Part Two: Russia’s Strategy: A Course Toward Multipolarity
Chapter V: Official Doctrines and Concepts
Primakov – Ivanov – MFA: Demagogy – Idealism – Utopia
Before we proceed with the analysis of the MFA’s official document, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, it is worthwhile to hear out Russia’s two main idea generators in the area of foreign policy and international relations: Yevgeny M. Primakov, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Igor Ivanov, the current minister. Let us start with the former.
Yevgeny M. Primakov. Among the many causes of the Soviet Union’s defeat in the Cold War and its subsequent collapse, one should pay attention, in particular, to the inability of its leaders of that time to evaluate realistically the international situation and the place and role of their country in the world. The most concentrated manifestation of their wishful thinking was the philosophy of so-called new thinking, where two of the main components were the much-touted “universal values” and de-ideologization of international relations. All this philosophy was built on utopian ideas and projects, e.g., the fifteen-year program of step-by-step liquidation of nuclear weapons by the end of the twentieth century.
Back then, I made public statements against this “new thinking” at the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (Russian acronym: IMEMO), where Primakov was director at the time. In 1987 I wrote the article “‘New’ Philosophy in Foreign Policy from ‘Deficit of Idealism’ to Concessions to Common Sense.” It was supposed to be published in the Institute’s journal, World Economy and International Relations, but the editorial committee rejected it on the grounds that the author’s position was at odds with the decisions of the XXVII CPSU Congress and, in general, with the policy line of the Party and the government. On the initiative of either the editorial board or Primakov personally, the article was subjected to preliminary discussion at the Director’s Council, involving leading research associates of the Institute. They all criticized me for deviating from the Party line on international policy issues. (All these critics later became the most rabid of anti-Communists.) The essence of my article was criticism of the main ideas of the “new thinkers,” of the utopianism and idealism of the very concept of new political thinking.
The only reason I recall this episode here is that despite the complete failure of all the utopias of the Gorbachev period, at present no-less-utopian plans are being proposed again and again in order to bring about “peace in the twenty-first century.” Their authors suggest humanizing the world—proceeding possibly from good intentions, supposing evidently that the world consists entirely of “doves” desiring world peace. One concrete manifestation of this childish utopia is the Plan-Synopsis of the Concept of the World in the 21st Century. Before analyzing this plan, I want to take a look at the current views of Primakov, whom I consider to be one of the politicians responsible for the collapse of the USSR.
More than ten years ago, Primakov was promoting the ideas of “new thinking” that went on to bankruptcy. In 1996 Mr. Primakov became Minister of Foreign Affairs, replacing the perfectly grotesque figure that was Andrei Kozyrev. Primakov’s anti-Western position found support in certain political circles in Russia, and the West even appeared to take some fright. It need not have. Primakov’s vision of international relations and, accordingly, of Russia’s foreign policy preserves the same idealism and inadequacy characteristic of him ten and even twenty years ago. Anyone who would look up his writings from those times would find my words justified.
Let us, for instance, take Primakov’s article “A Multipolar World on the Horizon.”73 What do we see there? The academician-turnedminister states: “After the end of the Cold War, the trend developed of transition from a confrontational bipolar world to a multipolar world” (italics mine). He either fails or deliberately refuses to notice that a unipolar system had replaced the bipolar one. His conclusion is either proof of complete professional incompetence or pure propaganda claptrap served to a starving population. The proper thing to say is this: “Regrettably, the system currently in place is unipolar, with the USA on top. But this kind of world is not to our liking, and we shall try to change it into a multipolar one.” It is necessary also to show what means are needed to achieve this goal and where they will come from.
Primakov’s statement is followed by his assessment of the international situation: “The countries of Western Europe have started demonstrating a greater independence than before, now that they have stopped being dependent on the American ‘nuclear umbrella.’ Their gravitation toward a ‘Eurocenter’ is gradually overcoming their trans-Atlantic orientation. Against the background of Japan’s rapidly expanding position in the world, its military-political dependence on the United States is weakening.”
On what grounds are these conclusions drawn? Just two years after the publication of this article, they were refuted by the NATO countries’ joint action in Kosovo. In the following two years, American-Japanese military ties have become even stronger through the modernization of military cooperation. Who needs a forecast that fails to calculate the developments of the next two to three years?
