Preface
Should no one like these Thoughts, they are doubtlessly bad;
but in my eyes, they would be despicable should they be liked by all.
Diderot
I ask my readers not to panic. I don’t mean to say that Russia will disappear from the face of the earth, although that is what many opponents of Russia dream about. But it won’t happen, at least not in the twenty-first century. What will happen is that Russia will cease to influence the course of world events; indeed, it has practically ceased already to do so. In geostrategic terms, it means that Russia has lost its superpower status and has ceased to be a “center of power” and world pole determining the structure of world relations. As a consequence, international relations are developing and unfurling without Russia’s involvement. From the historical viewpoint, there is nothing special about this because history shows that the course of world events is influenced by a handful of empire-type states fighting for hegemony in the world. All other states usually serve as objects of their policies. Hegemonic states replace one another, but the struggle for power and, ultimately, for hegemony continues. These states have always shaped the regional and global structures of international relations in the geostrategic world, and it is they that determine the course of events.
The Russian state has only twice changed the system and structure of international relations since its emergence. The first occasion was the birth of the Soviet Union after the October Revolution of 1917. The world then split into two camps (those of socialism and capitalism), with the struggle between them after World War II shaping the geostrategic bipolar system with its two centers of power headed by the USA and the USSR. The Soviet Union’s defeat in this struggle spelled the end of the Soviet superpower, and the bipolar system was replaced by a monocentric one headed by the USA. The Russian Federation that emerged in the place of the USSR very quickly regressed to the same marginal status that Russia enjoyed prior to 1917. Russia is now way below the world’s top ten nations in terms of GNP, and its influence is limited to its territory, which it barely manages to keep from further fragmentation. Thus, the birth and death of the Soviet empire shook the world in the twentieth century and changed the structure of international relations.
I find confirmation for these seemingly self-evident facts all the time, whenever I travel in North America, Western Europe, or East Asia. In whichever country I visit, there is almost no mention of Russia whatsoever, except for the occasional ten-second spot about Chechnya.
Nonetheless, Russia’s degradation is most vividly seen and felt by those living in Russia. The country is dying right before our eyes. One must be perfectly blind not to see the mass impoverishment of the majority of the population; the decay of dwellings, villages, towns, and cities; the inability of the authorities to deal with natural disasters or with the catastrophic levels of crime, drug addiction, and other social and physical ills. Most people’s minds are fixated on survival. In the provinces, the degradation has reached the stage of early feudalism. The average income has dropped to the levels of poor African countries. I could go on and on.
Against the backdrop of these multiple domestic tragedies, it is bewildering to hear Russia’s president, political leaders of all stripes, and scholars of different ideological persuasions talk and write so often about Russia as a great power that plays a role of global proportions. In this regard, I recall the saying of the famous Chinese military thinker, Sun Tsu, from his Art of War: “So it is said that if you know others and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know others but know yourself, you win one and lose one; if you do not know others and do not know yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.”1
I am deeply convinced that the majority, if not all, of those who call Russia a great power belong to the third category of people, i.e., those who do not know Russia or the outside world. It suffices to ask these people some concrete questions, such as: What is the critical mass of a state’s weight that qualifies it for the status of a great power? What is the degree of financial commitment required to make the country’s “greatness” felt around the world? What is the difference between a state’s place in the world and its role in the world, and how are these categories related to the country’s economic potential and the state budget? Ask any politician what sums are allocated for foreign policy in Russia and what sums in, say, the USA. I doubt whether the “great power propagandists” even consider these questions.
I’d like to believe that Russia is a great power. The facts, however, don’t support such a view. I was compelled to resort to arguments from the economic, political, and military-strategic areas to prove the opposite, namely: From the moment the capitalist reforms started, Russia lost the status not just of a superpower but even of a great power. It has turned into a regional power whose influence in the world is inferior not just to the G-7 countries of “the golden billion,” but also to a number of other countries with a GNP of more than $500 billion.
