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Part One: U.S. strategy in the 21st century: leadership through hegemony


Chapter IV: Funding for U.S. International Policy


Conclusion: Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy

At one of the Round Tables, Mikhail Gorbachev made this pro­nouncement: “I have just returned from America…. The Americans themselves, their public opinion, tend to believe they don’t need this— the world policeman role and world domination. They feel that they have enough of their own problems. Public opinion, though, is often ignored, same as in many other states. Public opinion remains just that—an opinion, while real politics moves in a different direction.”64

This statement, characteristic of many Russian political leaders and scholars, is curious in two respects: First, Mr. Gorbachev deliberately uses the wrong term here. No one in the United States talks about being a “world policeman” and about U.S. domination of the world. The es­sence of these terms is conveyed through other phrases, namely, the active role of the United States in the world, U.S. leadership, and be­nevolent hegemony of the United States. These words don’t change the essence of the phenomenon, but as propaganda tools they work effec­tively to win support for U.S. foreign policy. Second, what grounds does Mr. Gorbachev have for speaking on behalf of U.S. “public opin­ion”? Did he take the trouble of talking to each individual American? Some Russian politicians, though, aim even higher and presume to speak for “the entire humankind and all peoples”; we’ll deal with this later in the chapter on Russian scholars.

Because I have never heard of public opinion polls on the scale of entire peoples and humankind as a whole, let us look into the matter of American public opinion about the role of the United States in the world and its relations with Russia and China. This is easy enough to do with access to the data from the polls conducted by the Chicago Committee on Foreign Policy. The committee has conducted these polls regularly once every four years, from 1974 onward. The last poll was conducted in 1998; its results were published in 1999.65

Polled individuals are separated into two categories: the public (or­dinary folk, so to speak) and the leadership (people involved in one way or another in the U.S. foreign policy process).

The world in the twenty-first century. The majority of the public (53 percent) believes that the twenty-first century will be bloodier and more violent than the twentieth century. Among leaders, this view is shared by only 40 percent of those polled. This means that the public has fewer illusions about the future than the leaders. This disagreement is quite natural because leaders in all countries attempt to embellish the future. One has only to recall the pie in the sky that Russia’s leaders used to promise to their people.

Role of the United States in the world. Sixty-one percent of the public and 96 percent of the leadership supported an active role for the United States in the world. Fifty percent of the public believes that America is currently playing a more important and powerful role as world leader than it did ten years ago; 79 percent of the public and 71 percent of the leadership are certain that in another ten years, this role will become even stronger.

Fifty-nine percent of the public and 58 percent of the leadership considered the superiority of U.S. military might in the world arena a “very important” goal.

Asked about the main factor in maintaining the country’s superior might and influence in the world, 63 percent of the public said economic might, and 28 percent said military might; among the leaders, 89 percent chose economic might, and 8 percent chose military might. In other words, the proportion of those who rely on military might is much higher among the general public than among the leaders. The people turn out to be more belligerent than their politicians.

China. The “feelings thermometer” measures the attitude toward a particular country and its leaders (neutral attitude equals 50 degrees Centigrade). On this scale, China rates 47 degrees. The majority of the public and the leaders (57 percent and 56 percent, respectively) view China’s transformation into a world power as a “critical” threat to American vital interests. Despite this, 69 percent of the public and 97 percent of its leaders believe that in the next ten years, China will be playing a bigger role than now. At the same time, only 27 percent of the public, as opposed to 51 percent of its leaders, consider U.S. mili­tary intervention necessary in the event of China’s invasion of Taiwan. 

Russia. The “feelings thermometer” shows that between 1994 and 1998, the public’s feelings toward Russia grew colder—from 54 to 49 degrees. “Feelings toward Yeltsin” underwent a similar change.

Public support for economic aid to Russia remained low: 38 percent of the public wanted it decreased or stopped altogether, while 35 per­cent wanted Russia to solve its economic problems on its own. Only 17 percent of the leaders polled supported this latter position. At the same time, 44 percent of the leaders preferred that Russia rely on Europe rather than America in its attempts to emerge from its crisis.

On the list of major foreign policy problems, Russia occupies fifth place in the leadership’s view and eleventh place in the public’s view. The vast majority of the public (77 percent) and its leaders (93 percent) still regard Russia from the perspective of U.S. vital interests, even though their concern about a potential Russian military threat is negli­gible. Only a third of the public continues to view Russia’s military might as a critical threat to the USA, and only 17 percent of leaders feel the same way. Among these latter, 46 percent of administration mem­bers don’t see Russia as an “important” threat at all. Still, 49 percent of the leaders do see Russia as a threat, but as an “important” one, not a “critical” one.

The majority of the leaders (54 percent) believe that Russia’s role will become smaller in the next ten years; 42 percent believe that it will become bigger. The general public’s opinion is evenly split on this is­sue (44 percent either way).

An interesting difference between the attitudes of the public and its leaders was revealed by their answers to this question: Should the United States use military force against Russia in the event of its inva­sion of Poland? Fifty-eight percent of leaders said “yes,” but only 28 percent of the public. It appears that the American public, unlike its leadership, is hardly concerned about the fates of other countries.

* * *

As these polls demonstrate, U.S. public opinion is at odds with the assessment voiced by Mr. Gorbachev. It is high time for him and for other Russian leaders to start revising their perspective by basing it not on their personal experience but on scientific analysis. Otherwise, they will continue coming up with foolish pronouncements that have tragic consequences for their country.


64 The Gorbachev Foundation, Russia’s Foreign Policy: What is Possible, and What is Desired? (April 1997), 28.

65 John E. Reilly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1999, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (Chicago, 1999); Internet. In some cases, for verification purposes, material was used from the article by John E. Reilly, “Americans and the World: A Survey Century’s End,” Foreign Policy (spring 1999).


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(Philosophical-sociological Essay)