Part One: U.S. strategy in the 21st century: leadership through hegemony
Chapter III: Official U.S. Strategic Doctrines: A View of the World and of Russia
Annual Report to the President and the Congress49
Let us now move on to the Annual Report to the President and the Congress by the Secretary of Defense. We will take up the report prepared by William Cohen in the years 2000 and 2001. We are interested in the general statements, assessments about the world, and the Pentagon’s military policy, presented in the first part of the Report, called “The Defense Strategy.”
The document states that though a global war is not expected in the twenty-first century, “challenges” to U.S. security will remain and even multiply. Foremost among these challenges is the possibility of aggression or threats from Iraq and North Korea. There is the reminder that: “In East Asia, for example, sovereignty issues and several territorial disputes remain potential sources of conflict. Many instances of cross-border aggression will be small-scale in nature; but between now and 2015, it is entirely possible that more than one aspiring regional power will have both the motivation and the means to pose a military threat to U.S. interests.” (2) In general: “Even when important U.S. interests are not threatened, the United States may have a humanitarian interest in protecting the safety, well-being, and freedom of the people affected.” (ibid.) Therefore, every Russian citizen whose security and well-being cannot be protected by his country’s authorities has the opportunity to ask the USA for help.
Listed among “challenges” are the spread of potentially dangerous technologies, international terrorism, organized crime, information wars, etc., that can directly threaten the United States. Mentioned among threat sources are failed states because of their inability to resolve domestic problems.
Subsequently, the Report repeats the theses of the Presidential National Security Strategy concerning U.S. national interests in the international arena. Curiously, the Pentagon’s reformulation of vital interests adds one important line that is absent in the Strategy, namely: “Preventing the emergence of hostile regional coalitions or hegemons.” (4)
U.S. defense strategy to the year 2015 proceeds not just from the Strategy’s theses but also from the 1997 report known as the 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Review,50 also prepared in the name of the Secretary of Defense. This strategy consists of three elements: shaping, responding, and preparing; each section describes in detail the Pentagon’s activities for ensuring U.S. military security. The analysis of purely military aspects of Washington’s policy is outside the scope of this work, so let us proceed directly to the place and role of Russia in U.S. military strategy.
Russia. In the section on states that may potentially challenge U.S. security, in the subsection “A Global Peer Competitor,” the following is said about Russia and China: “The United States faces no global rival today, nor will it likely face one through at least 2015. In the period beyond 2015, however, there is the possibility that a regional great power or global peer competitor could emerge. China and Russia appear to have the most potential to be such competitors, though their respective futures are quite uncertain. China’s economy has been growing rapidly, and the People’s Liberation Army continues to modernize and increase its capability. China already has a strategic nuclear arsenal that, while not large, can reach the continental United States. China is likely to continue to face a number of internal challenges, however, both economic and political, that may slow the pace of its military modernization.
“Russia could, in the coming years, re-establish its capability to project large-scale offensive military forces along its periphery, but this would require substantial preparation that would be visible to the United States. While Russia continues to retain a large nuclear arsenal with both tactical and strategic weapons, its conventional military capabilities—both in terms of power projection and combat sustainability—have weakened significantly. Russia’s future will depend in large measure on its ability to develop its economy, which in turn is dependent upon a stable internal political environment. Should Russia’s political system fail to stabilize over the long term, disintegration of Russia as a coherent state could pose major security challenges for the United States and the international community.” (2-3) Thus, Russia is listed among the factors that comprise “the uncertain future.”
In the section “Regional Components of U.S. Strategy in Europe,” Russia is mentioned in the context of its relations with NATO, and in more detail about its relations with CIS countries. In connection with U.S. defense goals, the following is said: “The United States seeks the development of Russia, Ukraine, and the other New Independent States into stable market democracies fully integrated into the international community and cooperative partners in promoting regional security and stability, arms control, and counter proliferation. Integral to this goal is U.S. support of efforts to secure and stem the proliferation risk posed by former Soviet NBC weapons, weapons materials, and associated delivery systems or technologies, and to eliminate any former Soviet nuclear delivery systems remaining in the New Independent States other than Russia. …The United States wants to further develop the NATO-Russian partnership, as well as the NATO-Ukraine partnership promoting Ukraine’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.” (10)
It is worth noting some nuances of the similar Report of 2001.51
First, the section on proliferation of dangerous technologies now includes this line: “Moreover, the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch from Russia or China remains a concern, albeit an unlikely one.” (2)
Second, while the previous Report said that a global rival to the U.S. is unlikely to emerge before 2015, the Report of 2001 replaced the date 2015 with the words “the foreseeable future.” That is, the authors decided to be cautious about time frames. The subtext is that they expect such a rival to emerge before 2015. The same section contains a noteworthy addition: “It is not clear, however, whether China will pursue a path that is inimical to U.S. interests.” (ibid.) The section on Russia now contains the phrase that U.S. security may be threatened by “the inability of central authorities to maintain a coherent state [that] could pose major security challenges for the United States and the international community.” (3)
Third, the section on relations with New Independent States now mentions the Caucasus and Central Asia: “The United States also seeks a peaceful resolution to the ethnic and regional tensions throughout the NIS.” (13)
The most noteworthy fact is this: In the discussion of all other regions—East Asia and the Pacific Ocean, the Middle East and South Asia, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa—Russia is not mentioned in any context. This is true of all Reports since 1995. Therefore, we can safely say that in official U.S. military documents, Russia is viewed as a regional power only in the European context.
49 William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Department of Defense, 2000); available online at http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr2000/.
50 This document is one of the national defense reviews published every four years under the Defense Secretary’s name, under different titles.
51 William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Department of Defense, 2001); available online at http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr2001/.
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)