THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE WORLD WITHOUT RUSSIA

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THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE WORLD WITHOUT RUSSIA

Alex Battler

To the women in my life:
my mother—Taishiya Pavlovna,
my wife—Valentina,
and my daughter—Ulyana

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Preface for Western Readers

This book was originally published in Russia in late 2001 under my journalistic pen name of Oleg Arin. I then decided to publish it in English, for two reasons. To begin with, the book's topics are as much of interest to the West as they are to Russia; and second, I wanted the Western reader to get a more realistic perspective on Russia's place and role in the world. The latter is particularly important, considering that academic and especially popular literature in the West often presents a distorted picture of Russia; in particular, it tends to exaggerate the achievements of "democratic reforms" in this country.

In this book I cast doubt on the great power status claimed for Russia. Moreover, I was compelled to prove, by drawing on a vast body of material, that Russia has altogether lost the capacity of being a structure-forming subject of international relations. In the process, I uncovered the contradiction between Russia's actual potential and the official foreign policy objectives formulated by Moscow. The book also contains criticism of Russian politicians and scholars of all persuasions, but especially those who rely on wishful thinking rather than facts in their research and prognoses. I label such personages "if-only-ists." Some Western scholars, Americans for the most part, also come in for their share of criticism, even though the quality of their analyses depends on more rigorous standards of research than do the works of Russian political scientists.

In this book, I formulate, among other things, the laws of "poles," of "centers of power," and of "power" and introduce new concepts in

the theory of international relations (a state's foreign policy potential and the law of optimal proportion between expenditures on domestic and foreign policy).

On almost all issues raised, my views differ from the generally accepted interpretations and approaches prevalent both in the West and in the East.

I want to draw the readers' attention to the fact that although I am a Canadian citizen, I wrote this book from the perspective of a Russian (I am Russian by birth) concerned about Russia's destiny. I have spent most of my life in Russia, worked in its most prestigious scientific centers and schools, and traveled all over the country, rubbing shoulders with both those who govern Russia "from the top" and those who suffer their misrule "below." I am, therefore, free of the illusions entertained by some western scholars and politicians about Russia.

In my opinion, this book should be of interest not only to instructors and students of international affairs but also to all those who are interested in the theory of international relations and the foreign policies of the world's leading powers.

January 2002

Should no one like these Thoughts, they are doubtlessly bad; but in my eyes, they would be despicable should they be liked by all.

Diderot

Preface

I ask my readers not to panic. I don't mean to say that Russia will disappear from the face of the earth, although that is what many opponents of Russia dream about. But it won't happen, at least not in the twenty-first century. What will happen is that Russia will cease to influence the course of world events; indeed, it has practically ceased already to do so. In geostrategic terms, it means that Russia has lost its superpower status and has ceased to be a "center of power" and world pole determining the structure of world relations. As a consequence, international relations are developing and unfurling without Russia's involvement. From the historical viewpoint, there is nothing special about this because history shows that the course of world events is influenced by a handful of empire-type states fighting for hegemony in the world. All other states usually serve as objects of their policies. Hegemonic states replace one another, but the struggle for power and, ultimately, for hegemony continues. These states have always shaped the regional and global structures of international relations in the geostrategic world, and it is they that determine the course of events.

The Russian state has only twice changed the system and structure of international relations since its emergence. The first occasion was the birth of the Soviet Union after the October Revolution of 1917. The world then split into two camps (those of socialism and capitalism), with the struggle between them after World War II shaping the geostrategic bipolar system with its two centers of power headed by the

USA and the USSR. The Soviet Union's defeat in this struggle spelled the end of the Soviet superpower, and the bipolar system was replaced by a monocentric one headed by the USA. The Russian Federation that emerged in the place of the USSR very quickly regressed to the same marginal status that Russia enjoyed prior to 1917. Russia is now way below the world's top ten nations in terms of GNP, and its influence is limited to its territory, which it barely manages to keep from further fragmentation. Thus, the birth and death of the Soviet empire shook the world in the twentieth century and changed the structure of international relations.