Returning to the topic of a multipolar world, the academician starts listing the “conditions” that will make this “world” happen. The “conditions” often change into “suggestions.” Primakov “suggests” that the mentality that divides the world into “leaders” and “followers” be eliminated. Do you really believe that Americans are dying to hear the suggestion that they free themselves from the idea of being a “leading” power? Moreover, Primakov says: “This mentality is fed by the illusions that some countries emerged victorious from the Cold War, and other countries emerged defeated. This is not true. The peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain have combined forces to rid themselves of the politics of confrontation. The mentality of ‘leaders’ and ‘followers,’ meanwhile, directly works to support the trend toward a unipolar world. This model of the world order is unacceptable today to the majority of the world community.” (italics mine).
This guy wouldn’t blink if you spat in his eyes. This kind of logic supposes, evidently, that the Soviet Union is also counted among the “victors.” The academician is not perturbed by the fact that the USSR has been replaced by a shrunken Russia, squeezed along all the geostrategic vectors. I will not even mention the “fruits” of this victory on the economic and social fronts.
The appeal to a “world community” or to the “peoples of the world” who “don’t accept” something or other is elementary demagogy. Politicians use this trick when they have nothing to say on the essence of the matter. “The world community” is a chimera, just as the notion that peoples make some kind of effort in the sphere of international relations. “Peoples” don’t play the game of big-time politics; the leaders of their states do it for them.
The third condition, “democratization of international economic relations,” is just as utopian as everything the academician writes or talks about. Not one of his postulates works in principle, not one of his forecasts comes true, and not one of his analyses can be approached from a scientific perspective because the academician has never worked on the conceptual level. He offers nothing but words (utopia – demagogy, demagogy – utopia), and nothing more.
Igor Ivanov. Regrettably, the next minister of foreign affairs, Igor Ivanov, inherited this style and approach. His assessments of the international situation are more realistic, though, proving that sometimes life does sober one up.
In his article “Russia in a Changing World,” Ivanov writes: “Mankind is once again facing a choice of principle: either a multipolar system of the world order, based on the primacy of international law and strengthening of the existing international institutions, or a unipolar model with domination by a sole superpower.”74
It is hard to understand what moves politicians to speak for all of mankind. Besides the fact that 99 percent of mankind doesn’t even suspect the existence of this choice between a multi- or unipolar world, perhaps as many as 90 percent don’t even know that the country called Russia exists.
Equally touching is the appeal to strengthen international institutions. This wonderful appeal suggests, supposedly, the strengthening, among other things, of such an international institution as NATO.
Yet, I repeat that reality adjusts idealists’ assessments. Just one year later, Ivanov was compelled to state: “Also disappointed were the hopes that bipolar confrontation would automatically be replaced with partnership in the interests of international stability. Moreover, the power factor has not lost its significance; it only changed its orientation. A number of new areas of tension have flared up, some of them near Russia’s borders.”75
The hopes were “disappointed” precisely because these policies were built on “hopes,” on “faith,” and on “if only,” instead of relying on knowledge of the surrounding world and understanding of the Western “mentality.” Otherwise, there would be no need for expressing another “regret,” as Ivanov does. He continues: “Regrettably, the policy of Western states, especially in the last two to three years, has been manifesting the intent to build a unipolar model of the world order based on domination by a limited circle of the most developed states led by the USA.” (ibid.) This begs the question: Why would this same USA work to create a multipolar world, closing off its own opportunities to make the world work for the USA?
On one hand, Ivanov appeals for strengthening “international institutions”; on the other, he laments: “In European affairs, the logic of unipolarity manifests itself in NATO-centrism, in the intent to build the system of European and international security around a single military-political bloc.” (ibid.) So where’s the logic here?
The Concept of the World in the Twenty-First Century. Now we return to “The Concept of the World in the Twenty-First Century”—a pinnacle of utopianism, towering even over the utopianism of Primakov’s ideas. The grounds offered for this concept are curious. Ivanov says in his article: “Promoting our Concept of the World in the Twenty-First Century, we are not seeking a pretext for rivalry; we offer to seek together ways to increase manageability of world processes and to ensure stability in the world, these things being equally necessary to all states.” (ibid.) Right away, the utopian touch is in evidence: What kind of rivalry can we talk about today? Rivalry between whom? Can anyone believe that the USA is seriously regarding Russia as a rival—with its GDP of only $330 billion and an impoverished population? How can a country manage a world course of action when its rulers cannot manage elementary domestic issues?
Mr. Ivanov emphasizes without irony: “The novelty of the concept consists, first of all, in taking the realistic approach to assessing the world situation and our own foreign policy resources.” It is possible to agree, more or less, with the first part of this statement (see above), but its second part can only be perceived as a joke. It turns into a farce when you read the following: “Another important thing is the necessity to conduct a multivector policy, balanced in the geographical aspect. Considering Russia’s unique geopolitical location, it must have a proper place for relations with all key regions of the world.” (ibid.)
