Part One: U.S. strategy in the 21st century: leadership through hegemony
Chapter II: Role and Place of the USA in the Twenty-first Century in the Research of American Political Scientists and Scholars of International Affairs
The Strategy of “Engaging” Russia:
An Application of the Carrot-and-Stick Principle (Michael McFaul)
Professor Michael McFaul is one of the more respected Russia experts in the USA, and with good reason. He spent many years in Moscow, both before perestroika and after the start of capitalist reforms, so he is in a position to make comparisons.
Unlike all the American Russia experts who talk about “economic reform” or “the third wave” of democratization after the collapse of the Soviet Union, McFaul proclaims straightforwardly that a revolution has taken place in Russia, comparable in scale to the French Revolution of 1789 and the Bolshevik revolution.26 Proceeding from the classical definitions of a revolution, he shows quite convincingly that Yeltsin’s regime demolished the old structure of power and the society’s economic organization, and replaced both with a capitalist system. In his opinion, it differs from previous revolutions in that it was accomplished through non-violent means, if one disregards such “trifles” as the shelling of the Parliament in 1993. Another difference, labeled by McFaul as “fundamental,” is that the ideologies of those earlier revolutions challenged the established order of the international system of the time. However, the ideology and goals of the current Russian revolution were not directed against the status quo of the contemporary international system. On the contrary, the ideology preached by Yeltsin and his supporters is completely compatible with the economy and politics of the core powers. Moreover, Russia’s “revolutionaries” did everything they could to join that core. (54)27
There is nothing surprising in this, for it is precisely a capitalist revolution that took place, i.e., a society started to form whose content is identical with other capitalist states. It is unclear yet, even for McFaul himself, exactly what kind of capitalism will establish itself in Russia; as of yet, there is no answer.
Despite all this, the professor is convinced that: “Over the long term, Russia’s size, natural resources, educated population, and strategic location in Europe and Asia ensure that this country will emerge again as a power in the international system.” (66) (Note: He says simply “power” rather than “great power.”) The problem is, will this power become part of the Western core, or will it turn into a rogue nation threatening the world community? To a large degree, this depends on the policy that the USA pursues with regard to Russia.
McFaul reminds the reader that in America’s political-academic circles, there exist different approaches to the U.S. role in the world after World War II. Mentioned among them are isolationism, neocontainment, and engagement/enlargement. (54)
In McFaul’s opinion, the strategy of engagement is the best option as regards Washington’s policy toward Russia. In his understanding, this policy should be built on several basic principles. First, the United States must lead by example. A growing market economy and a robust democracy in the United States provide the best arguments for adopting capitalism and democracy in other countries. Second, engagement or enlargement requires a sustained and unwavering commitment to the principles of free markets and democracy. Third, engagement is not always a non-zero-sum game. Sometimes, U.S. foreign policy leaders must be prepared to accept short-term losses (and these are usually economic losses) to win long-term gains regarding enlargement of the “core.” A corollary to this principle is that engagement requires the use of both carrots and sticks. Progress regarding the development of market and democratic institutions is not without cost. (55) Fourth, not only must American leaders expend their energies trying to get “bad guys” to do good deeds, but they also must assist “good guys” in performing good deeds, even if such engagement might become complicated. (ibid.)
What McFaul had in mind was a policy designed to stimulate changes in the conduct of authoritarian leaders (“bad guys”) while simultaneously sponsoring and supporting new democratic leaders (“good guys”). These general principles are entirely applicable in Russia, too.
In the professor’s opinion, American tactics toward Russia don’t always fit the strategic goals of the United States. For instance, NATO’s eastward expansion contradicts the policy of engagement because it isolates Russia from the core and brings about an anti-Western reaction. This doesn’t suit the long-term interests of the USA. On the contrary, Russia must be enticed to join NATO structures. In this same manner, Russia must be included in different international organizations, such as the Paris Club, the World Bank, and the Group of Seven.
A special emphasis should be placed on the forming of market and democratic institutions, giving priority to the latter. McFaul believes it necessary to intensify collaboration with such people as Chubais, Nemtsov, Gaidar, and D. Vasiliev, and not abandoning them in their time of trouble, when they are out of government.
In other words, if the USA wants to see Russia in the core, it must carry out wide-scale work at all levels of political and economic power. McFaul is sincerely convinced that only the capitalist way of development will bring progress and prosperity to Russia.
26 R. Craig Nation and Michael McFaul, The United States and Russia into the 21st Century (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, October 1, 1997), 49. Available online: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/.
27 R. Craig Nation and Michael McFaul, The United States and Russia into the 21st Century (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, October 1, 1997), 49. Available online: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/.
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)