I find confirmation for these seemingly self-evident facts all the time, whenever I travel in North America, Western Europe, or East Asia. In whichever country I visit, there is almost no mention of Russia whatsoever, except for the occasional ten-second spot about Chechnya.

Nonetheless, Russia's degradation is most vividly seen and felt by those living in Russia. The country is dying right before our eyes. One must be perfectly blind not to see the mass impoverishment of the majority of the population; the decay of dwellings, villages, towns, and cities; the inability of the authorities to deal with natural disasters or with the catastrophic levels of crime, drug addiction, and other social and physical ills. Most people's minds are fixated on survival. In the provinces, the degradation has reached the stage of early feudalism. The average income has dropped to the levels of poor African countries. I could go on and on.

Against the backdrop of these multiple domestic tragedies, it is bewildering to hear Russia's president, political leaders of all stripes, and scholars of different ideological persuasions talk and write so often about Russia as a great power that plays a role of global proportions. In this regard, I recall the saying of the famous Chinese military thinker, Sun Tsu, from his *Art of War*: "So it is said that if you know others and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know others but know yourself, you win one and lose one; if you

do not know others and do not know yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle."[1]

I am deeply convinced that the majority, if not all, of those who call Russia a great power belong to the third category of people, i.e., those who do not know Russia or the outside world. It suffices to ask these people some concrete questions, such as: What is the critical mass of a state's weight that qualifies it for the status of a great power? What is the degree of financial commitment required to make the country's "greatness" felt around the world? What is the difference between a state's place in the world and its role in the world, and how are these categories related to the country's economic potential and the state budget? Ask any politician what sums are allocated for foreign policy in Russia and what sums in, say, the USA. I doubt whether the "great power propagandists" even consider these questions.

I'd like to believe that Russia is a great power. The facts, however, don't support such a view. I was compelled to resort to arguments from the economic, political, and military-strategic areas to prove the opposite, namely: From the moment the capitalist reforms started, Russia lost the status not just of a superpower but even of a great power. It has turned into a regional power whose influence in the world is inferior not just to the G-7 countries of "the golden billion," but also to a number of other countries with a GNP of more than $500 billion.

Therefore, the purpose of the present book is to show Russia's real place and role in the first half of the twenty-first century. For completeness of the picture, I had to use different methods and approaches. One of these consists of taking a look at Russia from the outside; that is, determining Russia's place and role in the strategic doctrines and concepts of the most active subjects of world politics. The latter are represented in this book by the USA. (Japan and China are represented in another book titled *The Strategic Contours of East Asia. Russia: Not a Step Forward.*) I left out Western Europe, not because it is of little importance in world politics but because it is close to the USA regarding strategic policy toward Russia. Besides, an analysis of the "Russian

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[1] Sun Tsu, *The Art of War. Translated by Thomas Cleary* (Boston and London: Shambhala, 1988), 82.

policies" of the four main powers (Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy) would greatly inflate the volume of this work.

The other approach is to take a look at Russia from inside Russia itself, i.e., through the official doctrines and concepts of the country's present leadership and through the works of Russian scholars of bourgeois leanings. I consciously avoided using, as far as possible, the political literature of the left-wing or "patriotic" camp because I regard its influence on Russia's foreign policy as being close to zero.

The political science approach had to be complemented by a theory of international relations—a theory to which I introduce three laws (the law of economic mass or "pole," the law of "center of power," and the law of "power"). The theoretical parts of this book are the most difficult to read, but without comprehending or at least perusing them, it is hard to get an understanding of the development of international relations and of everything connected to it.

This book is divided into three parts. Though each of them can be regarded as a whole in a certain way, they are connected through the axis of the main topic—what Russia is and what it will be.