First, it is desirable to have at least a hint as to which regions are not “key” ones. The subsequent text makes it clear that Russia will be acting in all regions of the world. Moreover: “The importance of Asia is climbing up the scale of Russia’s foreign policy priorities.” I’ve been reading and hearing this phrase for more than thirty years now, and still Asia hasn’t “climbed up.” Second, are there enough foreign policy resources to cover all the “key regions”? Third, this variant of the concept practically doesn’t differ from all the previous variants in its all-encompassing nature. It does, however, differ substantially in “content”—in the direction of utopianism. Judge for yourselves from these following examples:
Claim #1: The Charter of the United Nations Organization is the foundation of the Concept of the World in the Twenty-First Century; the UN ensures security and stability in the world.
First, neither the UN, nor the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, nor any other similar organization in all the time of its existence has ensured any stability in the world, nor is it capable of ensuring it.76 Why on earth would they suddenly start ensuring it in the twenty-first century? Second, these organizations are funded for the most part by the USA and its allies. Don’t the authors know that Russia’s share in the funding of the UN is close to 1 percent, while the USA’s share is more than 22 percent? Japan, which is not even a member of the Security Council, has a share of about 20 percent. For this reason alone, the UN is an instrument for realizing precisely the interests of “the golden core” of the capitalist world. How silly in this light is Ivanov’s statement that: “We see one of our main tasks in the year 2001 in working to strengthen the role and authority of the UN in international affairs, including the resolution of the remaining crisis situations in different regions of the planet.”77
Third, in order to make these above-mentioned organizations serve “the cause of peace,” Russia must acquire dominant financial and leadership position in them—something it simply doesn’t have resources for.
Claim #2: The world is experiencing globalization, and the world is interconnected.
The world is indeed undergoing globalization (just one of several trends, by the way, and by no means the dominant one), but definitely not for the benefit of the entire world; this process clearly benefits the “core” group of developed countries. That’s why, in most countries, this globalization process is viewed negatively as Americanization or, in the softer variant, as Westernization. The world is not interdependent; the fact is that the larger part of the world is “dependent” on the smaller part. Is it really necessary to prove these axioms?
Claim #3: Multipolarity is the world order of the twenty-first century.
Even if one agrees with this statement, there is still no proof that multipolarity is better from the perspective of international security than, say, bipolarity. Doesn’t the history of international relations bear evidence that of the three states (multipolarity, bipolarity, and hegemony), it is precisely multipolarity that is most unstable, inevitably producing wars? In the twenty-first century, the world will experience all three states, and the most durable and stable one will be precisely the bipolarity that will be established in the second quarter of the century and will last for about fifty years.
Claim #4: “The law of civilized international relations.”
This law does not exist. What has existed for centuries and will exist always is the law of power, which itself defines what is “permissible” and what is “not permissible.”
The various objectives proposed on the basis of these claims are in advance doomed to failure, as they have no objective foundation. The pinnacle of utopianism (a stronger word would be more appropriate) is the objective of “creating a new culture of peace.” Throw in the slogan: “To be the light of the world!” and the expected result would then be “happy people on a happy Earth.” (This is a quote from the program of the Ethical Movement, “Native Land.”)
Finally, it is clear to anyone who can see that nearly all of the theses of this “Concept for the Twenty-First Century” were taken from the propaganda arsenal of American foreign policy, as evidenced even by the terminology: “preventive diplomacy,” “control-and-implementation mechanisms,” “international monitoring,” and the much-touted concept of “sustainable development.”
Conclusion: On the basis of the submitted “plan synopsis,” it is possible to invent a fable about the twenty-first century that would only be believable to people who don’t read books or newspapers but believe in the Ten Commandments.
Speaking seriously, Russia’s strategy in the twenty-first century must be built on the realities and regularities of the development of international relations. Otherwise, all we have is just more “if only” claptrap about conquering the entire world with “Russian spirituality.”
73 Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 22, 2000.
74 Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 26, 1999.
75 See Ivanov’s presentation at MGIMO, Kremlin Package (Federal News Service), May 23, 2000.
76 It seems that of all scholars of international affairs, S. Rogov alone understands this obvious truth and expressed it in delicate diplomatic form: “At the same time such mechanisms of ensuring international security as the UN and the OSCE see their role decreasing, their functions are supplanted by NATO and other Western institutions.” Independent Military Review, Nezavisimaya gazeta, January 12, 2000.
77 Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 30, 2000.
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)