Therefore, the purpose of the present book is to show Russia’s real place and role in the first half of the twenty-first century. For completeness of the picture, I had to use different methods and approaches. One of these consists of taking a look at Russia from the outside; that is, determining Russia’s place and role in the strategic doctrines and concepts of the most active subjects of world politics. The latter are represented in this book by the USA. (Japan and China are represented in another book titled The Strategic Contours of East Asia. Russia: Not a Step Forward.) I left out Western Europe, not because it is of little importance in world politics but because it is close to the USA regarding strategic policy toward Russia. Besides, an analysis of the “Russian policies” of the four main powers (Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy) would greatly inflate the volume of this work.
The other approach is to take a look at Russia from inside Russia itself, i.e., through the official doctrines and concepts of the country’s present leadership and through the works of Russian scholars of bourgeois leanings. I consciously avoided using, as far as possible, the political literature of the left-wing or “patriotic” camp because I regard its influence on Russia’s foreign policy as being close to zero.
The political science approach had to be complemented by a theory of international relations—a theory to which I introduce three laws (the law of economic mass or “pole,” the law of “center of power,” and the law of “power”). The theoretical parts of this book are the most difficult to read, but without comprehending or at least perusing them, it is hard to get an understanding of the development of international relations and of everything connected to it.
This book is divided into three parts. Though each of them can be regarded as a whole in a certain way, they are connected through the axis of the main topic—what Russia is and what it will be.
Naturally, for a book of this size, I had to work through a lot of literature and statistical data. I obtained the bulk of my research material through the Internet. In this regard, I want to give a warning to the reader unfamiliar with the Internet system: Some of my references do not indicate pages. This means that the material was presented in HTML format. Pages are indicated only where the material was published in a PDF format. As of the present moment, the rules for making references to material found on the Web showing an Internet (Web site) address are not yet finalized. Therefore, I did the following: Wherever the address-holder is obvious (for example, international organizations, Japan’s Foreign Ministry, the CIA, the NSC, the Pentagon, the State Department), I did not indicate the address; in nonobvious cases, I did.
Regarding the language of this book, I am often accused of writing about serious subjects in “nonscientific” terms, which apparently means the academic writing style of Russian scholars. Also, I am accused of using the word “I” too often and criticizing everyone all the time. I use this opportunity to respond to my accusers. First, I don’t criticize indiscriminately; I criticize only those who use “scientific” language to write texts that have no relation to science. Second, I use the word “I” simply because it is I who am writing my works, not any sort of “we.” “We” is a way of shirking responsibility for what is written. Third, the academic style is the result of a form of depersonification common under the Soviet regime, especially during the period of stagnant socialism. Though I am better disposed toward the Soviet regime than toward the present one, I have no desire to depersonify myself, especially because I am convinced that one should write humorously about serious matters.
In my texts, I put the word “APR” (Asian-Pacific Region) in quotation marks, though abbreviations are not supposed to have quotation marks in the English language. I do this on purpose, for I maintain that the “APR” is a fiction. But when quoting documents or other authors’ texts, I am constrained to preserve their spelling and punctuation marks.
I also wish to note that certain paragraphs and small excerpts from this book have been published in certain newspapers, magazines, and collections. No one has criticized me for those texts; on the contrary, many readers have expressed their agreement with me. However, the publication of this book in its full form, under its actual title, is bound to cause some indignation, especially from Russian “if-only-ists,” and most certainly will provoke accusations of being anti-Russian. This does not perturb me because I believe the actions of politicians and politically engaged “scientists” cause more harm to Russia than does the truth about it. Nonetheless, should they find and publish any credible counterarguments, I am always prepared to respond, and I would be thankful to anyone who messages to my e-mail address with criticisms or reflections found in the press on my book.
As with my previous works, I never subjected this book to any preliminary discussions, and no one assisted me in writing it, except, of course, my wife, Valentina. As always, she read and edited texts of a nature alien to her. As always, I tested on her the degree to which my writing, especially the theoretical parts, would be accessible to laymen. Because this book was readily understood by an artist-pianist (my wife), I count on it not to be too difficult for those with an interest in foreign policy and international relations.
I would like to thank my wife, who is the inspiration in my life and work. I should also like to thank my son, Guerman, for financing the publication of this book. He is always ready to help me with any of my research undertakings. I am grateful to them both. May 2001 albattler@hotmail.com
1 Sun Tsu, The Art of War. Translated by Thomas Cleary (Boston and London: Shambhala, 1988), 82.
The 21st Century: The World Without Russia
(Philosophical-sociological Essay)