Naturally, for a book of this size, I had to work through a lot of literature and statistical data. I obtained the bulk of my research material through the Internet. In this regard, I want to give a warning to the reader unfamiliar with the Internet system: Some of my references do not indicate pages. This means that the material was presented in HTML format. Pages are indicated only where the material was published in a PDF format. As of the present moment, the rules for making references to material found on the Web showing an Internet (Web site) address are not yet finalized. Therefore, I did the following: Wherever the address-holder is obvious (for example, international organizations, Japan's Foreign Ministry, the CIA, the NSC, the Pentagon, the State Department), I did not indicate the address; in nonobvious cases, I did.

Regarding the language of this book, I am often accused of writing about serious subjects in "nonscientific" terms, which apparently means the academic writing style of Russian scholars. Also, I am accused of using the word "I" too often and criticizing everyone all the time. I use this opportunity to respond to my accusers. First, I don't criticize indiscriminately; I criticize only those who use "scientific" language to

write texts that have no relation to science. Second, I use the word "I" simply because it is I who am writing my works, not any sort of "we." "We" is a way of shirking responsibility for what is written. Third, the academic style is the result of a form of depersonification common under the Soviet regime, especially during the period of stagnant socialism. Though I am better disposed toward the Soviet regime than toward the present one, I have no desire to depersonify myself, especially because I am convinced that one should write humorously about serious matters.

In my texts, I put the word "APR" (Asian-Pacific Region) in quotation marks, though abbreviations are not supposed to have quotation marks in the English language. I do this on purpose, for I maintain that the "APR" is a fiction. But when quoting documents or other authors' texts, I am constrained to preserve their spelling and punctuation marks.

I also wish to note that certain paragraphs and small excerpts from this book have been published in certain newspapers, magazines, and collections. No one has criticized me for those texts; on the contrary, many readers have expressed their agreement with me. However, the publication of this book in its full form, under its actual title, is bound to cause some indignation, especially from Russian "if-only-ists," and most certainly will provoke accusations of being anti-Russian. This does not perturb me because I believe the actions of politicians and politically engaged "scientists" cause more harm to Russia than does the truth about it. Nonetheless, should they find and publish any credible counterarguments, I am always prepared to respond, and I would be thankful to anyone who messages to my e-mail address with criticisms or reflections found in the press on my book.

As with my previous works, I never subjected this book to any preliminary discussions, and no one assisted me in writing it, except, of course, my wife, Valentina. As always, she read and edited texts of a nature alien to her. As always, I tested on her the degree to which my writing, especially the theoretical parts, would be accessible to laymen. Because this book was readily understood by an artist-pianist (my wife), I count on it not to be too difficult for those with an interest in foreign policy and international relations.

I would like to thank my wife, who is the inspiration in my life and work. I should also like to thank my son, Guerman, for financing the publication of this book. He is always ready to help me with any of my research undertakings. I am grateful to them both.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABM	Antiballistic Missile (Treaty of 1972)
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APR	Asia-Pacific region
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CIS/NIS	Commonwealth of Independent States/New Independent States (the former republics of the USSR)
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
EA	East Asia
EC	European Community
FDI	Foreign direct investment
EIB	Export-Import Bank
FPP	Foreign political potential
G-7	Group of seven industrial countries
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNP	Gross national product
Goskomstat	States Statistics Committee
HDI	Human Development Index
ILO	International Labor Organization
IDV	Russian acronym for Institute for Far Eastern Studies
IMEMO	Russian acronym for Institute of World Economy and International Relations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MNBs	Multinational banks
MNCs	Multinational corporations
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area (Agreement)
NEA	Northeast Asia
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and

	Development
OSCE	Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PPP	Purchasing power parity
R&D	Research and development
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SAA	Strategic attack arms
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TVD	Russian acronym for theatre of military action
TNBs	Transnational banks
TNCs	Transnational companies (corporations)
UN DP	UN Development Program
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (defunct since 1991)
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapon of mass destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

