc.”
“The humanitarian interests are promoting human rights and seeking to halt gross violations of those rights; supporting democratization, adherence to the rule of law and civilian control of the military; assisting humanitarian demining; and promoting sustainable development and environmental protection.”
Curiously enough, threats to U.S. interests include threats originating from so-called failed states. These latter include, among others, the countries that “though possessing the capacity to govern—may succumb to the inflammatory rhetoric of demagogues who blame their nation’s ills on and persecute specific religious, cultural, racial, or tribal groups. States that fail to respect the rights of their own citizens and tolerate or actively engage in human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing, or acts of genocide not only harm their own people, but can spark civil wars and refugee crises and spill across national boundaries to destabilize a region.” (2) Anyone knowledgeable about the situation in Russia understands that this “bit” of the document is dedicated specifically to Russia.
Let us note the following: The main characteristics of the twenty-first century are: (1) globalization; (2) multitude of “challenges” and risks; and (3) leadership of the USA as the greatest power in the world. The three strategic goals (security, prosperity, and democracy) practically coincide with the three categories of interests (vital, important, and humanitarian). Now let’s move on to Russia.
Russia. In the document we are analyzing, we are interested only in Russia, or rather, the context in which Russia is mentioned or not mentioned. As was to be expected, Russia is represented in the part about arms control, where the START II Treaty between USA and USSR is mentioned, as well as the Helsinki (March 1997) agreement between the presidents of USA and Russia about the possibility of negotiations on a START III agreement.
Regarding initiatives for nonproliferation of WMD, we read that: “We are purchasing tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons for conversion into commercial reactor fuel, and working with Russia to remove 34 metric tons of plutonium from each country’s nuclear weapons programs and converting it so that it can never be used in nuclear weapons. We are redirecting dozens of former Soviet WMD facilities and tens of thousands of former Soviet WMD scientists in Eastern Europe and Eurasia from military activities to beneficial civilian research.” (9)
It is important to identify Russia’s role in U.S. policy’s regional directions. In the part dedicated to Europe, Russia is discussed not as a separate power but together with Ukraine and other CIS countries. The document expresses satisfaction with the process of NATO development and NATO cooperation with Russia (and with Ukraine) on the basis of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. The U.S. goal is to help “deepen and expand constructive Russian participation in the European security system.” (30)
In the subchapter dedicated to the CIS, it is stated that U.S. vital security interests are best served by the evolution of Russia, Ukraine, and other CIS countries into democratic market economies integrated into the world community. There are many qualifications, though, implying that the road to democracy is thorny and difficult—in short, far from completion. Yet, “It is in our national interest to help them build the laws, institutions, and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and corruption, and to advance human rights and the rule of law.” (32) Naturally, as soon as human rights are mentioned, the authors remember Chechnya, and in this connection they are sad that “the means Russia is pursuing in Chechnya are undermining its legitimate objective of upholding its territorial integrity and protecting citizens from terrorism and lawlessness.” (32)
The strategy also indicates: “We are working aggressively to strengthen export controls (meaning armaments) in Russia and the other NIS and to stem proliferation of sensitive missile and nuclear technology to countries of concern such as Iran.” (ibid.)
The strategy expresses satisfaction at the fact that although Russia was dissatisfied with NATO expansion and the Kosovo conflict, Russian units served shoulder-to-shoulder with NATO troops in Kosovo and Bosnia. In this connection, “The United States remains committed to further development of the NATO-Russia relationship and the NATO-Ukraine distinctive partnership.” (ibid.) Note the words I italicized: distinctive partnership for Ukraine, but plain relationship for Russia. The authors have no doubt there is nothing Russia can do—no matter how loudly its leaders oppose NATO expansion to the East. As for the other sub-regions (East Asia, the Pacific Ocean, Southeast Asia, the Western hemisphere, the Middle East, South Asia, Africa), Russia is not mentioned at all in any capacity.
From all this, the conclusion follows that in U.S. strategic policy, Russia only enters into consideration in two issues: the reduction of nuclear weapons and the imposition of the NATO concept of security in Europe. Moreover, it is stated directly that America’s positive attitude toward Russia is dependent on the latter staying on the course of capitalist reforms, i.e., the course toward democracy and market economy, which suits U.S. national interests. The other important thing to note is that in all regions except Europe, Russia has ceased to be taken into consideration by the USA.
47 A National Strategy For a New Century (The White House, December 1999); Internet.
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)