Part Two: Russia’s Strategy: A Course Toward Multipolarity
Chapter V: Official Doctrines and Concepts
Threats to the National Security of the Russian Federation
This part of the document is truly unique. The authors don’t understand elementary things. The logic of national security concepts is that when they talk about threats, they mean threats from foreign hostile forces. The “threats” that result from mistakes and idiocy in domestic and foreign policy are called crimes of the country’s leaders.
Consider this: Almost half the text in this chapter is dedicated to the sorry state of the “national economy.” In this sphere threats are “complex in nature and are caused (sic!) in the first place by the considerable shrinking of the gross domestic product, the decline in investment and innovation activities, in the science and technology potential,” and so forth.
Exactly. So who is responsible for the collapse of the USSR, for these “failures” and threats? Who “managed” the economy and politics in those years? Wasn’t it Yeltsin and his team? Wasn’t it Chernomyrdin and the “young reformers”? It turns out that all the “threats” listed in this chapter were created, initiated, and provoked by the country’s previous leadership. Because all these listed “threats” are still present under the new leadership, it too bears responsibility for them. In that case, isn’t this leadership the most important threat to Russia’s national interests and its people? The essence of the current regime hasn’t changed, after all. How can one expect it to change the situation?
The international affairs part of this chapter repeats phrases from chapter one, only through the prism of the “threats” category. Here’s an example: “Threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in the international sphere are manifested in the attempts of other states to counteract the strengthening of Russia as one of the centers of influence in a multipolar world, to hinder the realization of its national interests, and to weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, Trans-Caucasia, Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region.” One might add, how can anyone weaken Russia’s position in, say, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region, where they have been in a “weakened state” for the past ten years? Or maybe someone can prove that Russia’s position was never “weakened” in such countries as Chili, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and others that are included in the “APR” (Asian-Pacific Region)?
Mentioned among the threats are “territorial demands made on the Russian Federation.” Right, but who is making these demands? Isn’t it Japan—a country with which Moscow is trying to build a “strategic partnership”?
In reality, all the above-listed “threats” are nothing but the result of Russia’s own domestic and foreign policy.
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)