Part One

U.S. Strategy in the Twenty-first Century: Leadership Through Hegemony

Chapter I:
Concept Apparatus and Research Approaches

Russian scholars, with rare exceptions (E. Pozdnyakov, V. Baranovsky, N. Kosolapov, and a few others), are not concerned about the problem of the concept apparatus of the theory of international relations. They can write quite casually about globalization or integration, while in fact they are describing issues of internationalization; they can talk about a state's power, while in fact they are describing that state's might; they can formulate concepts of national security, while in fact they are describing problems of domestic policy. To them, world relations are identical to international relations, etc. This approach reflects the peculiarity of the Russian mind-set, which rejects rationality for irrationality, which they feel helps them to penetrate "deeper" into the essence of phenomena. I will later demonstrate this with examples, but for now, let us look at American ways of looking at the same problems.

The majority of American international relations scholars and political scientists are not inclined to "theorize." This gives grounds for the authors of the monograph *American National Security* to state: "A chronic source of presidential difficulties with the Congress and, sometimes, the nation at large, is the tendency to use the concept of national

security overly broadly, invoking it as a cloak to cover various controversial actions."[2]

One has to admit that Americans have been pondering the subject of this conceptual apparatus since the end of World War II, and in many respects they have achieved impressive results. Nonetheless, the problem persists. Ken Booth demonstrates its urgency in the following fashion: "Many," he writes, "use the word 'peace' in the sense of 'absence of world war,' despite the fact that since World War II, more than 20 million people have been killed in military conflicts.[3] The term 'Third World' is used to mean all underdeveloped countries. But the upper social strata of this 'world' is not any different in its level of well-being from the wealthy in the 'First World.' The term 'power' is used as being synonymous with 'military power,' even though these notions are not identical." Booth draws the following conclusion: "If these and other key words in academic international relations have not been naming things properly, how could the theories they create help us discern the future?" (336)

A confusion regarding concepts is often the result of several fields of science intersecting or overlapping. It is a known fact that in the West, "international relations" is studied as a branch of political science. Booth however says, "It has become increasingly evident that political science can be seriously studied only as a branch of the study of politics on a global scale. …World politics is the home of political science, not vice versa. Kant was right: political theory has to be international theory." (340)

Here's one more curious reflection from Booth: "Therefore, the goal of international political theory must be the joining of Marxian "science" with the "science" of Morgenthau in the art of utopian realism; the problem of international political science must be the attempt to unify the world through changing it." (347)

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2 Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 4.

3 Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds, *International Relations: Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 334.

Though it's not clear from this sentence what Booth means by "Marxian science" and "Morgenthau's science," the term "utopian realism" reminded me at once of an utterance by Mr. Data the Android, one of the colorful characters in the TV series *Star Trek: The Next Generation.* He remarked once, quite reasonably: "To expect the unexpected is impossible."

To a substantial, if not decisive, degree, the recent wave of theoretical research was caused by the end of the Cold War, when the Berlin Wall crumbled, along with the established clichés and stereotypes of the theory of international relations. To put it simply, this theory used to have two mighty currents: One was completely ideologically engaged (the school of political idealism dominant in the USSR), explaining all developments in international life through the struggle between "communism" and "capitalism." The other one, called geostrategic (the school of political realism), relies on the concept of power.

Nowadays, when ideology has ceased to play a dominant role (in the opinion of American theorists) and the concept of power has begun to change, the elegant constructs of the past have become outdated. What has emerged instead? This is where debates start, centering in most cases on the following: the current structure of international relations (bipolar, unipolar, or multipolar); the content of the concept of power in today's world; the role of the state in the era of "globalization"; and "national security"—an artificial abstraction or something objectively real?

I will address all these topics in one way or another throughout this book. But for a start, I want to present the views of Messrs. A. Jordan, W. Taylor, and M. Mazarr, the well-known authors of the textbook *National Security of the USA*. Their popularity is evidenced by the fact that their book is already in its fifth edition and is used by students of military academies and universities.

