Ensuring the National Security of the Russian Federation
This part in particular reminds me of the papers titled “The immediate tasks of the CPSU.” It consists from beginning to end of phrases with words “has to,” “should,” “must”—verbal garbage undeserving of comment. For example, it’s hard to argue with the statement that “the spiritual renovation of society is impossible without preserving the role of the Russian language as the factor of spiritual unification of the peoples of multinational Russia and the language of interstate communication of the peoples of the CIS member states.” So what? The democratic-minded mass media in Russia is currently corrupting the Russian language, turning it into Anglo-newspeak with a Brighton Beach accent. This Anglicization of the Russian language has audaciously invaded all the main television channels. “Programming that promotes violence,” taken from the trash heaps of Americanized culture, has taken over nearly 90 percent of all screen time. How does this fit with the achievement of the goals outlined in the National Security Concept?
All these wishes of the “has to—should be” variety will not be fulfilled, just as the wishes in the previous Concept-97 were not, and just as those in the next Concepts won’t be, for the reason that they are formulated by one and the same regime. It is the authority of state-oligarchic capital that is specifically Russian; it has other goals and objectives. The submitted Concept is nothing but camouflage, intended for a dumbed-down populace which still nurtures illusions about the possibility of their lives getting better and about the current rulers’ ability to protect Russia’s national interests. But these illusions will have to be discarded anyway. The elite is incompetent and illiterate, unable even to formulate the concept of the country’s national security professionally.
To be fair, it should be mentioned that even some adepts of the current regime have subjected the concept in question to some cautious criticism. Some have criticized it for its structural imperfections;68 others, for the vagueness of certain definitions. Valentin Rog suggested improving the definition of national security with the following addition: “A country’s national security is its ability to maintain and defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interests in the military sphere and the economic area, its cultural and moral-spiritual heritage, historical traditions and norms of social life; to ensure the strengthening of Russian statehood, the improvement and development of federalism and local self-government, as well as security in the ecological sphere.”69 This formulation, too, contains a lot of stuff that doesn’t belong there, but the direction chosen is the right one. There are other critics, though, whose suggestions, if adopted, would turn the working document into captivating reading about Russian life. Ramazan Abdulatipov, for example, complained that the Concept says nothing about the security of “ethno-national communalities”; it only mentions the security of the “multinational people.”70 Valentin Rog proposed including in the Concept the national idea, so that it would turn into a “concept of the Russian soul.”71 Considering how unique this soul is, one can imagine that many volumes would be needed to contain the document intended to guide the country’s policy. But then, that’s not what the Concept was written for.
* * *
After analyzing the National Security Concept (NCS), I intended to examine critically the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by a presidential decree of April 21, 2000. However, after examining this Doctrine, I lost the desire to criticize it, for, unlike the NCS, the Military Doctrine looks like a proper document, logical in structure and thematically justified. The approved variant is actually an improvement on the draft military doctrine of October 1999, due to the “removal” of the most vulnerable generalities about the international community. The silly declaration about Russia’s commitment to the model of a multipolar world is still there, though. On the other hand, the document contains a realistic evaluation of Russia’s situation in the world, and it lists the real threats to the country’s national security. It contains a good deal less propaganda confetti than the NCS, which makes it a working document. Quite timely are the corrected formulations of certain terms (for example, “military conflict” in its different varieties), as well as the structural hierarchy of threats: challenge – risk – danger – threat – aggression. In this connection, it is important to underline that the threats mentioned here are threats precisely to the national interests of Russia, not to the “world” or “mankind” in general, as political and diplomatic documents say all too often. To my surprise, military theorists proved to be better prepared for the task of formulating a doctrine than the people who worked on the NSC.
Even though I cannot agree with some purely military aspects of this doctrine, I have no intention of discussing them here. First, the doctrine is, as the authors themselves say, “a document of the transitional period.”72 Second, it will not be implemented anyway due to the lack of funding. Third, this book is devoted to the place and role of Russia in the world, not to the problems of Russian military reforms.
Let us now examine the theoretical level of the organization that spearheads Russia’s foreign policy by definition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).
68 See A.V. Grishin, “National Security of Russia” (interview with V.A. Ozerov), Profi, no. 3-4 (2000), 64-67.
69 Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 11, 2000.
70 Ibid., January 29, 2000.
71 Ibid., January 14, 2000.
72 See A Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the full text in Independent Military Review, Nazavisimaya gazeta, April 28, 2000.
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)