These authors (henceforth referred to as JTM) believe that the Cold War was followed not by simple peace but by a "hot peace." The difficulty lies in describing this peace. Unlike the champions of the concept of U.S. "unipolar hegemony" (such as Charles Krauthammer), JTM believe that what has really emerged is "a complex multipolar international system."

By the way, they remind the reader where the concept of "unipolarity" originated. Back in 1992, a document was prepared in the Pentagon and unfortunately leaked to the world, from which every-one learned of the proposed policy emphasis "on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor." (545) This was not directed at an already weakened Russia but rather at the allies of the USA, and formulated in rather harsh phrases, such as: "American defense should be so strong that potential competitors, from Western Europe or Asia, as well as the former Soviet Union, would be deterred from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role." (546)

The authors remind us that apart from the die-hard "unipolarists," there exist proponents of "superpower multipolarity" who champion hegemony by the USA while "allowing" other powers, such as Germany and Japan, to provide a multipolar background. JTM themselves favor a "complex multipolarity," denying hegemonic status to the USA for a number of reasons, among which is the following: The focus of U.S. national strategy has shifted from the global to the regional level. On the global level, there is no other global power; therefore, there is no adversary for a global struggle. On the regional level, the structural aspects vary widely. In Africa a balance of power shapes the structure of relations; in some places, it is defined by bipolarity; in others, by multipolarity. In other words, not one of the "power models" is universal, and none explains the actual reality.

Another cause of "multipolarity" has to do with the fact that several mighty regional powers are capable of ensuring their survival and independence on their own, without help from allies. This argument might appear strange at first, but the authors mean to say there is no hostile power in the world capable of endangering "the survival and independence" of, say, Germany, Great Britain, or Japan.

But the main reason for "multipolarity" is something else, namely, the problem of diffusion of the term "power"—the key term in all concepts of "polarity." "The diffusion of the other non-military elements of power—particularly of economic strength—throughout the international system further refutes this unipolar concept." (8)

In this connection, I want to draw your attention to the following important fact: Power is a key category in the theory of international

relations, debated by generation after generation of theorists who have failed to this day to define what it is. JTM acknowledge this fact, adding that the method for calculating power is also absent. That's only natural. If there is no definition, there is nothing to calculate. Because power is an important category, we'll let the authors expound in more detail on this subject.

JTM believe that the enigma of power is that "power is dynamic." They write: "In the simplest terms, it is the ability to get others to do something they would not do of their own volition." The authors clarify: The ability to coerce does not necessarily only mean "physical violence upon an adversary," though that is an important argument of power. Other aspects of power are listed as "bargaining ability" and "persuasion, based on common interests and values." (9) They consider this definition of power sufficient and move on to its estimation.

They write: "Power can be viewed and appraised in several ways. Since it is based upon capabilities, power has certain objective characteristics. But *it also has a highly subjective element*, for the reputation for having and being willing to use power is sufficient to achieve results in many cases, without really applying it. Hobbes rightly wrote, 'Power is what people think it is until tested.'" (Emphasis by the authors, ibid.)

At this point, JTM fall into an elementary logical contradiction. If power is an objective category, it cannot have "a highly subjective element" because only the evaluation of power can be subjective, not power itself. The observer's (analyst's) goal is precisely to have his subjective evaluation coincide with the content of power. (Hegel called this the merging of object and subject.) The multiplicity of interpretations of a single phenomenon means only that the phenomenon is not perceived correctly. Having fallen at this stage into a logical and philosophical trap, JTM are subsequently unable to get out of it.

They write: "*Power is also essentially relative in character*, for its utility depends in part on comparing it with whatever opposes it; when this comparison is made explicit, the resulting calculus is often called *net power*. Further, *power is highly situational*; what may generate power in one set of circumstances may not in another. Such intangibles as the political and technical skills of the key actors, national will and

solidarity on the issue, the nature of the issue in question, and the purposes being sought all condition the power a state can bring into play in a given situation." (Emphasis by the authors, ibid.)

If it is impossible to objectively estimate power as such, then it is also impossible to estimate the opposing power, and no kind of comparison will help because in this case two indeterminate values are being compared. JTM are optimists, however.

"If power is dynamic, subjective, relative, and situational, as well as objective in character, can it usefully be defined at all? Despite the caveats and difficulties, the answer is "yes." Particularly if we focus on its objective characteristics (which are, more accurately, measures of 'strength' and may or may not yield influence, as already noted) and qualify it appropriately for time and circumstances, we can say at least a few things useful about power." (ibid.) They did indeed say a few things, but not about power. Like everyone before them, they confused the concepts of strength and power, and I will return to this topic in the corresponding chapter.

The authors do offer valid criticism of the views held about the category of power by Harold and Margaret Sprout, for: "They suggested a crude equation: power is equal to human resources, plus physical habitat, plus foodstuffs and raw materials, plus tools and skills, plus organization, plus morale and political behavior, plus external conditions and circumstances." (ibid.) Clifford German's writings on the subject are in much the same key, while Ray Cline added "strategic purpose and national will" to those quantifiable characteristics. (10) By the way, the understanding of power by JTM themselves coincides to a large degree with Cline's formulations.

Further, JTM attempt to define the contemporary state of national power, which has been naturally undergoing some changes. "It was not only more fragmented, but at the same time more interdependent. The fragmentation came from the demise of the major bipolar blocs of the Cold War, as well as corresponding release of previously suppressed ethnic or rather tribal nationalism in many nations across the globe." (548) This resulted in national power becoming more diffuse, complicating the effect of one state's influence on another. "'Soft' forms of power, such as the ability to manipulate interdependences, become

more important, as does the long-term economic strength of the nation, which is the base for both hard and soft forms of power." (548)

Please note that the authors have started using the terms *power* and *strength* as synonyms without even noticing. This is the pit that ensnared all theorists who have ever struggled to define the category of power. Approaching "power" first from one side, then another, they failed to produce a clear definition thereof. They went on to repeat the well-known banality: "Power and the will to use it become the prerequisite for success, even survival. …*The purpose of power is to overcome resistance in an effort to bring about or secure a preferred order of things.*" (Emphasis by the authors, 13.) The result is this: Instead of defining power, JTM identified two of its functions (both debatable)—victory in struggle and securing of order. Power, as such, slipped away from them once again. In other words, the authors realize the treacherous nature of this concept, yet they fail to transcend the framework of views held by all theorists (without exception) who have struggled with this concept since the time of Hans J. Morgenthau.[4]

An even wider circle of theorists is involved in discussions of the category of national security. Heated attacks are mostly directed against the neorealists who represent two schools of thought, ordinarily called paradigms—structural neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. The attackers are sociologists whose mission is the "innovative unification of research in the areas of sociology and national security." Their views are presented in the monograph *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,* edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, one of the principal ideologues of the sociological approach.[5] To understand their charges against the neorealists, a few words are in order about those people's views.

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[4] For example, see Maruyama Masao, "Thought and Behavior" in *Modern Japanese Politics* (Oxford University Press, Tokyo, Oxford, New York, 1979), 268-89; K.Kaizer u. H.-P. Schwarz, Hrsg., *Weltpolitik. Strukturen—Akteure—Perspektiven* (Stuttgart: Klett-Gotta, 1985); and Hugh Ward, "Structural Power—A Contradiction in Terms?" *Political Studies* 35, no. 4 (1987): 593-610.

[5] Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

One of them is Kenneth Waltz, who belongs to the structural neorealists of the second wave (after Hans J. Morgenthau, George F. Kennan, Arnold Wolfers, and others). He identifies three distinctive characteristics in the international system of states: (1) It is decentralized; (2) the most important actors (states) are unitary and functionally undifferentiated; and (3) differences in the distribution of the capabilities of the most important states distinguish bipolar from multipolar state systems. (12)

The well-known theorist Robert O. Keohane is classified as a neoliberal institutionalist. He maintains that after the collapse of hegemony, international politics does not necessarily collapse into uncontrolled power politics that results in anarchy. The international order created in the period of hegemony has the capability to rectify the problems that provoke international anarchy. "The institutional infrastructure of a post-hegemonic system thus can facilitate the coordination of conflicting policies by lowering the transaction costs associated with cooperation." (13)

Sociologists accuse Keohane's theory of not explaining the category of interest, even though it does not deny its existence as an outside phenomenon. The category of interest is the sociologist's favorite hobbyhorse. This is recognized to a degree by Keohane himself: "Without a theory of interests, which requires analysis of domestic politics, no theory of international relations can be fully adequate. …Our weak current theories do not take us very far in understanding the behavior of the United States and European powers at the end of the Cold War. … More research will have to be undertaken at the level of the state, rather than the international system." (14)

According to P. Katzenstein, the sociologists' research paradigm contains a three-step analysis. "First, there is the specification of a set of constraints. Then comes the stipulation of a set of actors who are assumed to have certain kinds of interests. Finally, the behavior of the actors is observed, and that behavior is related to the constraining conditions in which these actors, with their assumed interests, find themselves." (ibid.)

All this balderdash, meaningless to the uninitiated, really is an exposition of certain elements of behaviorism as directed to the analysis

of security problems. Sociologists maintain that only on this basis can one capture such important factors as "prestige and reputation, which neorealists view as 'force effects' rather than as social attributions." (ibid.) In this connection they remember the well-known political economist Robert Gilpin. Katzenstein writes that though Gilpin, being a realist, does recognize sociological approaches, he falls back all the time on economic explanations. This is because for Gilpin "prestige" is the "functional equivalent to the concept of authority in domestic politics and has functional and moral grounding." "Gilpin," Katzenstein writes ironically, "asserts, but does not demonstrate, that 'ultimately' prestige rests on military or economic power." But he writes that "'prestige,' rather than power, is the everyday currency in international relations." (15)

If only American theorists knew Russian (I never met a single one who did), they would have discovered to their surprise that the concept of prestige and authority as a function of several variables was described by the Soviet systemic-economist A. V. Sergiev back in the 1970s and repeated by me in a book published in 1986.[6] Equally naïve is the tendency on the part of American sociologists to view the state as a "social organism" whose self-identification and norms affect national interests; these topics were widely discussed by Soviet political scientists in the 1970s and 1980s.[7]

Be that as it may, the sociological approach to the problem of national security through an analysis of the concept of national interests of the state as a social organism gained widespread acceptance, as evidenced by a monograph written by a group of English sociologists.[8] The practical creators of America's security policy prefer for the time

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6 R. Sh.-A. Aliev, *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1970s-80s (Theory and Practice)* (M.: Nauka, 1986), 284-85. [Aliev was my name when I lived in the Soviet Union.]

7 *International Relations, Politics and Personality. Annual of SPSA, 1975.* (M.: Nauka, 1976); *Contemporary political systems. Essays*. (M.: Nauka, 1978); E. Pozdnyakov, ed., *National Interests: Theory and Practice. Selected articles* (M.: IMEMO, 1991).

8 Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, eds., *The Origins of National Interests* (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1999).

being to rely on the neorealist approaches, including those of Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr (JTM).

The essence of their approach is not complicated and can be summarized as follows: Admitting the elasticity of the term "national security," JTM see a difference nonetheless between the volume of its content before and after World War II. The term itself, in its narrowest sense, means "defense." But prior to World War II, the policy of national security barely connected with foreign policy, or with economic, trade, and environmental policies. After World War II, parts of these three spheres overlapped each other, that is, became interconnected, though other segments of these blocks remained autonomous. (See figure on the next page.)

The overlapping parts have a name of their own, complex national security. This concept was formulated some time ago by the Japanese and played an official role in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[9] It is composed of three components: military security, economic security, and political security.



Few argue in principle with this approach (though some do argue; more about that in the corresponding chapter). More serious debates

[9] See Aliev, 148-164.

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